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 INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“War has no eyes” – Swahili Saying 
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Terrorism is a worldwide occurrence that in some way or other, affects every individual across 
the planet. Whether it is the increased security protocols that delay border crossings and travel, 
or the fear of an attack, or being the recipient of a change of status quo caused by terrorism, 
everyone is affected. Thus, it is important to examine terrorism when writing a dissertation in the 
scope of international relations, as it will have bearing on countless people. However, terrorism 
covers a vast array of themes; hence this paper will take on a more limited focus. 
This dissertation will look at the effects that the quality of governance has on the rise and 
development of terrorism in Africa. The quality of governance in Africa has long been regarded 
as substandard, with many countries being plagued by leadership negligence dating back to the 
colonial period and continuing today. The case studies that this paper will concentrate on are the 
East African country of Somalia, and the West African nation of Nigeria. Each case study will 
consider a number of measures put in place in order to reign in the scope of terrorism in Africa: 
each country is home to their own domestic terrorist organisation, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram 
respectively. The two countries represent two interesting points on the quality of governance 
spectrum, a collapsed state (Somalia) and a dysfunctional state (Nigeria). These two groups have 
garnered greater international prominence in recent years because of their actions and targets. 
Terrorism, both international and in Africa, will be defined in the context of understanding the 
concepts of a failed and dysfunctional state. It will prove important to identify the differences 
between the two in order to appreciate how each impacts both the creation and the sustainability 
of their respective terrorist organisations. Therefore, a comparison made between both countries, 
and their sectarian groups, will be made to identify just how important a government, and its 
responses to the groups, is to their development and growth. 
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The first chapter, Terrorism as a Global Phenomenon, will focus on the notion of terrorism. The 
primary goal of the chapter is to attempt to define what “terrorism” is. Thereafter, the chapter 
will look at the impact of the global occurrence of international and domestic exploits of 
terrorism around the world. Finally, in keeping with the African case studies of Nigeria and 
Somalia, Chapter 1A will look at terrorism on the African continent. It is important to note when 
referring to “international terrorism” that it is not to say that this does not impact on Africa, but 
rather to identify that this is terrorism committed either by an organisation in a country foreign to 
its creation, or a foreign country’s representatives or institutions attacked in a different country.  
 
Chapter 1B, will focus on other definitions. Understanding State Collapse vs. State Dysfunction 
will look at identifying the spectrum along which the quality of a state is categorized. In order to 
understand what a collapsed or dysfunctional state is, it is important to first ascertain what a 
reasonable or good nation-state is. Chapter 1B makes a comparison between the two states in the 
spheres of economics, politics, and society. The significance in defining such parameters of each 
state will help in assessing the socio-economic and political situations in the two case studies, as 
Somalia is widely considered a collapsed or failed state, and Nigeria is considered dysfunctional. 
The ensuing chapters will attempt to explain why these distinctions are made. 
 
Chapter 2, Somalia and al-Shabaab, looks at the country of Somalia as a whole. The history and 
makeup of the country are addressed first, while the suffering that the country sustained through 
leadership mismanagement and corruption are explained in an attempt to outline the political 
background of a more present day understanding of Somali politics. This paper will posit that it 
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is this present day version of socio-economics and politics that brought about the environment 
conducive to the establishment of a terrorist organisation. In attempting to describe the socio-
economic and political turmoil in Somalia the reasons behind Somalia being considered one of 
the few collapsed states in the world will be better understood. It was this environment into 
which al-Shabaab grew, out of an initially supported Islamic movement, and Chapter 2 goes into 
great detail to establish the origin and ideology of the sectarian group. The rise and actions, in 
this case, against foreign nations, is detailed to provide a better understanding of the inner 
mechanisms of the terrorist organisation. The chapter ends with a stark reminder of the strength 
and targets of al-Shabaab. 
 
The penultimate chapter, Chapter 3, deals with the second case study of this dissertation. This 
chapter, Nigeria and Boko Haram, follows a very similar structure to that of Chapter 2. In this 
chapter the history of Nigeria under colonial, civil and military rule is outlined. The political 
situation, which oscillated between civilian and military decree, is established and this shows the 
diminished capabilities of the country’s leaders to govern effectively. It is this ineffective 
leadership, as well as the exploitation by this leadership of the natural resources revenue, in 
particular its oil reserves, which have given Nigeria the label of being dysfunctional. This 
chapter looks at the socio-economic and political situation in Nigeria, and establishes the reasons 
for the dysfunctional classification. Similarly, once the socio-economic and political factors are 
explained, the formation of Boko Haram is cited. Most commentators on Nigeria and Boko 
Haram have linked the group’s origin to the Maitatsine Uprisings in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
thus the chapter delves briefly into them. The chapter ends with the attempts made by 
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government to deal with the radical Islamist group, and portrays the notion that the government’s 
policy of fighting fire with fire might not necessarily be working.  
 
The final chapter of the dissertation is Chapter 4, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram: Products of 
Dysfunction and Collapse?, will look at how each sectarian group was established and developed 
under their respective governments in an attempt to arrive at a conclusion as to whether or not 
the quality of government influences the rise and development of a terrorist organisation. The 
chapter will first address the similarities in history, as well as socio-economic and political 
factors. The differences between the two groups will also be established to provide a fair 
reflection of the situation on the ground in either country. The paper will consider how the 
governments have responded to their terrorist groups, and whether or not these responses have 
been effective. It is the belief that the responses can demonstrate the effectiveness, and thus the 
quality, of the government.  
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CHAPTER 1A: 
TERRORISM AS A GLOBAL 
PHENOMENON 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“If you can’t resolve your problems in peace, you can’t resolve them with war” – Somali Proverb 
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The events of 11th September 2001 have come to be regarded as a turning point in the 
international awareness of terrorism, but terrorism as a global phenomenon was evident for 
several years before that.1 A straightforward description and understanding of terrorism appears 
to be relatively difficult but simplistically it is the unlawful or threatened use of violence to 
intimidate. However, the motives, targets and the way in which the practice of violence is used 
are less simplistic. This definition does appear to reflect too general and sweeping a point of 
view. Thus, this chapter will attempt to define terrorism from both a global and an African 
perspective, and determine the preconditions for the existence of terrorism. As a final point, the 
impact that terrorism has on the African continent will be identified.  
 
DEFINING TERRORISM 
One of the most fundamental issues faced by the international community and academia alike is 
the difficulty in finding an agreed-upon definition of terrorism.2 A study conducted in 1988 
counted as many as 109 definitions of terrorism that covered a total of 22 different definitional 
elements.3 Throughout all these differing explanations, terrorism expert Walter Laqueur found 
that the only common theme was that “terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence”.4 
However, as Jeffrey Record (2003) points out, terrorism is hardly the only enterprise involving 
these attributes – war and coercive diplomacy do too. Condemning all terrorism as evil strips the 
1 Cilliers, J., “Terrorism and Africa” in African Security Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2003, p. 91. Retrieved from 
http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/ASR/12No4/Cilliers.pdf.  
2 Lawless, M.: Terrorism: An International Crime? National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, 
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/05-lawless-eng.asp, 29 November 2006, p. 1. 
3Record, J.: “Bounding the Global War on Terrorism” in Strategic Studies Institute, December 2003, p. 6. Retrieved 
from   
http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=SNJwKu7LIZUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR1&dq=terrorism+as+a+global+p
henomenon&ots=GcjdFFIgQS&sig=LucPgHXwIOv-
OClCJYVcV75QSjk#v=onepage&q=terrorism%20as%20a%20global%20phenomenon&f=false.  
4 Loc cit.  
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political context behind the act and ignores the circumstance behind the “militarily helpless”.5 C. 
E. Callwell (1896) labelled terrorism as “a form of irregular warfare or small war”, which he 
underscored as “a weapon used by the weak against a conventional enemy that cannot be 
defeated on his own terms”.6 Laqueur furthers argues that morality is involved in defining 
terrorism. He posits the idea that terrorism can be used to overthrow a brutal authoritarian 
leadership to safeguard the civilian population. This is not to condone terrorism, but rather to 
identify that there is a largely grey area in understanding the concept.  
 
The most basic of definitions of terrorism comes from a presentation made by Lawless (2006) 
where he identified three distinct elements: violence, a non-state actor, and a political purpose.7 
Acknowledging these three elements, the definition of terrorism becomes “the unlawful threat or 
act of violence committed for a political purpose by a non-state actor”. Admittedly, this 
definition does not identify state sponsored violence as potentially amounting to terrorism. In a 
number of cases, such as Stalinist Russia and Mao’s China, the state used violence for political 
gain. Thus, Lawless’ definition would require an amendment to include the state as a possible 
terrorist entity.  
 
Ohuoha and Ezirim provide this definition: 
“Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group 
to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure 
5 Ibid. p. 8. 
6 Loc cit.  
7 Lawless, M. Op Cit. p. 1. 
Page 8 of 234 
 
                                                            
in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of 
the individual or group behind such violent acts. Their demands or expectations may be for a 
change in status quo in terms of the political, economic, ideological, religious or social order 
within the affected state, or for a change in the (in)actions or policies of the affected state in 
relation to its interaction with (an)other group(s) or states.”8 
 
This is a strong and wide reaching definition of terrorism from a holistic point-of-view, as it 
appears to encompass all types of terrorist acts and all the motivations behind the attacks. 
However, the strength of its detail is a double-edged sword as it can be seen as somewhat long-
winded.  
 
Terrorism, by its nature, is organised and planned behaviour. Many terrorist organisations have 
set up networks of cells and supporters throughout the regions in which they operate. For 
example, Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Southeast Asia has networks operating in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia.9 Training camps are established across the region for 
terrorists to acquire the skills and weaponry needed to carry out their attacks. The fact that many 
attacks have been foiled by authorities, points to the planned nature of the terrorist organisation. 
Acts of terrorism, in most cases, do not occur as random events carried out spontaneously. For 
8 Onuoha, F. & Erizim, G. “Terrorism” and Transnational Organised Crime in Western Africa, 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/06/2013624102946689517.html, 24 June 2013, p. 1. 
9 Lloyd’s: Terrorism in Asia: What Does it Mean for Business?, Lloyd’s, 
http://www.lloyds.com/~/media/Lloyds/Reports/360/360%20Terrorism%20Reports/TerrorisminAsia_final.pdf, p. 8. 
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example, a JI terrorist cell was arrested in Singapore in 2001 when it became evident the group 
was planning an attack on Western diplomats using coordinated truck bombings.10  
 
The phrase “one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” has been repeated ad nauseam 
when attempting to define and/or justify the actions of a terrorist. The definition of a “terrorist” 
has to differ from that of a legitimate “freedom fighter”. The fundamental difference between 
these two entities is their type of target: for the most part, the terrorist is indiscriminate in 
targeting civilian populations, whereas the freedom fighter generally targets the state and 
institutions with whom he/she is in conflict.11 
 
Terrorism has also been broadly defined as “politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”.12 Across the numerous 
possible definitions of terrorism, there appears to be one common theme: political motivation. 
However, there is another trend which appears to be an even greater motivation for numerous 
terrorist organisations across the globe: religious motivation. The most notorious and globally 
recognised group in terms of religious motivation would be al-Qaeda, who, it is argued, misuse 
Islamic principles to validate their activities.  
Religiously motivated terrorism is arguably the largest terrorism threat today. Although 
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions have given rise to their own forms of 
10 Ibid.  
11 Lawless, M. Op Cit. p. 1. 
12 Perl, R.: International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, CRS Report for Congress, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33600.pdf, January 2007, p. 31. 
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extremism, it is Islamic groups that have now come to the forefront.13 It is not necessarily the 
conservative and orthodox believers that turn to violence, but rather extremists that manipulate 
religion and religious precepts to justify their actions. In a number of African countries, Islam 
has been adopted as the religion of the oppressed against the corrupt and often authoritarian 
elite.14 The precepts of Islam may hold a particular appeal for the dispossessed masses of Third 
World countries that are struggling to find meaning in their lives at a time of great cultural and 
economic upheaval.15 Although the majority of Muslims understand the peaceful, tolerant and 
good moral values that Islam preaches, the religion has been manipulated by fundamentalists. 
Islam appears to be on the defensive in a battle against its own militant extremists that misuse 
Islamic ideologies to justify their behaviour. Botha and Solomon (2005) identify that Islamic 
groups that adopt militaristic and violent behaviour represent a small minority within Africa. 
However, that minority appears to be increasing in both size and effect, and the majority appears 
to remain silent.16  
 
Another important facet of terrorism, which appears often to be ignored, is that terrorism seeks to 
induce retaliation.17 This can be seen as a way to further increase the tension on the original 
precondition that lead to terrorism. The understanding is that a single terrorist act does not have 
the power to fully change the system to gain the organisation more credibility. The terrorist relies 
13 Zulman, A., The History of Terrorism, http://terrorism.about.com/od/whatisterroris1/p/Terrorism.htm, p. 1. 
14 Botha, A. & Solomon H.: Terrorism in Africa, Centre for International Political Studies, 
http://www.cips.up.ac.za/files/pdf/uafspublications/TERRORISM%2520IN%2520AFRICA.pdf, 2005, p. 1.  
15 Loc cit.  
16 Ibid. p. 2. 
17 Cilliers, J. Op Cit. p. 92. 
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on human nature that the authority will react in such a manner that would fuel the flame of 
dissatisfaction and hatred, resulting in a spiral effect.18 
Although terrorism is organised and planned, there has been a more modern trend in terrorism, 
which appears to be a more loosely organised, self-financed, international network of terrorists.19 
In many cases it is through organised crime that these networks of terrorists have become self-
financed, and have not been as reliant on foreign financiers. For example, in the Sahel region20, 
terrorist groups have been linked with illegal activities such as drugs or human trafficking, and 
have been closely associated with organised crime.21 Their role is often to ensure safe passage 
for the illegal smuggling convoys across the Sahara desert. The Sahelian terrorist groups also fit 
into the loosely organised network of terrorists, as they lack compact structure. The groups form 
umbrella organisations for sub-groups that appear to have distinct strategies and objectives.22 
Thus, there appears to be a grey area when it comes to defining a terrorist group and their 
motives, support and structure.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, terrorism will be defined as the threat or use of violence against 
civilians or the state to achieve political or religious objectives. In the two case studies that will 
be addressed, radical Islamic terrorism will be defined as the threat or use of violence to bring 
about regime charge and / or to implement fanatical Islamic principles. 
 
18 Loc cit.  
19 Perl, R. Op Cit. p. 1. 
20 The Sahel region is the semiarid region of western and north-central Africa extending from Senegal eastwards to 
Sudan. 
21 Carbonari, A.: The Sahel: The Belt of Instability, Woodrow Wilson Centre Report, p. 39. 
22 Ibid. p. 5. 
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CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS OF TERRORISM 
Often labelled as the “root causes” of terrorism, this paper will posit that identifying the 
preconditions present in a country results in a better understanding of the situation. Whereas, root 
causes portrays the idea that there was no choice but to turn to violent extremism, the existence 
of preconditions embraces the notion that these assisted in paving the way towards extremism.  
 
Tore Bjorgo (2005) distinguishes the causes of terrorism as structural, facilitative, motivational 
and triggering causes.23 Structural causes are those such as rapid modernization, globalization, 
increasing individualism with rootlessness, relative deprivation etc. For facilitative causes, he 
gives examples of the evolution of modern mass media, transportation, weapons technology, 
weak state control etc. As motivational causes, Bjorgo explains the actual grievances people 
experience at a personal level. These are the causes that actually motivate people to act. Bjorgo 
describes triggering causes as being the direct precipitators of terrorist acts, such as political 
calamity, an outrageous act committed by the “enemy,” or some other events that call for 
revenge.24 
 
The growth of radicalism in Africa can be viewed as a direct result of socio-political turmoil that 
developed from poor socio-economic conditions, which have plagued the continent ever since 
independence.  
23 Asan, A.: “The Root Causes of Terrorism”, Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean, 
http://cdn02.abakushost.com/pam/downloads/REP-2010-1-TERR_EN%5B2%5D.pdf, October 2010, p. 2. 
24 Ibid. p. 2. 
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The political behaviour of people in the majority of African states is distinctly correlated with the 
continent’s material poverty. The zero-sum nature25 of the struggle for economic resources 
compels would-be political leaders to obtain material benefits in order to wield influence over 
followers and competitors. This is done in most cases through armed and violent means.26 
Furthermore, the abuse of political power in terms of a generalised system of patrimony and high 
levels of government inefficiency and corruption has resulted in a lack of confidence in 
governments by their populations. Neo-patrimonial regimes have demonstrated little ambition in 
development or state security that protects the whole population, instead of only a certain part. 
Additionally, these governments are usually militarily dominated and use repressive measures to 
consolidate their hold on power27. This has created the perfect environment for discontent to 
fester and assists the growth of rebellious sentiments.  
In Kenya, it was not governmental power abuse but rather government failure through the lack of 
effective governance practices that resulted in the decline of that country’s economy. The failure 
of the country’s agricultural sector as well as the decline in tourism resulted in economic 
collapse, which created a fertile environment for extremism.28 Although this is but one example, 
this situation can be seen as a microcosm of many African countries and how their failure to 
overcome the unequal situation post-independence provided the prospect for organisations to 
become more radical in their personal strive for gain.  
 
25 The zero-sum game is a situation in which one person’s gain is equivalent to another’s loss, so the net change in 
wealth or benefit is zero. 
26 Sierra Leone, Liberia and a number of other African countries have had civil wars fueled by the greed of leaders 
for diamonds to finance their causes. The acquisition of these diamonds has been carried out through violence. 
27 Botha, A. & Solomon, H,. Op Cit, p. 6. 
28 Ibid, p. 17. 
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Botha and Solomon (2005) contend that the development of democracy and political pluralism 
have enabled radical Islamic groups to function openly through integration into the political 
system – however only after concealing their illegal behaviour.29 Evidence shows that despite 
governments becoming more democratic, the banning of Islamic organisations has occurred as 
the groups gain prominence. The government’s reason behind this behaviour was to eradicate the 
extremist groups and align Islamic party candidates with government in order to reduce the 
possibility of government being targeted by Islamic groups for supposed links to the West.30 
 
In Eastern Africa, the development of radical Islamic groups came about because of social 
tumult on the part of the Muslim minority that experienced feelings of discrimination, 
marginalisation and systematic dispossession.31  
 
TERRORISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL SPECTACLE 
International terrorism became most prominent in the late 1960s.32 The distinction between 
domestic or international terrorism refers not to where the terrorist act takes place but rather to 
the origin of the individuals or groups responsible for it.33 Using this definition, international 
terrorism in Africa has been on the increase for many years. The most prominent international 
terrorist acts on African soil would be the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998, which are dealt with in greater detail later in this chapter.  
29 Both, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 17. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Zulman, A. Op Cit, p. 1. 
33 Guadalupe-Blanco River Trust: Terrorism, Guadalupe-Blanco River Trust, 
http://www.gbra.org/documents/hazardmitigation/update/Section18-Terrorism.pdf, p. 1. 
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Up until the 1980s, terrorist organisations were close-knit, disciplined groups that were often 
funded by foreign powers. In their place, there have arisen larger more amorphous groups within 
which people coalesce at a more local and religiously motivated level.34 With this in mind, the 
threat posed by a number of Jihadist groups appears to lack a direct connection to larger Islamic 
groups such as al-Qaeda.35 There is the possibility, however, that these more localised radical 
groups acquired training and funding through al-Qaeda, and are inspired by them.  
To understand the global phenomenon of terrorism, one must look at the scope of terrorism. 
Probably the most recognisable terrorist organisation is that of al-Qaeda (AQ), previously under 
the leadership of Osama bin Laden, and more recently Ayman al-Zawahiri.36 Al-Qaeda has 
largely been based in the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with affiliates as far as South 
Asia and Africa. With the Western world being led by the United States in its “War on Terror,” 
many high ranking members of Al-Qaeda have been removed. This has turned out to be 
somewhat of a double-edged sword for the War on Terror because as the main body of al-Qaeda 
is weakened through leadership loss, groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have become stronger in recent times.37 It is 
important to note that up until 2006 / 2007, AQIM was previously known as the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (Known by its French acronym GSPC).38 Thus, AQIM was not newly 
established but morphed from an already established, financed and equipped organisation. In 
Yemen, security forces have been battling AQAP in its strongholds based in the south of the 
34 Cilliers, J. Op Cit. p. 94. 
35 Perl, R. Op Cit, p. 8. 
36 Bureau of Counterterrorism: Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, United States Department of State Publication, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf, May 2013, p. 5. 
37 Ibid. p. 5. 
38 Goita, M.: “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy”, in Africa Security 
Brief, No. 11, February 2011, p. 2. Retrieved from http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/Africa-Security-Brief/ASB-
11.pdf. 
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country, which has led the terrorist network to retaliate against government targets and civilians 
in a campaign of bombings and targeted assassinations.39 
 
Another terrorist organisation known as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) was responsible for the 2008 
Mumbai attacks, which left 166 people dead,40 and it continues to pose a serious threat to the 
region’s stability.41 LeT has known training bases in Manshra, Thatta and Muzzafarabad, all of 
which are based in Pakistan. Despite numerous pledges from the Pakistani government, LeT are 
still operating on its soil and, according to intelligence officers and current and former members 
of the group, the group is largely intact and determined to strike India again.42 The fact that only 
10 members were involved in the deadly Mumbai attacks, speaks to the possibility of the group 
mobilising rapidly for elaborate attacks that require few resources. The group has achieved 
underground popularity within Pakistan and has received the backing of numerous former 
officials of Pakistan’s military and intelligence enterprises.43 Thus, despite attacks to abolish the 
terrorist group, it still remains, and it still has the potential for further attacks. This is one facet of 
the global phenomenon that is international terrorism.  
Northern Ireland has been home to its own brand of terrorism with the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA). The IRA was formed in response to Ireland’s goal of national independence from Great 
39 Bureau of Counterterrorism. Op Cit, p. 5. 
40 Nelson, D. Pakistan Details how Lashkar-e-Taiba 2008 Mumbai Attack Gunmen were Trained, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9672494/Pakistan-details-how-Lashkar-e-Taiba-2008-
Mumbai-attack-gunmen-were-trained.html, 12 November 2012, p. 1. 
41 Bureau of Counterterrorism. Op Cit, p. 5.  
42 Polgreen, L. & Mekhennet, S., Militant Network is intact Long After Mumbai Siege, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/asia/30mumbai.html?ref=lashkaretaiba&_r=0, 29 September 2009, p. 1. 
43 Loc cit. 
Page 17 of 234 
 
                                                            
Britain.44 In operation from 1969 to around 1997, the IRA splintered into a number of different 
groups who all assumed the name, the IRA. The most notable terrorist attack by the IRA has 
been infamously labelled as “Bloody Friday”, where in Belfast, 1972, a series of as many as 22 
bombs were detonated in just over an hour.45 Although only 9 people were killed, and 130 
injured, the event has left a stain on the relationship between Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
Basque separatists known by the acronym ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna – translated to Basque 
homeland and freedom) have clashed on numerous occasions with the Spanish government.46 
Since the 1960s when ETA started its armed operations, as many as 800 people have been killed. 
The main targets for ETA have been government and security services institutions, with 
bombings and assassinations the main modus operandi.47 Although in more recent times, since a 
failed ceasefire in 2006 was terminated48, ETA has not been as active as it was, the government 
is still attempting to completely destroy the terrorist organisation.  
 
South America, and in particular Argentina, has not escaped terrorism either. In 1992 the Israeli 
Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed leaving 29 people dead.49 Again in 1994, the bombing of 
the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association (AMIA) community centre killed 85 people and left 
44 Zulman, A., IRA (Irish Republican Army)-Guide to the IRA, 
http://terrorism.about.com/od/groupsleader1/p/IRA.htm, p. 1. 
45 Loc cit. 
46 Reuters, Spain’s Rejection of Talks will Delay Political Resolution: ETA, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/26/us-spain-eta-idUSBRE92P11Y20130326, 26 March 2013, p. 1. 
47 START: Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=31, p. 1. 
48 Loc cit. 
49 BBC News, Argentina Marks 1994 Bomb Attack, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5190892.stm, 18 July 2006, 
p. 1. 
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300 wounded. In both incidents, no one claimed responsibility for the attacks. An Argentine 
prosecutor stated that a Hezbollah terrorist, Ibrahim Hussein Berro, had been behind the AMIA 
bombing, although the Iran-supported terrorist organisation denies the claim.50 Argentine 
prosecutor Alberto Nisman outlined a number of Iran-linked intelligence bases located in more 
than half a dozen South American countries.51 This has fuelled the accusation that Iran was the 
mastermind behind the AMIA terrorist attack. The targeting of Western, Israeli and Jewish 
targets in South America appear to be at the top of the agenda for terrorists in the region. 
On April 19, 1995, a truck-bomb was detonated outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City, killing 168 people and leaving hundreds more injured.52 The attack, known as 
the worst terrorist attack to take place on United States’ soil before 9/11, was perpetrated by 
radical right-wing survivalist group members Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols.53 The 
motive behind the Oklahoma bombing was not a religious one – rather it has been alleged that it 
was in retaliation for a siege where 82 members of the Branch Davidian cult died.54 Whether or 
not this is accurate is debatable, but what is clear is that these terrorists, who called themselves 
“patriots”, were not religious extremists but domestic anti-government fundamentalists.55 
 
50 Loc cit. 
51 TheTower.org, 500 Page Indictment Details Vast Iranian Terror Network Throughout Argentina, South America, 
http://www.thetower.org/500-page-indictment-details-vast-iranian-terror-network-throughout-argentina-south-
america/, 30 May 2013, p. 1.  
52 History, Oklahoma City Bombing, http://www.history.com/topics/oklahoma-city-bombing, p. 1. 
53 Loc cit. 
54 BBC News, 1995: Many Feared Dead in Oklahoma Bombing, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/19/newsid_2733000/2733321.stm, p. 1. 
55 Vulliamy, E., Oklahoma: The Day Homegrown Terror hit America, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/11/oklahoma-bombing-15-years-on, 11 April 2010, p. 1. 
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The most publicised and well known terrorist attack was on September 11, 2001, with the attack 
on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon.56 Militants linked to the radical Islamic terrorist 
network al-Qaeda hijacked aeroplanes and crashed them into the World Trade Centre in New 
York, the Pentagon just outside Washington D.C., and another crashed into a field in 
Pennsylvania.57 This attack, which subsequently led to the War on Terror and infamous 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, was religious in motivation.  
 
TERRORISM IN AFRICA 
Global terrorism appeared to bypass Africa in terms of international terrorist attacks. With the 
majority of international terrorist organisations targeting the Western world, Africa seemed to be 
spared. However, between 1995 and 2001, the continent recorded 194 acts of terrorism resulting 
in 5932 casualties. Sub-national or even state-led terrorism has become a long-standing feature in 
Africa. Terrorism in Africa is largely on a domestic level, with many governments, and anti-
government movements, relying on violence and terror to rule or usurp power. 58 
 
Terrorism in Africa is growing exponentially due to the continent being home to both a 
facilitating and target-rich environment for terrorists that are seeking global influence.59 The 
56 “Oklahoma City Bombing” Op Cit. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Cilliers, J. Op Cit, p. 93. 
59 Ibid, p. 91. 
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continent’s counter-terrorism and police intelligence services are notoriously weak60, which 
facilitates the lack of risk for terrorist organisations to operate.  
Humanitarian workers, who are seemingly ever present in poverty-stricken African countries, are 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks, insofar as there would be a greater recognition by the international 
community when these soft targets are attacked.61 There has been an increase in attacks directed 
at humanitarian representatives in a number of African countries, such as Somalia where in 2001 
gunmen killed six and wounded several members of the World Food Program. In the same year 
11 people were killed, with 40 more wounded, when a Medecins Sans Frontieres facility was 
attacked.62 It appears that these vulnerable targets send the most powerful message to the 
international community that localised extremists will do everything in their power in their 
attempts to remove foreign actors from their countries. In this way, these acts of terrorism in 
Africa attract greater global attention as it is both the home country as well as the foreign nation 
that is victim to the attacks. It is these targets, as well as international corporations or 
organisations that have facilities in Africa, that are symbolically attacked as a way to hit at the 
core of the international community. In many oil producing states, foreign firms, which are 
usually Western world-owned are high value targets for terrorists.  
 
A number of African states are on the brink of collapse or dysfunctional, and this provides a free-
zone63 for many illegal organisations to operate in.64 These free-zones provide rebel and terrorist 
60 Herbst, J. & Mills, G., “Africa, Terrorism and AFRICOM” in Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 152, No. 2, 
April 2007. Retrieved from http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.co.za/files/AFRICOM-Rusi.pdf, p. 40.   
61 Cilliers, J. Op Cit, p. 99. 
62 Loc Cit. 
63 Examples of dysfunctional or failed, or even collapsed states include: Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan, 
amongst others. 
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movements with easy access to natural resources and arms. The natural resources, such as 
diamonds, have purportedly been used by al-Qaeda to fund their operations.65 
 
Africa has become a breeding ground for continental and global terrorists. Mills and Herbst 
(2007) state that “Africa could be the source of considerable international terrorism, or at least 
provide sanctuary for those engaged in nefarious acts against other nations.”66 The presence of 
marginalised youths who are angry at their plight provides fertile grounds for recruitment into 
terrorist organisations. With such a large number of people feeling ostracized and suffering under 
poverty-stricken circumstances, the association to terrorist organisations that appear to provide a 
way out of poverty looks appealing. The vast expanses of ungoverned territories as well as the 
porous borders became topics of interest for the idea of terrorist sanctuaries.67 
However, despite the fact that Africa may be the perfect ground for terrorist organisations to 
recruit members, it also, paradoxically, suffers from circumstances that prevent these 
organisations from recruiting. The biggest issue for Africans, and terrorist organisations, is the 
vast number of poorly educated people.68 Indeed these individuals could provide terrorist 
organisations with foot soldiers, but terrorist organisations that are looking to spread to a global 
level are more interested in better educated individuals that could blend into Western societies.  
64 Ibid, p. 100. 
65 Jones, L., Al-Qaeda ‘Traded Blood Diamonds’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2775763.stm, 20 February 2003, 
p. 1. 
66 Herbst, J. & Mills, G. Op Cit, p. 40. 
67 Ibid, p. 43. 
68 Ibid, p. 41. 
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Mills and Herbst (2007) point out that completely ungovernable spaces are not wholly ideal for 
terrorist organisations.69 International terrorists require communication and transport systems 
that allow them to do their work, as well as a substantial population in which to hide and recruit. 
This could be the reason that South Africa is, allegedly, becoming a locale of importance for al-
Qaeda. Terrorist attacks, although not on a global scale, have taken place in the country. People 
Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) was blamed for attacks, which took place between 
1998 – 2000.70 However, it has been reported that al-Qaeda has set up training camps in South 
Africa in recent years71, and as South Africa is one of the better governed countries on the 
continent, it justifies Mills and Herbst assessment of international terrorists groups needing 
adequate communication, transport and banking systems. 
The more controversial determinant of terrorism in Africa is the presence of Islamic populations 
within Africa.72 In many African countries, Islam has been posited as the religion of the 
oppressed in the fight against corrupt elites. Marginalised and disillusioned Africans have found 
the preaching of Islam to hold particular appeal in a time where cultural identity is changing.73 
However, despite the majority of Muslims in Africa being moderate in their belief and Islam 
preaching peace, the religion has been deceptive in its spread. More radical Islam followers have 
been known to provide “behind-the-scenes” supply of finance and weaponry, as well as advisors 
from Middle Eastern countries to African groups since at least 1990.74 As a result of the spread 
of a more radical approach to Islam, many African governments are struggling to control the 
69 Ibid, p. 42. 
70 Solomon, H.: “Researching Terrorism in South Africa: More Questions than Answers”, in Scientia Militaria South 
African Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2012, p. 2. 
71 News24, Al-Qaeda training camps in South Africa, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Al-Qaeda-
training-camps-in-SA-report-20130513, 13 May 2013, p. 1. 
72 Herbst, J. & Mills, G. Op Cit, p. 42. 
73 Botha, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 1. 
74 Ibid, p. 2. 
Page 23 of 234 
 
                                                            
more violent approach to achieving a more “Islamic” government, society and rule of law. Botha 
and Solomon (2005) have pointed out that even in countries where there is little prospect of 
Islam becoming the country and government’s dominant rule, Islamic extremists still present a 
threat to the culture and ethnic behaviour of the country.  
An extreme example of Islam being used to bring about a more radical Islamic or Sharia 
government and society can be seen in Darfur in Sudan. Sudan’s policy in the region has been 
that of “Arabization” or “Islamization”.75 The area has never been ethnically homogenous, with 
non-Arab black Africans from a variety of tribes. The central government of Sudan, Khartoum, 
then favoured Islamic followers in the region and exploited the non-Arab Africans, which 
resulted in violent resistance. African rebels justify their uprising because they are 
disenfranchised, and Khartoum has responded with government-backed Arab militia to combat 
these insurgences.76 The repeated fighting and numerous human rights abuses by both sides has 
resulted in what is known by the United Nations and United States as the “world’s worst 
humanitarian crisis” or “genocide.”77  
 
A number of African governments and global security organisations have labelled Islamic 
military groups as being among the greatest threats to their security.78 Although the number of 
Islamic military groups that misuse Islamic principles is relatively small, it is an ever growing 
situation within Africa. This current trend is found to be more prolific in the Northern African 
75 Quach, T.: The Crisis in Darfur: An Analysis of its Origins and Storylines, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12242004-143603/unrestricted/tquachmajorpaper.pdf, 2004, 
p. 1. 
76 Ibid, p. 12. 
77 Ibid, p. 1. 
78 Botha, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 2.  
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region, where the majority of the population is Muslim, in contrast to sub-Saharan Africa where 
the population is predominantly non-Muslim.79  
 
Terrorism in Africa differs from other global incidences of terrorism not only in targets, but also 
in modus operandi. In contrast to the more common modus operandi of terrorist groups in 
Europe, the Middle East and South East Asia, the use of explosives in Africa is not the primary 
form of attack. In Africa the vast majority of terrorist attacks have been carried out through the 
use of firearms.80 From 1990 – 2001, 47% of all terrorist attacks were shootings. 81 One of the 
most significant contributing factors to this fact, and general instability across the continent, is 
the flow of illegal firearms stockpiled from the numerous inter- and intra-state conflicts. 
Similarly to the lack of effective counterterrorism intelligence in Africa, the majority of countries 
lack the resources necessary to implement successful disarmament, control over illegal weapons 
and border control measures that could prevent the spread of illegal firearms and thus reduce 
terrorist groups’ access to them. 
 
IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA 
The impact of terrorism across the African continent can be seen in two lights: the ‘direct costs’ 
in terms of damage to infrastructure, and the ‘indirect costs’ in terms of withdrawal of 
investments and decline in tourism. According to Botha and Solomon (2005), the impact cannot 
79 Ibid, p. 3. 
80 Ibid, p. 18. 
81 Ibid, p. 19.  
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be accurately calculated.82 It is through these two elements that the following subparagraphs will 
attempt to outline the impact terrorism has had across the African continent.  
 
The impact of terrorism in Africa has diminished the continent’s global appeal. According to 
Jessica Piombo (2007) at the Centre for Contemporary Conflict, the image of Africa is that of 
multiple lawless and stateless areas that are ideal sanctuaries for terrorists.83 Recruitment is easy, 
as victims of warlords and authoritarian governments dispossess their populations, and Islamic 
militant groups infiltrate these communities to recruit the new generation of suicide bombers84 
that are keen to strike at the Western world. Whether or not this image is truthful, the stain on the 
African global opinion cannot be understated.  
Botha and Solomon (2005) identify that the effect terrorism has on the African continent can be 
categorised into two distinctive groups, targets and agents: One where African countries were 
targets of acts of terrorism, and the other where African nationals were the terrorists in other 
countries.85 The US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) align with the first 
category, as two countries in Africa became the targets, or victims, of acts of terrorism. Although 
the bombings targeted a foreign entity, it was still on African soil. African agents of terrorism 
can be seen in many regional terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or even 
al-Shabaab. The latter, which is based in Somalia, has carried out attacks in neighbouring 
82 Ibid, p. 4. 
83 Piombo, J. “Terrorism and US Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview”, in Strategic Insights, Iss. 1, 
January 2007, p. 1. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA520353.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Botha, A. & Solomon, H., Op Cit, p. 20. 
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Kenya86, and it has been reported that there is al-Shabaab activity in other neighbouring 
countries. Thus, it is important to note that terrorism in Africa is twofold, and neither the 
continent nor its population is isolated from the notion of terrorism.  
Terrorism can impose economic costs on a targeted country in a range of ways. Terrorism can 
negatively affect foreign direct investments (FDIs), destroy infrastructure, redirect public funds 
into security, or limit and negate trade.87 Terrorism has the potential to enhance uncertainty 
within a country or region, which limits FDIs and diverts these investments to safer venues.88 
Costs which are lost due to terrorism can be seen as direct costs, which refer to the immediate 
losses from terrorist attacks including damage to goods and infrastructure, and the value of lives 
or injuries. Indirect costs are subsequent costs borne from the terrorist attack, such as greater 
security costs, greater compensation in high-risk areas, and on a macro-level, reduced growth in 
gross domestic product (GDP), lost FDIs, and increased inflation and unemployment.89  
Terrorism in Africa, using Nigeria as the example, has damaged investors’ confidence and sent 
the economy into a decline.90 The major threat to security provides consumers and investors with 
little confidence that a country can maintain a semblance of order and growth, which are vital 
when trying to obtain FDIs. Additionally, thousands of man-hours of productivity have been lost 
86 Stewart, S.: Al Shabaab’s Threat to Kenya, Stratfor Global Intelligence, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/al-
shabaabs-threat-kenya, April 2012, p. 1. 
87 Enders, W. & Sandler, T., “Economic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing Countries”, in 
Keefer, P. & Loayza, N. (eds): Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, Cambridge, New York, 
2008, p. 18, Retrieved from http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=tzQobMX-
nNAC&oi=fnd&pg=PA17&dq=impact+of+terrorism+in+africa+trade&ots=wFk1bjqWlj&sig=pczk4EaV1i7qthXW
DHNRMyAShJg#v=onepage&q=impact%20of%20terrorism%20in%20africa%20trade&f=false.  
88 Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T.: The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic Terrorism on Growth in Africa, 
CREATE Homeland Security Centre, 
http://research.create.usc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=published_papers, January 2010, p. 1. 
89 Enders, W. & Sandler, T. Op Cit, p. 20. 
90 Umeji, E., Counting the Economic Cost of Terrorism in Nigeria, http://www.americandailyherald.com/world-
news/africa/item/counting-the-economic-cost-of-terrorism-in-nigeria, 18 September 2011, p. 1. 
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through damage and injury, and indirectly through time spent on bureaucracy and security 
checks.91  
Money has to be diverted from public funds, which could be used in ways more beneficial to 
society, to supply capital and security across business ventures and the country as a whole. This 
money is another burden that is directly imposed through terrorism. The risk assessment of 
Nigeria, which has overtaken South Africa as the biggest economy in Africa92, provides a 
microcosmic overview of the majority of Africa. Foreigners are afraid to invest in and visit a vast 
number of places in Africa; locals are being warned of doing business with foreigners as it 
becomes a high security risk, and the FDI that does make it into the continent is focused on the 
energy or natural resources sectors that require little capital in maintaining.93  
 
Transport throughout Africa is plagued by a number of obstacles from high transport prices94 to 
failing infrastructure. Terrorism is another impediment that hinders transport on the continent. 
Bus and railway stations have been targeted in Africa, and in particular Kenya, as high traffic 
and high risk objectives for terrorist attacks looking to inflict as much damage as possible.95 The 
increase in vehicles being used as bombs96, either as suicide or roadside bombs, has the potential 
to negatively impact the transport system and routes that citizens and tourists would take. 
Additionally, in many regions in Africa that are plagued by terrorism, border control systems 
91 Loc cit. 
92 Smith, M., Nigeria set to Overtake SA as Africa’s Biggest Economy, http://mg.co.za/article/2013-03-05-nigeria-
set-to-overtake-sa-as-africas-biggest-economy, 5 March 2013, p. 1. 
93 Loc cit. 
94 Raballand, G. & Macchi, P., Transport Prices and Costs: The Need to Revisit Donors’ Policies in Transport in 
Africa, http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/0809conf/Raballand.pdf, p. 2. 
95 Liloba, H., Kenya: Terrorism Affecting Kenya’s Economy, http://allafrica.com/stories/201206190006.html, 17 
June 2012, p. 1. 
96 Goita, M. Op Cit, p. 2. 
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between the countries hinder transport time. It is no surprise that due to increasingly thorough 
security checks at border crossings, there has been an increase in waiting times, which delays 
transportation.  
In Mogadishu, Somalia, al-Shabaab militants have targeted newly installed solar power street 
lights that were intended to increase visibility and public safety.97 The street lights also provided 
a deterrent to reduce night-time assassinations carried out by the group, and allowed businesses 
to remain open later, thus attempting to boost the economy. Although this is not a direct attack 
on the transport system, the street lights form an integral part of the transport network at night, 
and thus the style of attack diminishes the safety the public feels on the roads of the city.  
 
The link between terrorism and organised crime can have a massive impact across the African 
continent. The UN Security Council released a statement in early 2013 declaring the 
international body’s growing concern at the increasing violence perpetuated in Africa.98 The 
biggest concerns for the Council revolved around the illicit activities of arms, drugs and human 
trafficking. The theft and smuggling of natural resources, piracy, and small arms and weaponry 
smuggling are also major issues. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has used the illegal 
trade of small arms and light weapons to arm themselves in their kidnappings-for-ransom in 
Western Africa. AQIM and Boko Haram have relied upon bank robberies to generate finances to 
support their causes, with more than 30% of all bank robberies in Nigeria during 2011 having 
97 Garowe Online, Somalia: Second Explosions Target Solar Power Street Lights in Mogadishu, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201308020089.html, 1 August 2013, p. 1. 
98 Freund, L. UN Links Terrorism in Africa to Organised Crime, http://www.voanews.com/content/un-links-
terrorism-in-africa-to-crime/1660348.html, 13 May 2013, p. 1. 
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been carried out by Boko Haram.99 Moroccan authorities arrested a network of around 34 
individuals, who were in the process of attempting to smuggle over 600 kilograms of cocaine 
into Europe. These individuals were reportedly associated with AQIM.100 Oil, which is the 
largest natural resource in Nigeria, has also fallen victim to organised crime as a potential source 
to finance terrorism.  
West Africa has developed into a vital transit hub for drugs emanating from Latin America that 
are destined for Europe.101 In many instances it is the terrorist groups that provide safe haven for 
drug smugglers, at a cost, and act as guides through the terrains of the region.102 Togolese 
President Faure Gnassingbe labelled these terrorist-linked organised crime groups as “criminal-
narco-terrorists groups”.103 AQIM, according to several Western and European sources, are 
closely associated with smuggling, in particular cigarettes, in the Sahel. Drug trafficking has 
provided the funds for insurgency, and in some cases has even become the currency used in the 
commission of terrorists attacks.104 The link between terrorism and organised crime is nothing 
new, and the impact of both entities on economic and social growth in Africa cannot be ignored.  
 
The impact of terrorism on tourism also has a substantial effect on economic growth. In many 
countries, tourism generates large amounts of the country’s GDP, and the loss of income to the 
tourism industry destabilises the potential for development. Tourism is the fastest growing sector 
99 Onuoha, F. & Erizim, G. Op Cit, p. 1.  
100 Goita, M. Op Cit, p. 4. 
101 Onuoha, F. & Erizim, G. Op Cit, p. 1. 
102 De Andres, A.: Organised Crime, Drug Trafficking, Terrorism: The New Achilles’ Heel of West Africa, United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.fride.org/download/com_achilles_heel_eng_may08.pdf, May 2008, 
p. 5. 
103 Freund, L. Op Cit, p. 1. 
104 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Drug Trafficking and the Finance of Terrorism, United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-and-the-financing-of-
terrorism.html, p. 1. 
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of Africa’s economy and is one of Africa’s major investment opportunities.105 According to the 
United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), it was estimated that Africa’s share of 
international tourism for 2012 was around 60 million.106 The World Bank reports that tourism 
accounts for 8.9% of East Africa’s GDP, 7.2% of North Africa’s, 5.6% of West Africa’s, and 
3.9% of Southern Africa’s GDP.107 Thus one can clearly see the importance of the income 
generated by tourism across the continent. The development required to boost tourism, which 
would in turn boost the individual country’s economy, is of paramount significance to Africa. 
Tourism is inextricably linked with terrorism for a number of reasons, specifically because 
tourism hotspots become ideal targets for terrorist attacks that would cause large economic and 
social awareness.108 Additionally, tourism provides the means for terrorist groups to attack a 
foreign national on African soil, without having to worry about the progressively more advanced 
security measures of more developed nations. 
In Mombasa, Kenya, for example, tourism constitutes as much as 80% of the country’s entire 
tourism activities.109 However, threats and acts of terrorist attacks have resulted in ever 
diminishing numbers of tourists, as the Kenyan coast was labelled as “unsafe” following a spate 
of kidnappings.110 In addition, the impact terrorism has on tourism goes hand in glove with 
another insidious terrorist pastime, the issue of kidnappings.  
105 Van Beek, et al.: Tourism in Africa, African Studies Centre, http://www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/infosheet3engels.pdf, 
2008, p. 1.  
106 eTurboNews, Africa Expects 60 Million Tourists in 2012, http://www.eturbonews.com/27463/africa-expects-60-
million-tourists-2012, 18 January 2012, p. 1. 
107 Ighobor, K. & Haidara, A., Tourism in Africa is Slowly Coming of Age, 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2012/tourism-africa-slowly-coming-age, August 2012, p. 1. 
108 Bennet and bray 1 
109 Liloba, H. Op Cit, p. 1. 
110 Ibid. 
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In the period (January 2012 – December 2012) there were a number of kidnappings111 of 
foreigners in Africa.112 Although in absolute numbers it seems like a small percentage, 
kidnappings have a major impact on the potential tourism industry in Africa. Additionally, it is 
important to note that these are only some instances, which have been reported; there is no 
evidence of how many individuals are kidnapped without the incident being reported for fear of 
reprisals.  
Oumar Ould Hamaba, an Islamic commander in the deserts of Western Africa, is one of the self-
proclaimed kidnappers of Westerners. He openly states that it is Western countries that are 
financing his jihadist, through the ransoms being collected from their kidnappings.113 
Kidnappings in Western Africa have netted tens of millions of dollars in recent years for these 
terrorist groups, which has greatly assisted their objectives of forming terrorist-held territories. It 
is reported that from 2006 – 2011 AQIM netted as much as $70 million in ransom payoffs.114 
In 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States’ trained many anti-Soviet 
Muslims in guerrilla tactics. When both the Soviets and the US withdrew from Afghanistan, 
those same trained individuals felt isolated and betrayed by their respective brokers and began 
forming a new independent brotherhood that coalesced around the targeting of the West.115 At 
the end of the Cold War, with particular attention paid to Afghanistan, there was an influx of 
111 Two tourists in Ethiopia on 16 January 2012 (A further five foreign tourists were killed in the attack); a German 
national was kidnapped ten days later in Nigeria, a Swiss national kidnapped three months later in Mali, four foreign 
aid workers taken in Kenya two months after that, and more than a dozen more incidents between December 2012 
and this year. 
112 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Kidnapping Threat Worldwide, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/TravelBulletins/Kidnapping, p. 1. 
113 Nossiter, A., Millions in Ransom Fuel Militants’ Clout in West Africa, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/africa/kidnappings-fuel-extremists-in-western-
africa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, 12 December 2012, p. 1. 
114 Onuoha, F. & Erizim, G. Op Cit, p. 1. 
115 Cilliers, J. Op Cit, p. 94. 
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terrorism into Northern Africa.116 The influx of radical fundamentalism infiltrated countries like 
Algeria, Egypt and Sudan, and was financed by radical private financiers such as Osama bin 
Laden and other individuals in Saudi Arabia. The estimation is that around 1000 Algerian battle-
hardened veterans returned home from Afghanistan. These individuals formed the nucleus for a 
number of African-based terrorist groups to follow.117 It is believed that these veterans were able 
to reinvigorate domestic violent extremism and reorganise their focus on both a domestic and 
international level.  
 
In a number of African countries there have been attempts to implement strict Islamic Law, or 
Sharia Law, and to transform countries into Islamic Republics.118 Extremists groups in Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, Somalia and even Tanzania have expressed this goal in their justification for their 
actions. Sharia Law has been implemented in the Sudan, as referenced below, and in some 
Northern territories of Nigeria.119 In some cases where groups have been unable to attain Sharia 
law, there have been attempts to destabilise the government on all levels, as has happened in 
Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. 
 
African countries are being used as targets for attacks directed at foreign governments. There is 
the belief that due to the lack of effective policing and counter-terrorism measures in African 
countries, these foreign government targets become ‘soft’ and vulnerable to terrorist attacks.120 
116 Loc cit. 
117 Loc cit.  
118 Botha, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 6. 
119 Loc cit. 
120 Herbst, J. & Mills, G. Op Cit, p. 40.  
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On August 7, 1998, two massive car bombs exploded at United States Embassies in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, resulting in the deaths of 224 people and wounding as 
many as 5000 others.121 According to the evidence, 12 Americans were killed in the Nairobi 
blast, with no reported American casualties in Dar es Salaam. The group believed to be 
responsible was al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden.122 Thus, an attack on the US government on 
African soil resulted in casualties for non-Americans, mostly Africans, at more than 20 times the 
number of Americans killed. The impact of international terrorism on Africans in this instance is 
staggering as the intended targets, Americans, suffered so few fatalities in the bombings. 
However, the message seemed to be: we will attack Western targets, and those governments 
allied to the West will become targets as well. 
 
The Islamic revival in Africa has resulted in the establishment of more radical Muslim groups, 
which according to many African governments, are determined to overthrow their regimes.123 
Another phenomenon to emerge in Africa, in recent times, is competition between rival Islamic 
groups that are associated with different transnational terror networks. Thus, Africa has become 
a battleground not only for Islamic extremists, but also for groups attempting to dominate each 
other. 
 
121 Anti-Defamation League: The US Embassy Bombings in Kenya & Tanzania, Anti-Defamation League, 
http://archive.adl.org/terror/focus/15_focus.asp, Fall 1998, p. 1. 
122 Zill, O., The US Embassy Bombings Trial – A Summary, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/bombings.html, p. 1. 
123 Botha, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 2.  
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Globalisation has been identified as a key element in the spread of international terrorism. This 
provides for the possibility that terrorist organisations will become better networked, and harder 
to track effectively with the growth and spread of the internet.124 Additionally, globalisation has 
brought about the awareness of terrorism against foreign governments in Africa. In previous 
times, attacks on “Westerners” in Africa did not have the same political impact, as an attack on 
home soil would have.125 
 
Timing and selection of targets by terrorists can affect international interests in Africa in areas 
ranging from commerce to travel and diplomacy. In February 2010 in Angola, rebels from the 
Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Flec) attacked the Togolese football team 
with machine guns.126 In terms of casualties, the attack did not have a massive impact, but the 
timing and targets affected had a greater emphasis. The timing was just prior to the African Cup 
of Nations and the World Cup to be held in South Africa, which garnered a large amount of 
African and international attention for the football tournament. The target, a national football 
team with players based in Africa and Europe, received greater attention than if it was a 
completely localised target. The impact on travel between the two nations and commerce which 
travels the route had to have been influenced by the attack as the group stated that this was only 
the start of targeted actions to annex the territory of Cabinda.127 In a domestic issue such as 
annexing territory, the terrorist attack on an international victim highlighted and brought about 
greater global attention to Flec.  
124 Guadalupe-Blanco River Trust. Op cit, p. 1. 
125 Herbst, J. & Mills, G. Op Cit, p. 41. 
126 BBC News, Togo Footballers Shot in Ambush, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8449319.stm, 8 January 2010, p. 1. 
127 Loc cit. 
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The growth of cross-national links among different terrorist organisations, which may involve 
training, funding, technology and participation128, is a major concern when addressing the lack of 
effective control of many borders across the African regions. In Senegal for example, Islamic 
organisations were responsible for public violence and armed clashes with Senegalese 
government forces. These Islamic groups were under sponsorship from Islamic organisations in 
Algeria and inter alia Iran.129 Sierra Leone was reportedly “identified” by Iran as an ideal 
springboard to spread their more radical Islamic ideals throughout Western Africa. Additionally, 
Foreign Ministers of countries in the Sahel came together in an attempt to curb the spread of 
Islamic extremism in the region. This has evidently not been as successful as the Sahelian 
governments would have wished, with particular emphasis placed on the situation in northern 
Mali where Islamic rebels became entrenched. As Cilliers (2003) points out, international 
terrorism in Africa is awakening with links across the continent from South Africa to Algeria. A 
transnational terrorist network is concerning because it provides the opportunity for a more 
regional or global unified response from the terrorists. For example, France’s intervention into 
Mali led to threats from AQAP in Yemen, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and AQIM.130 
It appears that the lack of a unified approach, as well as ineffective counter measures has resulted 
in terrorism in Africa prospering. The biggest threat that terrorism, or in a number of African 
cases, Islamic extremism presents in Africa, is not the temporary hold or shift of a particular 
country’s political and economic power, but rather the establishment of a transnational terrorist 
network.131 AQIM has been especially active in recruiting and forming a transnational terrorist 
128 Perl, R. Op Cit, p. 1. 
129 Botha, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 9. 
130 Atallah, R. Crisis in the Sahel: Transnational Terrorism, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/crisis-sahel-
transnational-terrorism, 24 May 2013, p. 1. 
131 Botha, A. & Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 1. 
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network, such as the involvement of Canadians in the attack on the gas plant in Algeria.132 Boko 
Haram, which focused primarily on gun battles and bomb planting, attacked the UN headquarters 
in August 2011 with a suicide bomber – a tactic learned from AQIM if a YouTube video is to be 
believed. Boko Haram, in particular, has started training and aligning itself with AQIM133, which 
is a growing concern to regional and global powers as Nigeria is home to many foreigners that 
would have appeal as targets to the terrorist network.  
 
The establishment of a transnational terrorism network in Africa has the potential to increase the 
impact terrorism has on the continent. Regional terrorist groups have the chance to align with 
one another, share training, tactics, financial resources, fighters and weaponry. Additionally, 
with the porous borders in much of Africa, the groups can move unhindered to support one 
another and thus look to establish more of a foothold in territories they want to bring under their 
influence.  
 
The global occurrence of terrorism has been acknowledged as reaching almost every corner of 
the globe, with varying degrees in motivation and targets. This paper hopes to have provided an 
overview of international terrorism, which was defined as both geographic and ethnic in target 
and agent. Terrorism in Africa, and the impact it has on the continent, has been dealt with in 
greater detail. The consequences of terrorism in Africa have been addressed to demonstrate the 
ways in which the acts have impacted on the continent on an economic, social and political scale. 
132 Attalah, R. Op Cit, p. 1. 
133 Zenn, J.: Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention, Combating 
Terrorism Center, March 2013, p. 1. 
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The situations in Nigeria and Somalia, although briefly addressed, will be looked at in greater 
detail in the ensuing chapters to outline the circumstances surrounding their establishment and 
the impact that each group has had on their respective countries and authorities.  
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UNDERSTANDING  
STATE COLLAPSE  
VS. 
STATE DYSFUNCTION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“When there is peace in the country, the chief does not carry a shield” – Ugandan Proverb 
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Chapter 1B, Understanding State Collapse vs. State Dysfunction, will attempt to detail and 
simplify terminology around what the “state” is, and the characteristics that compromise a 
strong, dysfunctional, failed, or collapsed state. This chapter will begin by defining what a state 
is, in order to establish a base before addressing aspects that are either lacking or deteriorating to 
outline what collapsed and dysfunctional states are. 
 
DEFINING A STATE 
The state as a concept invokes different ideas and experiences for different people. Thus, 
defining a “state” requires an in-depth analysis, but this paper will attempt to do so succinctly. 
 
Jackson and Rosberg (1984) considered the transfer of political authority from monarchs to the 
populace as the transition to statehood. This consideration identifies a political approach, as well 
as the population sanctioning the political authority to govern the territory they inhabit. Busza 
(1997) defines “the state” as “an institution or set of institutions which administers and regulates 
the social, economic and political life of a territorially circumscribed population.”134 
The definition of “the state” is not uncomplicated. A straightforward understanding of a state is 
an entity that is comprised of a permanent population, a defined territory, a leadership or 
government, and the capacity to engage with other states.135 In some situations, one of these 
134 Busza, E.: The Dysfunctional State and International Collaboration: New Challenges to National Security 
Regimes, College of William and Mary, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/ruseur_wp_003.pdf, September 1997, 
p. 3. 
135 Fox, C., Defining the word, “Nations”-more than “People Groups”, 
http://www.reformedliving.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=364:defining-the-word-
qnationsq-more-than-qpeople-groupsq&catid=71:special-topics&Itemid=59, 12 March 2012, p. 1. 
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characteristics can be more opaque than the rest. For example, Sudan and South Sudan are 
engaged in a battle over their borders, or territories, and North Korea is isolated from relations 
with many other states. However, all three are still classified as states. In saying that, these 
examples are not ‘extreme’ in their break from the norm, and thus when defining a collapsed or 
dysfunctional state, the distinction from the norm is more apparent.  
Busza (1997) associates the term of “state structure” with the above definition of “the state.” She 
outlines a state’s structure as consisting of a network of administrative, legal, extractive, and 
coercive institutions. A coercive institution is a state’s apparatus used to ensure safety and public 
order both internally and along the country’s borders.136 However, Busza (1997) does identify 
that the first three, namely administrative, legal and extractive are problematic in defining the 
state, as they link society and the state, while the latter fails to capture the institutions’ abilities to 
act as more than individuals. Although state structures are important to the state, the structures 
are not the only component to the state.  
 
A ‘strong’ state can be seen as not having inherent dysfunctionalities and is home to a number of 
characteristics that will be addressed below as being vitally important to a state’s capability.137 
The state has the capacity to establish and enforce laws in the interest of the public and common 
good. The state’s power and authority is sanctioned and limited by its population, with the 
136 Soeters, J.: Organisations as Coercive Institutions, Blackwell Reference Online, 
http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_yr2012_chunk_g978140512433121_ss1-
24, 2007, p. 1. 
137 Solomon, H. & Cone, C.: “The State and Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo”,  in South African 
Journal of Military Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2004. Retrieved from 
https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&ved=0CF8QFjAG&url=http%
3A%2F%2Fwww.ajol.info%2Findex.php%2Fsmsajms%2Farticle%2Fdownload%2F81075%2F71304&ei=9MYdUs
3OFo7B7AauxYG4Dw&usg=AFQjCNE6dJMSk2ownU43JrRTlvZl82VMnQ&sig2=mGfVq2JZdtUFE275Vto0Ag
&bvm=bv.51156542,d.ZGU, p. 53. 
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expectation that the state will meet the level of political, social and economic standards. Strong 
states offer safety and security from both political and criminal violence, while ensuring political 
and civil rights.  
The concept of ‘good governance’ has come to the fore as a requirement for a strong state. The 
concept includes a dedicated approach to individual and national security, education, medical 
services, basic human services, and the establishment of infrastructure and public order.138 On 
the other side, misrule, violence, corruption, forced migration, poverty, illiteracy and disease can 
all reinforce each other in rendering a state dysfunctional. Conflict may impoverish populations, 
increase the availability of weapons and debilitate rulers. Weak governments are less able to stop 
corruption and the production and smuggling of arms and drugs, which may in turn help finance 
warlords, insurgents and terrorists. 
 
DEFINING A ‘COLLAPSED’ OR ‘FAILED’ STATE 
According to Rotberg (2003) a collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state.139 
While Solomon & Cone (2004) point out that a collapsed state is an intense form of paralysis of 
the ‘strong state’.140  
Thus in order to define what a “collapsed state” is, this paper will first endeavour to identify 
what a failed state is. Simply put, a failed state is one where the state is thrust into turmoil by 
138 Solomon, H. & Cone, C. Op Cit. p. 54. 
139 Rotberg, R.: Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators, Brookings , 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2003/statefailureandstateweaknessinatimeofterror/statefailureandstat
eweaknessinatimeofterror_chapter.pdf, 2003, p. 9. 
140 Solomon, H. & Cone, C. Op Cit. p. 54. 
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internal violence and can no longer provide positive political outcomes to its population.141 
There are more elusive characteristics to define state failure.142 
Another understanding of a failed state is one that has lost control of its territory or has lost the 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The term ‘failed state’ does not provide a concise and 
precisely classifiable description,143 but does offer a broad label for a phenomenon, which can be 
understood through a number of factors. The political factor outlines the belief that once the 
power structures that provide political stability for law and order collapse, the country can be 
labelled as failed. Where countries in civil wars have clearly distinguishable military and 
“rebels”, failed states tend to be associated with the complete breakdown of these structures.  
In contrast to stable states, failed states cannot control their territories or borders adequately.144 
Control is generally limited to a capital city or an ethnic territory that the members of 
government hail from. Arguably, the extent to which a state has failed can be measured by the 
amount of territory over which the state has lost control. Territorially, failed states are associated 
with endogenous problems, which may have cross-border implications.  
Looking at a failed or collapsed state from a sociological standpoint there are two phenomena 
that are evident. The first is the collapse of the core of government, described by Max Weber as 
the “monopoly of power”. In a state that has failed or has gone further and collapsed, the core 
elements of government, namely the police, judiciary and executive bodies, have either ceased to 
141 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 1. 
142 Foreign Policy & the Fund for Peace: The Failed State Index, Foreign Policy, 
http://relooney.fatcow.com/00_New_940.pdf, July/August 2005, p. 1. 
143 Thürer, D.: Failed State, Institut fur Volkerrecht und Auslandisches Verfassungsrecht, 
http://www.ivr.uzh.ch/institutsmitglieder/thuerer/forschung/Failed.pdf, 1999, p. 1. 
144 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 5. 
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exist or are no longer capable of functioning.145 In some cases, these organs are used for other 
purposes that differ from their intended duties. Thürer (1999) identifies militiamen in the Congo 
that turned into gangs and private warlord armies that created enterprises to benefit from the 
wealth of the country’s natural resources.146 As regimes of failed states tend to become more 
patrimonial, the leadership focuses on protecting its own ethnicity and support base.147 This type 
of patronage exposes the state to violence as those who feel resentful or exploited rise up in 
opposition to the government.   
Rotberg (2003) identifies the fact that if a citizenry feels unsafe, or the government fails to 
establish an atmosphere of security and struggles to maintain official power, the state’s failure 
becomes more evident and rebel groups gain greater prominence.148 The second phenomenon 
that stands out is the brutality of the violence that follows.149 The violence has been described as 
a collective insanity in some instances. Thus, the collapse of law and order is generally triggered 
by anarchic forms of violence – either internal or external.150 The radicalisation of violence 
stands in stark contrast to the generally politically-guided and police-governed society. 
Furthermore, the use of the military would need to be proportionate to the strength of the 
anarchic violence to maintain and control the conflict.151 
 
145 Thürer, D.: The “Failed State” and International Law, International Review of the Red Cross, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jq6u.htm, 1999, p. 1. 
146 Thürer, D. Op Cit. p. 3. 
147Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p 6. 
148 Loc cit. 
149 “The “Failed State” and International Law” Op Cit. p. 1. 
150 Thürer, D. Op cit. p. 1. 
151 Ibid. p. 3. 
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According to Rotberg (2003), failed states are deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested by a 
number of warring factions.152 It is not the intensity of the violence or resistance that defines a 
failed state, but rather the enduring characteristic of it and the fact that the target of the violence 
is the existing government. In a number of cases, especially in Africa, the violence and civil wars 
that have marred failed states generally stem from ethnic or religious differences.153 However, a 
failed state cannot be ascribed solely to the inability to harmonise a differing ethnic population, 
or to the oppression of one group by another. Although, such behaviour can result in state 
collapse.  
 
Security in a failed state is associated with the rule of the powerful. This power is generally seen 
in a vacuum, as the rest of the territory is largely ungovernable and all authority is centred at one 
point. As failed states completely collapse, sub-actors such as warlords and rebel leaders take 
over and gain control over territorial regions through their own private security forces.154 
Regardless of the authority provided by warlords, there is still a prevalence of disorder and 
anarchic behaviour. 
 
A collapsed state’s economy is generally defined by a severe economic decline. In some cases it 
has been the rivalry between opposing forces attempting to gain wealth and resource extraction 
that has led to a failed or collapsed country’s economic breakdown.155 The constantly changing 
152 Rotberg, R. Op cit. p. 5. 
153 Loc cit. 
154 Ibid. p. 10. 
155 Powell, B., Somalia: Failed State, Economic Success?, http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/somalia-failed-
state-economic-success#axzz2iLfVP7nZ, 1 April 2009, p. 1. 
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governments or rivalling elites who attempt to line their pockets before being deposed has been a 
major hindrance in collapsed states’ chances to resuscitate their failed economies.  
 
Therefore, to conclude this definition subchapter, a collapsed state is an extreme version of a 
failed state. 
 
DEFINING A ‘DYSFUNCTIONAL’ STATE 
A dysfunctional state is characterised by the growing ineffectiveness of administrative, legal, 
extractive, and coercive institutions that form the state’s core.156 A dysfunctional state is home to 
a modicum of political control, basic levels of public institutions, and a common acceptance of 
identity and national authority across the majority of the country.157 The inability to provide 
stable authority is another factor of a dysfunctional state. However, there is no one archetype of a 
dysfunctional state, as dysfunctionality is on a linear spectrum. One end of the spectrum is 
extreme disintegration, which is generally seen in the form of a civil war158 or revolution. The 
other end of the spectrum is harder to define, as it is difficult to distinguish between a weak state 
and a completely ineffective state. 
Reverting to Busza (1997) and her statement around state structures, the networks of 
administrative, legal, extractive, and coercive institutions, defining state dysfunctionality is made 
156 Busza, E. Op Cit. p. 4. 
157 Lewis, P.: The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria, Centre for Global Development, 
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/shortofthegoal/chap3.pdf, 2011, p. 1. 
158 Busza, E. Op Cit. p. 5. 
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even more challenging, as dysfunctionality does not need to impact on all state structures 
simultaneously.159  
 
It has been argued that in places where states are either dysfunctional, or heading in that 
direction, terrorists and organised crime can step into the vacuum caused by dysfunctionality.160 
The rising level of internal violence speaks to a social level of dysfunctionality within the 
country.161  
There are signs, or causes, that show when a state is heading towards dysfunctionality. Dramatic 
and long-lasting changes in economy policy, volatility around the distribution of political power, 
the absence of a stable and effective governing system162, and arguably the most dangerous 
development, is the increasing ineptitude of a state’s security apparatuses.  
 
COMPARING DYSFUNCTION AND COLLAPSE 
A comparison between a dysfunctional state and a state that has collapsed is tricky. The level of 
dysfunction in a state cannot be objectively assessed, and thus it cannot be definitively labelled 
as finite. However, looking at both scenarios from a holistic perspective, a comparison will be 
made in order to try and clearly delineate or distinguish the terms ‘dysfunctional’ and ‘collapsed’ 
when looking at the case studies of Nigeria and Somalia later. 
159 Loc cit. 
160 The Economist, Fixing a Broken World, http://www.economist.com/node/13035718, 29 January 2009, p. 1. 
161 Lewis, P. Op Cit. p. 91. 
162 Busza, E. Op Cit. p. 5. 
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ECONOMIC 
A dysfunctional state’s economy is engaged in negligible growth in comparison to the complete 
breakdown of a collapsed state’s economy. The growth is, however, minimal and a dramatic 
increase in poverty has occurred. The dramatic increase in poverty results in a growing social 
inequality gap. In many instances, the cause of increased poverty and a widening social 
inequality arises from unfavourable economic structures, adverse political conditions, and 
negative external shocks.163 In a collapsed state, the economy has virtually failed. There is no 
growth in the sector, as those in power are more interested in lining their pockets before being 
usurped, than the country’s wellbeing. There are similarities between the two insofar as 
increasing poverty and the formation of informal black-markets, or “shadow economies” 
provides access to goods and services that the governments cannot provide.164 
 
POLITICAL 
A dysfunctional state is characterised by the growing ineffectiveness of administrative, legal, 
extractive, and coercive institutions that form the state’s core.165 Although a dysfunctional state 
has established infrastructures and institutions they are not equipped or able to provide essential 
services at a proper standard.166 This is in contrast to a collapsed state, as a collapsed state’s 
institutions and infrastructure have declined past ineffectiveness to widespread failure.167 The 
political factor outlines the belief that once the power structures that provide political stability for 
163 Lewis, P. Op Cit. p. 86. 
164 Murphy, T., The Collapse of Somalia and Economic Considerations, http://www.mbali.info/doc287.htm, p. 1. 
165 Busza, E. p. 4. 
166 Lewis, P. Op Cit. p. 89. 
167 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 6. 
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law and order collapse, the country can be labelled as failed, or in extreme cases, collapsed. 
Some political signs of a state heading towards dysfunctionality include volatility around the 
distribution of political power, and the absence of a stable and effective governing system.168 
Looking at these signs, it can be argued that they are the basic indicators of a collapsed state if 
fully reached.  
Generally speaking, while a dysfunctional state is home to a modicum of political control, basic 
levels of public institutions, and a common acceptance of identity and national authority across 
the majority of the country,169 a collapsed state is one that has almost no political control or 
public institutions, has entirely lost or rescinded control of its territory, and has lost the 
legitimate use of force, which is generally exploited by whomever is in charge.170 
According to Rotberg (2003), failed and collapsed states are deeply conflicted, dangerous, and 
contested by a number of warring factions.171 It is not the intensity of the violence or resistance 
that defines a failed state, but rather the enduring characteristic of it and the fact that the target of 
the violence is the existing government. 
In some African examples172, it was a combination of internal unrest and the ineffective 
governance of state leaders that destroyed the social and political legitimacy of their countries. 
Rivalries between ethnicities, mineral-rich and mineral-poor regions, democrats and autocrats, 
and territorial inhabitants have bedevilled many African states. Through corruption and poor or 
limited economic growth, states have descended into internal fighting as parts of countries look 
168 Busza, E. Op Cit. p. 5. 
169 Lewis, P. Op Cit. p. 1. 
170 Foreign Policy & the Fund for Peace. Op Cit. p. 1. 
171 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 5. 
172 Poor leadership in countries like Libya and Mali have resulted in social and political turmoil that has pushed the 
country towards dysfunctionality and failure.  
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to gain strength under weakening governments. This unrest can lead to dysfunctionality at a 
state-level, which can be seen in the case study of Nigeria, which is to be analysed in-depth in 
chapter 3. 
Through authoritarian dictatorships, institutions and facets of democracy were ruined by the 
abuse of power to instil political patronage, causing human rights abuses towards the rest of the 
population. The case study of Somalia, which will be addressed in greater detail in chapter 2, is a 
prime example of a state that collapsed due to the failed leadership of those in power post-
independence.  
 
SECURITY / CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 
It has been argued that in places where states are either dysfunctional, or heading in that 
direction, terrorists and organised crime can step into the vacuum caused by that 
dysfunctionality.173 In the extreme cases of a collapsed state, the growth of criminal violence is 
exacerbated, as state authority weakens or the state becomes more criminal in its persecution of 
its citizenry, which results in lawlessness becoming more obvious.174 Collapsed states have taken 
on a more profound position in geopolitics because of the dangerous exports that spread from 
them.  
A dysfunctional state has the following characteristics: an increasing ineptitude of the state’s 
security apparatuses in effectively monitoring and policing borders and additionally internal 
173 “Fixing a Broken World” Op Cit.  
174 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 6. 
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targets become more vulnerable to attack by rebels, militia and terrorists.175 A collapsed state 
also cannot control its territories or borders, but the lack of control is even greater than in a 
dysfunctional state.176  
Within a collapsed state sub-actors such as warlords and rebel leaders generally force their way 
into control over territorial regions through their own private security forces.177 Regardless of the 
authority provided by warlords, there is still a prevalence of disorder and anarchic behaviour. 
There are some similarities with a dysfunctional state in this regard. However, it does differ from 
a dysfunctional state as in the latter the central government still holds onto some power in an 
attempt to remain in control against sub-actors. 
It appears that Somalia has little to no capacity to operate in any sector. Somalia is unable to 
issue birth or death certificates, as all records have been destroyed or lost through decades of 
war.178 According to Peter Fabricius,179 there are only five public schools, with essentially no 
other public service, and the little public service there is has “pathetically low” skill levels. 
 
SOCIAL 
In some circumstances, a dysfunctional state is the result of negligence and maladministration by 
governing authorities. Collapsed states stem from the process of almost total decay at a nation-
state level. The capacity for states to perform positively has deteriorated at an alarming rate. 
However, Rotberg (2003) pointed out that it took endemic neglect and concerted will for a state 
175 Busza, E. Op Cit. p. 5. 
176 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 5. 
177 Rotberg, R. Op Cit. p. 10. 
178 Fabricius, P.: Making Peace with the Reality of Somalia as a Failed State, The Star, 21 April 2014, p. 7. 
179 Foreign Editor at Independent Newspapers. 
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to fail and / or collapse. Whereas corruption hinders any attempt to reduce the deterioration 
towards dysfunctionality, corruption flourishes in a failed or collapsed state at an unusually 
destructive level.180 
 
CLOSING REMARKS 
Providing an adequate definition of state collapse and state dysfunction for this paper has been 
gleaned from a number of sources due to the subjectivity of each term. As identified, a collapsed 
state can be seen as an “extreme” case of a failed state, where the state has lost control over 
authority and territory, and cannot provide adequately for the country’s population. Whereas, 
state collapse has a relatively forthright definition, state dysfunction cannot be as finitely 
defined. State dysfunction is defined along a spectrum and hinges on the level of deterioration 
within the branches of government.  
A comparison between a collapsed and dysfunctional state depends on the level of deterioration 
within the country’s authority. Looking at each case from an economic, social, security, and 
political point of view does provide for a contrast between state collapse and state dysfunction. 
State collapse can be seen as the failure of all aspects within the state. State dysfunction is a 
decaying of these aspects at differing levels. In some cases, a dysfunctional state can have a 
sound economy but failing social and security features.181 In others there could be a stable 
political system, but failing economic and social aspects.182 
180 Ibid. p. 8. 
181 Nigeria is a strong example of such a situation. This will be detailed in chapter 3. 
182 South Africa has a reasonably stable political situation, but the social and economic aspects of the society are 
much less stable.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
SOMALIA  
AND  
AL-SHABAAB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Where there is dialogue and agreement, there is God” – Burundi Proverb 
Page 53 of 234 
 
Chronology: 
1960 – Somalia achieves independence from British, French, Italian and Ethiopian colonial rule. 
1969 – Somali Youth League (SYL) wins first election. 
1969 – Muhammad Siad Barre assumes power through a bloodless coup after Shermarke is 
assassinated.  
1977 – Siad Barre attacks Ethiopia with support of the Soviet Union, but is betrayed and cannot 
hold territory. This results in guerrilla groups forming with the goal of toppling Siad Barre. 
1988 – Full-fledged civil war breaks out. 
1988 – Somali National Movement (SNM) is part of an uprising against Siad Barre. SNM is 
formed by support from the Isaaq tribe. 
1990 – There are multiple armed liberation movements driving Siad Barre out of their lands. 
1991 – Siad Barre is overthrown, and withdraws to his clan’s lands in exile. There are still 
remnants of his, and other, armed forced throughout Somalia forming their own armed divisions. 
1991 – SNM declares the northern regions of Somalia as independent Republic of Somaliland.  
1991 – 1992 – Described as the “catastrophe”. The country was being ruptured by clan-based 
warfare, with groups vying for power of the country’s key resources.  
1991 – 1992 – Devastating famine aided by government and tribal conflicts – population left to 
fend for itself. 220 – 300 000 died.  
1992 – US marines arrive ahead of UN peacekeeping force to restore order and safeguard relief 
supplies. 
1993 – Addis Ababa Agreement by 15 Somali factions provided blueprint to establish 
transitional Somali government. 
1994 – US mission ends in March, after US Army Rangers killed by Somali militia in 1993. 
1995 – UN peacekeepers leave, having failed to achieve their mission. 
1998 – Puntland region of Somalia declares autonomy. 
2000 – Clan leaders and senior figures of Transitional National Assembly elect Abdiqasim Salad 
Hasan president of Somalia.  
2001 – Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) forms in Ethiopia to put forward 
rival national government. The SRRC is made up of factions from southern Somalia.  
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2004 – Transnational Federal Government (TFG) is created in Kenya by representatives from 
Somalia’s largest clans.   
2004 – 11 Sharia courts create the Union of Islamic courts under Sheikh Ahmed. 
2005 – 2006 TFG begins to move into Somalia, starting with Baidoa in the south.  
2006 – A group of Mogadishu-based warlords, under Mohamed Qanyare, form the Alliance for 
Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) in order to confront the (UIC). 
2006 – ARPCT is defeated by the UIC, and the militia loyalists to the UIC take control of 
Mogadishu.  
2006 – TFG and the UIC begin peace negotiations in Sudanese capital, Khartoum.  
2006 – Ethiopian and TFG forces engage with Islamists in battle and drive them out of 
Mogadishu.  
2007 – Islamists are driven out of their last key stronghold, Kismayo. President Adullahi Yusuf 
enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004.  
2007 – African Union and Ethiopian armies battle Islamic insurgents in Mogadishu. 
2008 – President Yusuf tries to fire Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein over attempts to draw 
moderate Islamists into government. Yusuf failed, and resigned. 
2009 – Ethiopia completes the withdrawal of its troops. Al-Shabaab almost instantly retakes 
Baidoa. 
2009 – Parliament swears in 149 members of opposition Alliance for the Reliberation of 
Somalia. Moderate Islamist Sheikh Sharif Ahmed is elected president.  
2009 – al-Shabaab launches massive assault on Mogadishu and advance southwards. 
2009 – State of Emergency is declared. Somalia government requests foreign assistance.  
2010 – 2012 A second famine claims 260 000 lives. 
2010 – al-Shabaab formally declares alliance with al-Qaeda. 
2011 – Kenyan troops enter Somalia. 
2012 – 2013 – Somalia’s first formal Parliament is sworn in. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is elected 
president. US recognise Somali government for the first time since 1991. 
2013 – al-Shabaab attack Westgate Mall in Kenya.  
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2013 – al-Shabaab kills around 60 people in Kenyan shopping mall in retaliation for Kenyan 
military involvement in Somalia. 
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This chapter is divided into two sections. The first looks into the history of the nation of Somalia. 
This is vital to address, as the history of the country plays a major role in determining the reasons 
for anti-authority, or political terrorism in the country. Part 1 deals with the socio-economic and 
political situation in Somalia that contributed to the establishment of the terrorist organisation al-
Shabaab. Part 2 deals with the emergence, formation, and the development of al-Shabaab. The 
concept of Somalia being a failed state will be addressed in order to determine if this was a factor 
in the facilitation of the rise and development of the organisation.  
 
PART ONE 
 
THE HISTORY OF SOMALIA 1839 – 1991 
In 1839, European colonial powers were present in the region, when the British starting using 
Aden on the south coast of Arabia, as a stopping-point for ships en route to and from India.183 
The French located their stations in modern day Djibouti, while Italy made the coast of Eritrea its 
African coastal home. In the 1880s, these three colonial powers were battling each other for the 
land of Somalia, and the fight was joined by Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia in around 1889. 
The resulting conflict led to a split between Somalia and Somaliland. Further conflict just prior 
to World War II arose as Fascist Italy started, under the newly appointed governor, an energetic 
imperialist expansion.184 At the start of the Second World War, French Somaliland claimed 
183 History World, History of Somalia, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad20, 
p. 1. 
184 Ibid. 
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neutrality, while Britain withdrew from its East African colony. However, just over a year later, 
in 1941, British forces invaded and annexed almost the entire territory of Somalia and placed it 
under British rule. The situation continued with Britain, France, and Ethiopia in a tense 
relationship over their respective territories until 1960 and the independence of Somalia from 
colonial rule. At independence, it was made an imperative by the Somali government for the 
country to reunite three Somali territories in other states – French Somaliland, regions in 
Ethiopia, and territory in Kenya. The reuniting of these territories was largely unsuccessful as the 
West backed both Ethiopia and Kenya in maintaining their rule, which resulted in Somalia 
turning to the Soviet Union for support. The Somali government remained mostly neutral in 
international affairs during the Cold War, until 1969, when the Somali Youth League (SYL) won 
a large majority in the country’s first elections. The SYL became increasingly dictatorial. 
President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke of the SYL was assassinated, and the descent into political 
crisis began.185 
 
The commander of the Somali army at the time, Mohamed Siad Barre, seized power. The new 
president aligned himself and Somalia, with the Soviet Union side of the Cold War. A brutal 
Marxist dictatorship was installed, which insisted upon the promotion of party and nation over 
that of clan and tribal loyalties, which were a major cultural factor in Somalia. In 1977, President 
Barre attacked a chaotic Ethiopia (as the country was in bedlam after the fall of Haile Selassie). 
However after the betrayal by the Soviet Union,186 President Barre was only able to hold onto 
the captured territory of Ogaden for a year before it was recaptured by Ethiopian forces that were 
185 BBC News Africa, Somalia Profile, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632, 19 December 2013, p. 1. 
186 The Soviet Union shifted their alliance to Ethiopia, as they saw the country as a more of a potential client.  
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backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba.187 In the aftermath, clan and tribal-based guerrilla groups 
were formed in and around Somalia with the goal of toppling the repressive regime of President 
Barre.  
 
1988 – CIVIL WAR 
The start of the Civil War speaks to the political situation that existed in Somalia, which then 
collapsed further. By 1988 there was a fully-fledged civil war. In northern Somalia, Barre’s 
government forces were facing a stiff uprising from the Somali National Movement (SNM). The 
SNM garnered its support from among the Isaaq tribe, and escalated the conflict when it attacked 
government garrisons in Burco and Hargeisa. In response, the Barre government attacked the 
Isaaq clan and killed as many as 50 000 people and displaced around 650 000 to neighbouring 
Ethiopia and Djibouti.188 
In 1990 the regime was confronted by multiple armed liberation movements across the nation, 
resulting in Barre’s forces having to retreat to a few key strongholds. However, in 1991 when the 
regime finally collapsed, remnants of its leadership and armed forces fled to the Jubba and Gebo 
areas of the country, and formed their own armed divisions. 
 
  
 
187 “History World” Op Cit.  
188 Healy, S., & Bradbury, M.: Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict, http://www.c-r.org/accord-
article/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflict, 2010, p. 10. 
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The civil war resulted in the overthrow of Barre in 1991. He withdrew to his clan and became 
one of many warlords vying for power in the deteriorating country. At this point in time, Somalia 
was effectively under the rule of as many as 12 rival clans and sub-clans.189 After 1991, the 
several clan-based liberation factions were unable to come to an agreement on the creation of a 
national government, which perpetuated Somalia’s deterioration into a collapsed state. This, in 
part, was due to clever politicking by Barre’s regime that successfully sowed the seeds of distrust 
through many years of divisive and authoritarian rule. However, it can be argued that myopic 
factional leadership was also to blame. Furthermore, these armed militias plunged the country 
deeper into conflagration because of internecine warfare both on a clan-based level, as well as a 
sub-clan level, which reflected the centrifugal political dynamic that made it almost impossible 
to maintain cohesive alliances.  
As if the internal fighting wasn’t enough to ruin the country, many of the militias were unpaid, 
and turned to looting from the population, which was the easiest and most successful way of 
189 Roth, J., Somalia: A country in turmoil, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~jmroth/, 2004, p. 1. 
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acquiring wealth. Virtually the entire country of Somalia was subjected to campaigns of ethnic 
cleansing, or inter-clan combat, which reduced much of the country, and Mogadishu in 
particular, to a destroyed combat zone. 
 
In May 1991, there were dramatic signs that the civil war was resulting in the restructuring of the 
country. The most obvious example would be the SNM’s declaration that the northern regions of 
the country were seceding to become the independent Republic of Somaliland.190 
The civil war destroyed most of Somalia’s crops, resulting in widespread famine, and although 
international powers attempted to actively intervene with Operation Restore Hope, the situation 
did not improve. The capital Mogadishu became another battle ground as opposing factions 
challenged for power, with many blocs declaring themselves in power and electing presidents 
that were subsequently usurped by one another.  
Somalis have described the period in their history from December 1991 – March 1992 by the 
word burbur, which can be translated to mean “catastrophe”. The country was being ruptured 
from within by clan-based warfare and factions vying for power that were plundering the country 
for control of key assets.191 As many as 25 000 people were killed and 2 million were internally 
190 Loc cit. 
191 Various clan-based movements, like the Somali National Front (SNF), United Somali Congress (USC), the 
Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) were among the rival clans 
in Mogadishu at the time. The first major explosion occurred when members of the victorious Hawiye tribe started 
killing non-Hawiye residents in the capital. Most of the victims were members of the Issaq clan, who were supports 
of Siad, and various clans belonging to the Darod clan-family. Politico-military leaders would incite members of 
their own clan to systematically hunt down members of opposing clans as a means of involving civilians in clan 
cleansing. Additionally, clans that felt victimised by the usurped military regime would carry out revenge killings on 
clans that gave support to Siad, and beneficiaries of the government.  
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displaced, with 2 million more fleeing the country in the 4 months of fighting in and around 
Mogadishu.192 
 
FAMINE 1991 – 1992  
Coupled with the internal fighting in Somalia, a drought plagued the country at the same time. 
The famine that consequently plagued the East African country was not caused solely by natural 
phenomena, but also by government and tribal conflicts.193 While government forces and armed 
militias fought for control of Somalia, the population of the country was left to fend for itself.  
Throughout the drought, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure by asset-stripping 
and ‘clan-cleansing’ heightened the famine in which an estimated 220 000194 to 300 000 died.195 
In many cases, it was the politically marginalised and poorly armed agro-pastoral communities in 
the south of Somalia that suffered the most. Raiding parties from the better armed clans in the 
north added to their plight.196 The repeated looting by unpaid militias of farming communities 
created the circumstances for widespread famine.197 Bay, in southern Somalia, previously one of 
the most productive agricultural provinces in the country, became the epicentre of the famine. 
192 Healy, S., & Bradbury, M., Op Cit, p. 10. 
193 Africa Twenty Four Media, Somalia Famine, 
http://photography.a24media.com/index.php/photogallery/photoarchive/62-somalia-famine, p. 1. 
194 Agence France-Presse, Somalia: 2011 Somali Famine worse than 1992’s, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201305021330.html, 2 May 2013, p. 1. 
195 Samatar, A., Genocidal Politics and the Somali Famine, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/2011726135256169831.html, 30 June 2011, p. 1. 
196 Healy, S., & Bradbury, M., Op Cit, p. 10. 
197 Menkaus, et. al.: A History of Mediation in Somalia since 1988, International Peace Alliance, May 2009, p. 25. 
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Warlords in the region, instead of using the production for the benefit of the citizenry, were 
rather using it as a weapon against farmers and pastoralists to leverage control.198 
 
Food was scarce throughout the country, and millions of people were forced to flee their homes 
both from powerful clansmen in search of food. International aid organisations used large trucks 
and convoys to transport food aid to stations around Somalia and people began to flock to these 
stations in hope.199 In many cases this hope was destroyed by greed. Many aid convoys were 
hijacked before arriving at their designated aid stations. Militias used the foodstuffs for their own 
clan, or sold it for weaponry. In many cases, international aid was inadvertently fuelling the 
Somali civil war instead of helping the citizens. 
 
SOMALIA 1991 - PRESENT 
It is axiomatic that the political situation in the country was marred by both colonial opposition, 
as well as authoritarian leadership failing to govern the country adequately. Somalia has had no 
fully functioning government since the ousting of then-President Barre in 1991.200 The rivalry 
between Somali warlords, ‘government’ forces, and a number of Islamist insurgents has resulted 
in thousands of casualties and displacement of Somalis. 
198 Gangs of militiamen invaded the region and looted farms to such an extent that food production was not allowed 
out of the region as the local major warlord wanted it all under his control. By being in control of all food 
production, it gave him the power of distribution.  
199 “Africa Twenty Four Media” Op Cit. 
200 IRIN, Somalia: Conflict timeline from 2000, http://www.irinnews.org/report/85051/somalia-conflict-timeline-
from-2000, 29 June 2009, p. 1. 
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In 1993, the Addis Ababa Agreement, an UN-sponsored agreement, was signed by 
approximately 15 Somali factions. This followed the General Agreement at the Informal 
Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation that was held in January of the same year.201 
The Addis Ababa Agreement was designed to provide a blueprint for the establishment of a 
transitional Somali government. This agreement became the lynchpin for the entire process of 
reconciliation and state-building assigned to the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).202 Along 
with the Addis Ababa Agreement, there were around 20 000 UN peacekeepers in Somalia in 
December 1992. Their goal was to put an end to the massive famine and civil war. As many as 
250 000 casualties were reported as a result of the famine in 1991 – 1992.203 
 
On 26 August 2000, a 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan and tribal 
representation, elected Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the president of Somalia.204 In April 2001, the 
Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC), which was a group of factions in 
southern Somalia who were opposed to the interim government, formed in Ethiopia to put 
forward a rival national government. There were many attempts to bring the two sides into 
agreement, which did not reach fruition.205  
In 2004, the Transnational Federal Government (TFG) was created. This was a ruling body 
comprised of representatives from Somalia’s largest clans.206 The TFG did not believe the 
201 Menkhaus, et. al. Op Cit, p. 24. 
202 Loc cit. 
203 Loc cit. 
204 “Somalia: Conflict timeline since 2000”, Op Cit. 
205 Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi attempted to do so in November-December 2001, where the Nakuru 
agreement was signed. In January 2004, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveri, chairman of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), which was tasked with reconciliation talks, allegedly brokered a deal to resolve 
contentious issues.205 
206 Wise, R.: al-Shabaab, Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 2011, p. 2.  
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situation in Somalia was safe enough to relocate from Kenya, where it had formed in exile, 
without foreign protection.207 However, both the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) 
declined to provide a protection force, and thus the TFG elicited Ethiopian armed forces and 
moved into Baidoa in southeast Somalia in 2006. Although the TFG held support from abroad, 
the organisation was increasingly isolated within Somalia.208 In 2008, following negotiations in 
Djibouti, the TFG amalgamated with the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS). 
However, this “unity” was fraught from the start, as many Islamist movements had boycotted the 
Djibouti negotiations. 
 
ISLAMIC INFLUENCES IN SOMALIA POST-BARRE 
Two Islamic groups became prominent during the time. They were the Islamic Union (IU – 
otherwise known as Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam), and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).209 There is no 
confirmed date for the creation of the IU. Many commentators have dated it around 1983. The IU 
is believed to have been a splinter group of a local Somali chapter of the transnational Muslim 
Brotherhood.210 The organisation received funding, support, and influence from Salafi/Wahhabi 
movements that had the support of Saudi-based charity organisations. The IU was unique insofar 
as it was comprised of “educated, young men who had studied and worked in the Middle 
207 Moller, B.: The Somali Conflict, Danish Institute for International Studies, 
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/59871/1/592906116.pdf, 2009, p. 15. 
208 The TFG was perceived as an Ethiopian proxy, which further alienated the government from support of the local 
population. Additionally, because the TFG was created outside of Somalia, it lacked legitimacy. The TFG benefitted 
militarily and held international diplomatic support, but it lacked the capacity to deal with issues on the ground in 
Somalia. 
209 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M., Understanding al-Shabaab, http://www.daveedgr.com/publications/policy-
journal-articles/understanding-al-shabaab/, 4 November 2010, p. 1. 
210 Barnes, C., & Hassan, H.: The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts, Chatham House, 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf, April 2007, p. 3. 
Page 65 of 234 
 
                                                            
East”211, and was not an organisation formed amongst the poorer classes. Although it had a 
covert existence, the goals of the IU were to overthrow Barre’s regime and install an Islamic 
State, which would unify the territories that were not incorporated into Somalia at independence 
– north-eastern Kenya, Odagen in Ethiopia, and Djibouti.212 
In 1991, after the overthrow of Barre, the IU attempted to gain a foothold in Somalia by 
acquiring “targets of opportunity”, that included strategic sites of seaports and crossroads. 
However, the town of Luuq near the border with Ethiopia and Kenya was the only area the IU 
could hold onto for a sustained period. Luuq became the IU safehaven and strict sharia law was 
implemented. However, due to the IU’s stirring up of separatist behaviour in Ethiopia’s Odagen, 
as well as IU-orchestrated militant activity in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian forces invaded Luuq 
and destroyed the IU’s stronghold.213 After the invasion, remnants of the IU sought refuge in 
Mogadishu, where they subsequently joined the ICU movement.214 
 
In mid-2004, 11 Sharia courts merged to create the ICU, under the leadership of Sheikh 
Ahmed.215 This second Islamic group that held prominence in Somalia, the ICU, can be 
classified as a “loose coalition of Islamists and local sharia courts”.216 The ICU was more 
militarily proficient and more capable of governing than the defeated IU. Whereas the IU gained 
international attention for its activities bordering Ethiopia, the ICU was more daring and received 
international attention by capturing Mogadishu in 2006. At this point, the ICU was virtually in 
211 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit. 
212 Loc cit. 
213 Loc cit. 
214 Barnes, C., & Hassan, H. Op Cit, p. 3. 
215 Wise, R. Op Cit, p.3. 
216 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit. 
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control of the capital’s key strategic points.217 However, it is important to note that the ICU was 
comprised of both moderate and hardline Islamic elements, and it was not until the hardliners 
gained strength that they succeeded in marginalising the moderates and pushing the ICU towards 
a more radical approach to governing. Like the IU, the ICU implemented sharia law in its 
territories and gained greater popularity amongst Somalis by its emphasis on stability and the 
rule of law (Sharia law), and denouncing support of warlords and harnessing Islam as the 
religion of the downtrodden.218 
The IU and ICU were able to provide some stability through religion, compared to semi-anarchy 
that reigned under the secular control of the Somali authorities. This may provide evidence that 
the conflict between religion and secularism is more complex than at first thought. Religion 
provided the marginalised with the opportunity of permanence that was often not the case under 
the rule of the warlords. Warlords often ruled through subjugation, whereas for many 
disillusioned Somalis, Islam provided the means to throw off the yoke of oppression. Somalia 
was at this time a battleground between religion and secularism, which appears to still be the 
case. 
In February 2006, a group of Mogadishu-based warlords, united by Mohamed Qanyare and 
backed by the US, formed the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism 
(ARPCT) in order to confront the ICU.219 Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was wanted by the US for 
alleged association with al-Qaeda, was part of the IU. Thus, the US backing of the ARPCT could 
217 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit. 
218 Botha, A. & Solomon H, Op Cit, p. 13. 
219 “Somalia: Conflict timeline since 2000”, Op Cit. 
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be seen either directly or indirectly as a ploy to challenge Aweys as well as the Islamic Courts 
that were gaining influence.220 
The resulting clashes and violence between the ICU and the warlords’ forces forced thousands to 
flee the capital. The ICU defeated the warlords and restored a semblance of stability to 
Mogadishu. This was short lived. The ICU attempted to intimidate and isolate the TFG in 
Baidoa. Further provocations by the ICU were ever present during “peace negotiations” between 
the two organisations. The involvement of Ethiopia in its backing of the TFG resulted in a call by 
Aweys for the “Greater Somalia” to be carved out of the Horn of Africa.221  
It would appear that the battles between the warlords’ forces and the ICU represented a clash of 
the religious beliefs of the ICU and the secular dogmas of the warlords. The conflict of religion 
versus secularism played a pivotal role in the conflict between the government, with the backing 
of neighbouring countries and the radical Islamist groups in Somalia.  
 
FACTORS LEADING TO THE RISE OF THE IU AND ICU 
Amid the continued lack of effective governance, the country was subject to soaring poverty. 
With the destruction of infrastructure, ethnic cleansing, almost continuous armed conflict, a 
famine, a number of semiautonomous regions were devastated.222 
In Somalia, according to the UNDP’s Somalia Human Development Report 2012, 82% of the 
population are “considered poor across multiple dimensions”.223 The figures point to a greater 
220 Roggio, B. The rise and fall of Somalia’s Islamic Courts: An Online History, The Long War Journal, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the_rise_fall_of_som.php, 4 January 2007, p. 1. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 2. 
Page 68 of 234 
 
                                                            
socio-economic problem in the country. With such a high poverty figure, there appears to be 
little hope for any real development or investment. Related to high poverty is the social and 
economic indicator, unemployment. High levels of unemployment can show whether or not a 
country is able to provide adequate economic opportunity for its citizens. Over 70% of Somalia’s 
population is under the age of 30, and thus youth unemployment is a vital indicator of the 
country’s welfare. In the same report, the youth unemployment rate in Somalia was at 67%.224 
Thus, one can see why many young men felt so disenfranchised by the Somali government and 
believed that the government was not meeting the demands of its multi-ethnic people.  
The diverse mosaic of the Somali society has given rise to many conflicts in the nation. Through 
manipulation of clan sentiment, political and military leaders in Somalia were able to turn 
ordinary civilians against one another along clan lines. According to Lidwien Kaptejins,225 it was 
not the clans that killed, but rather people who killed in the name of their clan.  
The clan-conflict emerging from the politico-military regime of Barre, himself closely identified 
with the Darood sub-clan of the Marehan,226 involved mass violence against civilians in the 
Somaliland and Puntland regions. Clan-based groups in southern Somalia were also subject to 
Barre’s wrath, as attempts were made by various clan-based groups to usurp him. The Isaaq tribe 
in northern Somalia and Somaliland, along with the Majeerteen clan in Puntland, and the Hawiye 
were all targeted by the Barre regime to dissuade any support for the Somali National Movement 
223 United Nations Development Programme: About Somalia, United Nations Development Programme, 
http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo/, p.1.  
224 Ibid.  
225 Kapetejins is a historian focusing on African history, specifically on Somalia and Sudan, at the Wellesley College 
in Massachusetts, United States of America. 
226 Greenfield, R., Obituary: Mohamed Siad Barre, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-mohamed-
said-barre-1566452.html, 3 January 1995, p. 1. 
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(SNM), the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), and the United Somali Congress 
(USC).227  
After independence and under the brutal and oppressive regime of Barre, Somalia suffered a 
military dictatorship that led to many social and civil rights being suppressed. Somalia, with 
guidance from the Soviet Union, pursued a more socialist approach, but invested heavily in its 
military.228 The investments went into weapons and troops for both foreign and domestic 
structures. This led to grim socio-economic development, outside of the military. There were 
little resources for investment into vital public essentials, such as education, healthcare, and 
infrastructure.229 The focus on the military, instead of social and economic development could 
only have angered the already fragile population. The military was used by Barre to further 
cement his hold on political power and often the ruling regime would “dissuade” other ethnic 
groups by violence rather than dialogue. Thus, the conflict between ethnic groups and the secular 
system of government comes as no surprise. Religion became the uniting factor in opposition to 
the government. This will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
In a 2001 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, the international body found 
that the 21-year regime of Barre had one of the worst human rights records in Africa.230 
Somalia’s entire judicial and law enforcement systems collapsed, human rights abuses escalated, 
and internationally and domestically accepted norms and rules were methodically sullied. 
227 Somaliland Press, Somaliland: Brief history of the Somali National Movement (SNM), 
http://somalilandpress.com/somalilandbrief-history-of-the-somali-national-movement-snm-37322, 10 November 
2012, p. 1. 
228 Leeson, P.: “Better off Stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse” in Journal of Comparative 
Economics, Vol. 35, 2007, p. 693. Retrieved from http://www.peterleeson.com/better_off_stateless.pdf.  
229 Ibid.  
230 Bradbury, M. et. al.: Human Development Report 2001: Somalia, United Nations Development Programme, 
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Somalia/Somalia_2001_HDR_en.pdf, 2001, p. 42. 
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After Barre was usurped, his Marehan sub-clan and members of the Darood clan fled 
Mogadishu, but the members of the Hawiye clan could not agree on how to share power.231 This 
resulted in an inner clan conflict between the Adgai sub-clan and the Habargidir. There is still a 
complicated web of clan-based politics in Somalia. Southern Somalia is plagued by fighting 
between the Darood clan and the Habargidir sub-clan of the Hawiye. Thus, even with the 
removal of a dictator and the increasing radical Islamic courts, the situation in Somalia is dogged 
by clan-conflict.  
The structure of the economy played a major role in the country’s collapse. There was a 
mismatch between the needs of the population, and the incentive structure set by the state and 
market. There was a reliance on conditional foreign loans as the sole source for financial 
development and investment.232 Those in charge dominated the distribution of the foreign aid, 
which led to the misappropriation of funds for their own ethnic clans, and embezzlement. There 
were very little public resources directed to improve and grow the agricultural sector,233 which in 
a country in which starvation was evident, is a major dereliction of duty by the authorities. The 
political conflict over Somalia’s meagre resources brought about the virtual collapse of the 
economy that perpetuated social restlessness and communal strife.  
Lawlessness became endemic in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, as competing warlords vied 
for control of various neighbourhoods to cement their position in the capital. In the late 1990s, 
sharia courts were being created in these neighbourhoods as a localised attempt to implement a 
231 Muthuma, G., Clans and Crisis in Somalia, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/may/06/clansandcrisisinsomalia, 6 May 2007, p. 1. 
232 Samatar, A.: “Somalia’s Post-Conflict Economy: A political economy approach” in Journal of Somali Studies, 
Vol. 7, No. 8, 2007, p. 129. Retrieved from 
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=bildhaan&sei-
redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.co.za%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D10%26q%3Dsomalia%2527s%2B
economy%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C5#search=%22somalias%20economy%22.  
233 Ibid, p. 130. 
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degree of stability. Although the majority of Somalis are not particularly religious, and practice a 
more moderate form of Islam, the sharia courts were welcomed as a means to fill the vacuum 
created by the disappearance of policing and judiciary.234 However, these courts slowly became a 
law unto themselves, by recruiting their own mercenaries to hand out punishments. Punishments 
included public stoning, amputations, and beheadings for crimes such as listening to music, or 
shaving beards.235 
Islamic clerics from the Abgal sub-clan, part of Somalia’s largest and most powerful Hawiye 
clan, with the blessings of local political leaders, founded the first Islamic Court in Mogadishu in 
1994, after nearly 4 years of persistent anarchy and botched political reforms.236 The Islamic 
Courts were set up as a reaction to the dire need for some means to uphold law and order. The 
enforcement of the Courts’ laws and punishments were not carried out by government officials, 
but rather by militia from the local clan. The Courts were, whether directly or indirectly, part of 
the clan power struggle in Mogadishu. The Hawiye clan members received special treatment, as 
well as “security” under the Islamic Courts. An unintended consequence was that in north 
Mogadishu the Islamic courts proved to be very successful. The chairman, Sheikh Ali Dheere, 
was becoming a popular figure and a possible rival for Abgal “warlord-entrepreuneur” Ali 
Mahdi. Mahdi demoted Dheere and issued a decree calling for the dismantling of the entire 
Courts establishment.237 The Islamic Courts in south Mogadishu were not as successful as their 
northern partners due to the political leadership of General Mohamed Farah Aideed, political 
leader of the Habr Gedir, the rival sub-clan of the Hawiye.  
 
234 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 3. 
235 Ibid, p. 5. 
236 Barnes, C., & Hassan, H. Op Cit, p. 2. 
237 Barnes, C., & Hassan, H. Op Cit, p. 2.  
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In 2006, when the ICU had all but defeated the warlords and had taken control of Mogadishu, it 
began spreading their system of leadership throughout the rest of the country. From an outsider’s 
perspective, this appeared to be a great stride forward towards stability for the war-torn country. 
The conflict appeared to have come to a halt; crime was plummeting, and businesses were 
starting to reopen in the hope of better trade. These positive affects garnered greater support for 
the ICU. However, looking deeper into the situation on the ground, one can see that it was not all 
positive.  The more radical or extreme elements of the ICU were imposing strict Islamic law. 
This resulted in women having to be completely covered, football was banned, and any 
individuals who were perceived to be “un-Islamic” were severely punished.238  
Competing warlords and longstanding clan conflicts prevented any single entity from decisively 
controlling the country and enacting widespread stability.239 According to Wise (2011), by the 
time of writing his report, there had been as many as 14 attempts at a peace process since 
1991.240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
238 Ibid. 
239 Wise, R. Op Cit, p.2. 
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PART TWO 
 
AL-SHABAAB 
Al-Shabaab, or “The Youth”, emerged as the radical military wing of the ICU.241 The group was 
reportedly the youth wing of the ICU.242 The exact history or time of inception of al-Shabaab 
varies, with some commentators believing that the group first rose to prominence in 2005 after a 
series of well-coordinated reprisal killings in Mogadishu in response to the assassinations of ICU 
members. Other reports believe that the group was created in 1998 by Islamic leader Aweys as 
the “crack military unit” of the ICU.243 Another report posits that al-Shabaab was created in mid-
2006 as a “special unit” of the ICU to carry out the Court’s “dirty punishments” and spearhead 
the insurgency against the authorities and foreign intervention.  
The origins of al-Shabaab are not perfectly clear. What is clear is that by 2007 al-Shabaab had 
parted ways with other insurgency groups in Somalia. Al-Shabaab boycotted a conference held 
in Eritrea for the opposition factions within Somalia, where the ICU re-emerged as the Alliance 
for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS). Al-Shabaab was vocal in its criticism of the conference 
and subsequent ARS, claiming it worked with non-Muslims and failed to adopt a global jihadist 
ideology. Al-Shabaab, through its leader in 2012, Abu Mansoor al-Amriki (formerly known as 
Omar Hammami, an American Muslim, who was reportedly killed in Somalia in September 
241 Pantucci, R.: Understanding the al-Shabaab networks, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5025~v~Understanding_the_al-
Shabaab_networks_by_Raffaello_Pantucci.pdf, October 2009, p. 1. 
242 Masters, J.: Al-Shabaab, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650, September 
2013, p. 1. 
243 Pantucci, R. Op Cit, p. 1. 
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2013244), was critical of the ICU’s involvement, and was concerned that cooperation with 
“infidels”, (as the non-Muslim country of Eritrea was referred to) would force its ideology to be 
one of a political nature, rather than one with a global jihadist perspective. The criticism touted 
the idea of pan-Islamism in opposition the ICU’s clan-based politics.245 Al-Amriki went further 
to condemn the Islamic Courts for having limited goals, instead of a global goal of establishing 
an Islamic caliphate.  
It is important to understand that al-Shabaab is the latest in a long line of Islamic inspired groups 
involved in the Somalia conflict. Following the loss of the ICU’s control of Somalia, the group 
gained prominence. Al-Shabaab’s hard-line approach was evident from the beginning, as it 
vociferously accused the ICU of cowardice and being more interested in “having a good time in 
foreign lands” than carrying out the vision of an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.246 
 
ORIGINS OF AL-SHABAAB 
Somalia, and Mogadishu in particular, was a battleground between secular warlords and radical 
Islamic groups. The country had no effective governance, and appeared to be waiting for the 
outcome between the two warring factions, the Mogadishu-based warlords of the ARPCT and 
the Islamic militants of the ICU. The government at the time backed the warlord coalition. The 
government had no plan on how to govern and stabilise the country without the warlords, nor 
was there a long-term plan for after the coalition.  
244 Associated Press, US-born ‘jihadist rapper’ Omar Hammami reportedly killed in Somalia, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/12/jihadist-rapper-omar-hammami-killed, 12 September 2013, p. 1. 
245 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit, p. 1. 
246 Pantucci, R. Op Cit, p. 2. 
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According to Gartenstein-Ross and Gruen (2010), al-Shabaab represents an evolutionary step 
from two previous Somali Islamic groups, the IU and the ICU.247 There are three strands to this 
evolution: ideology, networking, and ability. Ideologically al-Shabaab and its predecessors all 
went through a phase of concentrating leadership in a more radical style under the dogma of 
Sharia law. However, al-Shabaab differed from the IU and the ICU as its primary focus was on 
Somalia and neighbouring territories where ethnic Somalis constitute sections of the particular 
populations.248 Al-Shabaab’s leadership advocated a global jihadist ideology.249  
The second element, networking, relates to al-Shabaab’s association with al-Qaeda. A number of 
knowledgeable commentators believe that al-Qaeda and the IU were not deeply connected, 
whereas al-Shabaab openly engaged with the senior leadership of al-Qaeda.250 This association 
will be examined later in the chapter.  
The final strand to the evolution is the groups’ ability and opportunity to govern. As mentioned, 
the IU was unable to sustain control over territories apart from Luuq for any extended period. On 
the other hand, the ICU and later al-Shabaab, have been able to exert control over territories in 
Somalia and neighbouring regions.251 The governing strategies put in place by the ICU and al-
Shabaab, although primarily based on Sharia law, showed careful planning and the ability to 
maintain and expand its authority. 
 
 
247 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit, p. 1. 
248 One of al-Shabaab’s primary goals was to unify what is regarded as Greater Somalia. The Greater Somalia 
territory included northeastern Kenya, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Djibouti – added to the existing Somali state. 
249 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid.  
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By late 2006, Baidoa, the final stronghold under control of the TFG, was besieged.252 The ICU 
launched an attack on Baidoa expecting a swift defeat of the Ethiopian forces that manned the 
security posts. The response by the Ethiopians was greater than the ICU imagined, resulting in 
the TFG and Ethiopians wresting control of Magodishu, as well as key strategic points, from the 
hands of the ICU on 26 December 2006. The combined force then managed to reverse the 
strategic gains made by the ICU.253 However, after its success the TFG had no coherent plan to 
stabilise Somalia. The head of the ICU’s executive council, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, called 
for an insurgency to repel the TFG once again, which succeeded.  
It is believed that the intervention of the Ethiopian forces – at the request of the weakened 
Somali government – became a catalyst and radicalising period for al-Shabaab.254 While much of 
the ICU fled into exile in neighbouring countries, al-Shabaab retreated to southern Somalia to 
regroup.  
252 Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Gruen, M. Op Cit. 
253 Loc cit. 
254 Masters, J. Op Cit. 
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Al-Shabaab then began using guerrilla-style attacks on the conventional Ethiopian army, and 
through unconventional assaults, the organisation was able to gain a semblance of control over 
large regions in the south. Addis Ababa has repeatedly stated that the intervention was a 
“reluctant response” to the ICU’s calls for a jihad in Ethiopia, and highlights that the intervention 
was supported by many global actors including the United States and the AU. Ethiopia was 
requested by the failing Somali government of the day to help oust the ICU from Mogadishu. 
The reasons behind the intervention, which is whether or not it was reluctant, or was supported 
by global actors, do not really matter. The importance lies in the outcome of the intervention, 
which led to the radicalisation of al-Shabaab. However, there appears to be a skewed focus on 
Ethiopia’s involvement and its contribution to the rise and development of al-Shabaab, and little 
to no emphasis placed on the role of the Somali government. The complete lack of central 
governance in Somalia, and the lack of forward planning, in relation to the period after the TFG 
wrested control from the ICU, warrants concern.  
Phillips (2013) argued that al-Shabaab gained greater influence in Somalia post the Ethiopia 
invasion in around 2007.255 He believed that this larger influence was in part from the material 
backing of the Eritrean government, which used al-Shabaab as a proxy against that country’s 
lifelong enemy, Ethiopia. 
If the Somali government had been able to sustain control of its own capital as well as maintain 
vigilance over the developing fundamentalism of the ICU’s al-Shabaab wing, the Ethiopian 
invasion would probably not have been required. This seems simplistic, but a level of blame is to 
be attributed to Somalia’s lack of ability to govern. This significance cannot be understated. The 
255 Phillips, M. The complete, concise history of al-Shabaab, the group behind the Kenyan mall attack, 
http://qz.com/126991/a-concise-complete-history-of-al-shabaab-the-group-behind-the-kenyan-mall-attack/, 23 
September 2013, p. 2. 
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ineffectiveness of the government, through clan-politics, corruption and violence, resulted in an 
environment that was conducive to the establishment of the al-Shabaab organisation. After the 
Ethiopian and TFG forces reoccupied Mogadishu and other key strategic gains, the Somali 
government did not implement a plan to stabilise the country, nor did it attempt to track down, 
limit and destroy al-Shabaab members and strongholds in the south. Instead, it appears, the 
Somali government simply seemed to ignore the fact that the terrorist group existed, let alone 
controlled large swathes of the country. The lack of ability and political will to remove arguably 
the largest destabilising force both in Somalia and the East African region falls on the shoulders 
of the leaders of Somalia.  
 
THE LACK OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND AL-SHABAAB’S RISE 
In 1970, the year after Barre usurped control, he transformed the country into a socialist state 
with central planning under the government’s policy of “scientific socialism”.256 This created a 
twofold damaging effect on development in Somalia. There were little resources left for public 
goods and services such as education and healthcare, as the government focused on the military. 
The military dictatorship, by eliminating all possible opposition, was left unchecked and 
corruption and embezzlement were rife. The economy of Somalia suffered massively under these 
limitations. Barre abandoned his socialist programme, to gain funding from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), but any finance that resulted was being diverted or redirected for political 
patronage and rampant corruption. Even prior to the country’s collapse in 1991, a number of 
256 Leeson, P. Op Cit, p. 692. 
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sectors in the economy were in shambles. The agricultural and livestock sector had just about 
disintegrated, and malnutrition and starvation were common place.257  
After the collapse of Barre’s regime, Somalia descended into anarchy that had no “functioning 
economy”.258 Although, some sectors appeared to be better off in stateless Somalia,259 and the 
various factions that controlled territories in Somalia were able to provide public goods and 
services, the country’s political climate was established by these controlling factions among 
others. There was no loyalty to a government, since there was no effective or cogent government 
present. The “taxes” raised by the militia provided for public goods and security, while the 
Islamic courts secured the protection of payments to businessmen.260 The political environment 
was slowly but steadily determined by the lack of economy and security by the government, and 
more by the assured safety of goods and services by militant groups.  
Al-Shabaab developed relationships with villages and local clans in the areas under its control 
because it provided the goods and services261 that the Somali government had failed to do. Al-
Shabaab was regarded as an authority that brought stability to the regions for a short while.262 
However in 2006, the group took on a more radical approach with the catalyst being the 
Ethiopian invasion.  
Wise (2011) wrote that the Ethiopian invasion was responsible for "transforming the group from 
a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into the most 
257 Loc Cit.  
258 Leeson, P. Op Cit, p. 691. 
259 Somalia’s cross-border cattle trade with Kenya was particularly beneficial without government predation.  
260 Leeson, P. Op Cit, p. 705 
261 Al-Shabaab was able to provide adequate policing, judicial decision-making, and welfare. Although, the policing 
and judicial services were in accordance with Sharia law, and thus favoured Muslims, it did replace the general 
anarchy with a sense of law and order. 
262 Niang, A.: Chaos and its Consequences: The development of al-Shabaab and the underdevelopment of Somalia, 
http://www.pennsid.org/2013/10/chaos-and-its-consequences-the-development-of-al-shabaab-and-the-
underdevelopment-of-somalia/, Penn Society for International Development, 22 October 2013, p. 1. 
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powerful and radical armed faction in the country”.263 From 2006 – 2011 the ranks of al-Shabaab 
expanded from around 400 to 1000. However, the total size of al-Shabaab is not clear.264 At the 
same time, information about the group’s association with al-Qaeda started to emerge as well as 
al-Shabaab’s commitment to a global jihadist network. In 2010 Al-Shabaab “vowed to connect 
the Horn of Africa jihad to the one led by al-Qaeda and its leader Sheikh Osama bin Laden.”265 
The group made good on its promises almost instantly with an attack in Kampala, Uganda. 
“The most powerful and radical armed faction in the country” is how Rob Wise266 describes al-
Shabaab after Ethiopia’s invasion. The group was able to swell its membership, and the 
association with al-Qaeda became apparent. Al-Shabaab emerged as an Islamic alternative to 
government, as the anarchy under the TFG had left much of the population in desperate need of 
basic necessities, security and the rule of law. Furthermore, al-Shabaab was once in control of 
Mogadishu, and held key strongpoints in the resource rich areas of the country.267 Some 
commentators believe that al-Shabaab developed alongside Somalia’s underdevelopment to deal 
with the foreign intervention.268 The humanitarian needs of the people benefitted al-Shabaab, as 
the group developed relationships with village people and clan elders, and through its control of 
resources, al-Shabaab was able to provide for the population under their control.  
Additionally, many Islamist-nationalist fighters joined al-Shabaab to combat the invading 
Ethiopian forces. The response of al-Shabaab to the Ethiopian intervention both at the time of the 
TFG’s request for help, as well as to the attacks on Ethiopian forces that followed, helped boost 
263 Masters, J. Op Cit. 
264 Watkins, T., Al-Shabaab grew amid Somalia’s lawlessness, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/21/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-explainer/, 23 September 2013, p. 1. 
265 Masters, J. Op Cit. 
266 Counterterrorism Expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
267 Niang, A. Op CIt. 
268 Loc Cit. 
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al-Shabaab’s appeal to these Islamist-nationalists. Al-Shabaab was not defeated, but instead 
under the ruse of a “tactical retreat” withdrew into the hinterland of southern Somalia to regroup. 
The secular government and its supporters were not in control of Somalia, and the mosaic society 
required more in terms of authority. Some supporters stood by the TFG, while others followed 
their religious beliefs and backed the ideology and Sharia law that al-Shabaab was enforcing. 
The conflict between secularism and religion appears to be a thread throughout Somalia’s 
history.  
There are rumours that al-Shabaab splintered into different factions based upon differing 
ideologies, but the organisation has proved adept at managing any divisions to form an effective 
thorn in the TFG’s side. Spokesperson for the Kenyan police, Eric Kiraithe, believes that the 
availability of firearms, and lawlessness from Somalia, together with the failure of legal ways of 
resolving disputes, exacerbated the situation. It is clear that regional actors who are being 
impacted by the Somali situation, place the majority of blame on the laissez-faire attitude of the 
government.269 
Somalia’s lack of governance and its own corruption can also be seen as a trigger for the rise of 
al-Shabaab, as that sectarian group’s membership felt marginalised and disenfranchised by the 
corrupt political elite. Many international donors were concerned with money going into Somalia 
because of the perception of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government siphoning off the 
aid.270 Prior to Hassan Sheikh, and the other attempts at governance, the political void in Somalia 
provided a fertile ground for al-Shabaab to operate almost unhindered, with no government 
actions stopping its growth. 
269 IRIN, Kenya-Somalia: Insecurity without borders, http://www.irinnews.org/report/90505/kenya-somalia-
insecurity-without-borders, 17 September 2010, p. 1. 
270 Fabricius, P. Op Cit. 
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GOVERNMENTS’ RESPONSES TO AL-SHABAAB 
Successive Somali governments have struggled to deal with the threat of al-Shabaab, and have 
had to rely on external actors and their counter-terrorism efforts. Somalia had relied upon foreign 
intervention almost exclusively until April 2013, when the Somali government deployed a 
number of counterterrorism units in Mogadishu, with the aim of disarming and destroying 
terrorist cells and strongholds.271 The hope was that these units would combat the threat of al-
Shabaab and bring about peace and stability. However, even though the units were government-
deployed, they appeared to be reliant on the international community’s contributions in order to 
be adequately resourced. This appeared to be a step in the right direction for the Somali 
government to take ownership of the troubles at home but the success of the units cannot be 
sufficiently measured. There is a possibility that they achieved a modicum of success, as assisted 
by foreign intervention, but outside of the capital, the terrorist group is still a massive threat. 
Additionally, the withdrawal from Mogadishu by al-Shabaab can be seen as a tactical retreat to 
reorganise and rearm.  
The attack by al-Shabaab on the Presidential Palace, Villa Somalia, in February 2014 proved that 
the counterterrorism units did not achieve substantial success. It did, however, expose Somalia’s 
fairly meagre counterterrorism ability. On 24 May 2014, there was another attack in central 
Mogadishu, this time targeting the Somali parliament.272 The parliament buildings are about 
300m away from Villa Somalia. What is symbolic about al-Shabaab’s target is that President 
271 Hussein, A., Counter-terrorism unit to hit Mogadishu streets, 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/18/feature-01, 18 April 2013, p. 1.  
272 The casualties of the attack vary, depending on whether one believes the Somali police or al-Shabaab. Estimates 
are between 10 and 30 government and AU forces, with around 7 al-Shabaab militants killed. Al-Shabaab utilized a 
car bomb, a suicide bomber, and gunfire in the attack. 
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Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was in South Africa for that country’s presidential inauguration,273 so 
it was not a direct attack on an individual. Rather it was a symbolic attack on the authority of 
Somalia. Al-Shabaab was clearly making a statement that it is capable of waging war in the 
capital despite the presence of government and foreign forces.  
James Clapper274 identified that political infighting, ill-equipped government institutions, and the 
lack of effective governance, threatens stability in Somalia. Thus, even with heightened security 
around President Hassan, and the counterterrorism units operating in the capital, al-Shabaab is 
able to operate almost with impunity. The country’s attempts at countering terrorism appear to 
have all but failed.  
In April 2014, the Somali Federal Cabinet submitted an anti-terrorism law to Parliament for 
approval, which aims to punish groups engaged in terror-related acts. Its aim is to “help to 
eliminate the groups who are threatening our [Somalia] security and endangering our society”.275 
Although this sounds like an obvious and necessary law, especially in a terrorism-stricken 
country, it has taken so long to come to fruition that there are already problems. A report 
commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, found that the growing counterterrorism legislation in Somalia is 
having a direct adverse effect on humanitarian efforts, by restricting funding and stalling project  
273 Omar, F., & Hussein, A., Al-Shabaab attacks Somali parliament http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/24/us-
somalia-blast-idUSBREA4N03B20140524, 24 May 2014, p. 1. 
274 US Director of National Intelligence. 
275 Horseed Media, Somalia Cabinet submits anti-terrorism law to Parliament, 
http://horseedmedia.net/news/2014/04/somalia-cabinet-passes-anti-terrorism-law-parliament/, 24 April 2014, p. 1. 
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implementation.276 The report also established that many humanitarians involved in Somalia 
believe the legislation is polarising the tense environment by portraying humanitarian workers as 
being partisan. In a country so desperate for humanitarian aid, as the government is struggling to 
improve the levels of impoverishment, any added obstacle to humanitarian assistance is 
devastating.  
 
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND INTERVENTION 
Foreign intervention in Somalia has played a key role in the country’s development. The ICU 
firmly rejected any form of foreign involvement in Somali affairs. The ICU went as far as to 
launch a “defensive jihad” against Ethiopia, and supported the ethnic Somali uprisings in the 
Ogadeen region. As stated earlier, in December 2006, under the auspices of the TFG, Ethiopia 
launched a fully-fledged invasion against the Islamic Courts. The ICU, knowing the battle was 
very uneven fled Mogadishu to regroup.277 The resultant establishment of the TFG in Mogadishu 
worsened the plight of Somalis as a humanitarian crisis has developed, the likes of which can be 
compared to that suffered in the 1990s.  
 
KENYA’S ROLE 
Kenya has long been active and involved in Somali politics, sponsoring the peace accords that 
lasted from 2002 – 2004, and in creating the Transitional Federal Government. Ken Menkhaus 
276 IRIN, Counter-terrorism laws can stifle humanitarian action, http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/jul/25/counter-terrorism-humanitarian-aid-study, 25 July 2013, p. 1. 
277 Moller, B. Op Cit, p. 16. 
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(2012) identified that Kenya’s support of the TFG “earned it al-Shabaab’s wrath.”278 More 
recently, following the increase in both frequency and intensity of al-Shabaab attacks in 2010 
and 2011 along the Kenyan border, the country launched a number of military “semi-invasions” 
to drive al-Shabaab away from the border. Further involvement is that of Kenyan forces as part 
of the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia.279 The rivalry between Kenya and al-Shabaab 
does not solely reside within the borders of Somalia. The terrorist network has conducted and 
allegedly is still conducting, small-scale attacks, smuggling operations and fundraising in Kenya. 
There are around 2.4 million ethnic Somalis living in the north eastern region of Kenya and they 
provide recruitment opportunities and support for al-Shabaab, as the ethnic Somali minority is 
often marginalised.  
Kenya appears to be a secondary target for al-Shabaab, as the group has for the most part 
remained a Somalia-centric organisation.280 However, the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya in 
2013 that was claimed by al-Shabaab was the first large-scale attack by the Somali terrorist 
group outside of its home country. What one can glean from this attack is that it was not an 
attack to destabilise Kenya or attempt to gain a foothold in the country, but rather it was in 
retaliation for Kenya’s soft and hard power involvements.281 It is important to note that the attack 
in Kenya is an extension of al-Shabaab’s fight in Somalia, rather than a diversion away from it. 
According to Mann (2013), Kenya has become a target for al-Shabaab because it has involved 
itself as a type of foreign “party” in Somalia’s on going internal conflict.282  
278 Mann, S., Tit-For-Tat: Kenya, Somalia, and the Resurgence of al-Shabaab, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tit-for-tat-kenya-somalia-and-the-resurgence-of-al-shabaab, 29 November 2013, 
p. 1. 
279 Loc Cit. 
280 Loc Cit. 
281 Loc Cit. 
282 Loc Cit. 
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The near complete lack of effective governance in Somalia has allowed Islamic militant groups 
the freedom to promote anarchy and to prosper without threat of curtailment by government 
forces. It appears from the country’s unstable history since the overthrow of Barre, that 
government forces have been preoccupied with attempting to maintain power and control 
Mogadishu, rather than focusing on the underlying causes that brought about the rise of the 
Islamic militant movements. Somalia’s experience with formal government has been one of 
plunder and resource extraction by the ruling elite283 – as unfortunate anachronism of many 
African countries.  
 
More recently, the rivalry between Kenya and al-Shabaab has brought global attention to al-
Shabaab, which has welcomed the attention and persisted with attacks on Kenyan forces along 
the border, and more brazenly within the country with the attack on Westgate Mall and 
subsequent attacks.  
Since its inception and up to 2012, al-Shabaab held a strong position in southern Somalia. 
However, since 2012, the terrorist entity has lost its last fortification and economic lifeline from 
Kismayo.284 Gartenstein-Ross (2013) went as far as to say that in 2012 the organisation “melted 
away” but retained its military capabilities.285 This is evident from the group’s assaults during 
2012 and 2013. These attacks will be covered in more detail below.  
283 Powell, B., Somalia: Failed State, economic success? http://www.fee.org/the_freeman/detail/somalia-failed-state-
economic-success#axzz2iLfVP7nZ, 1 April 2009, p. 1. 
284 Lake, E., Nairobi mall attack signals the rise of al-Shabaab, 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/21/nairobi-mall-attack-signals-the-rise-of-al-shabaab.html, 21 
September 2013, p. 1. 
285 Loc Cit. 
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It appears that al-Shabaab was one of the many Islamic groups that were formed during the 
decades of anarchy in Somalia. The group did not initially pose the threat to the region that it 
now does. Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion, at the request of the TFG, turned out to be a double-edged 
sword: it may have eradicated al-Shabaab from its known strongholds, but it then provided the 
facilitator for the group’s affiliations to grow.286 With the ineffective Somali government, al-
Shabaab still poses a grave threat as long as there is little to no attempt to hinder or erdicate the 
group. 
 
AL-SHABAAB’S IDEOLOGY 
Al-Shabaab represents a step towards a global jihadist vision. Similar to the IU and ICU, al-
Shabaab believes that religious governance is the sole way to cure Somalia’s ills, but it is even 
more radical in its belief than its predecessors.  
Al-Shabaab’s implements a misguided and strict interpretation of Sharia law through overseeing 
all matters pertaining to law and governance in its controlled areas. It maintains power through 
strict punishment including torture and death, as well as through rules that censor any 
information for journalists. An example provided by Amnesty International in 2009 is that of a 
13-year-old female rape victim who was stoned to death in Kismayo for alleged adultery.287 
Al-Shabaab seems interested in a global goal, rather than the more domesticated goal of its 
forerunners. The group has stated the desire to establish control of the Greater Somalia region, 
which would govern territories in neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Additionally, the 
286 Many Islamist-nationalists joined al-Shabaab in the belief that Ethiopia was invading their country, al-Shabaab 
was standing in the way of Ethiopia impinging on Somalia’s sovereignty. 
287 Gartenstein-Ross, D. & Gruen, M. Op Cit.  
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group’s connections to al-Qaeda suggest that it also has an international agenda. Al-Shabaab see 
the continuation of jihad beyond the borders of Somalia as being a religious imperative.288  
In areas under al-Shabaab control, the group has enforced a harsh interpretation of Sharia law. 
Various types of entertainment are prohibited: smoking and shaving beards and many other “un-
Islamic” activities were also forbidden. The punishments for those “un-Islamic” acts were 
stonings and amputations among others. According to the US State Department, al-Shabaab has 
also violently persecuted non-Muslims. Beheadings and grave desecrations were carried out. The 
Somali government has been unable to hinder the terrorist group’s activities and control. 
Analysts say that the al-Shabaab’s resilience, despite the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) and TFG inflicted setbacks, is likely due to the significant support from local 
clans,289 and the perception that al-Shabaab is a viable alternative to the corrupt institutions in 
Mogadishu. In many cases, there appear to be parts of Somalia that the government appears to 
have ignored and left in the hands of al-Shabaab. The populations in these areas are thus under 
the control of ruthless religious dictators, which do not allow or provide for any form of non-
Sharia behaviour. Anarchy, as much as the Somali government might disagree, still remains in 
parts of the country, and al-Shabaab has exploited this disorder by implementing, what it deems 
as law, to maintain control.  
 
AL-SHABAAB’S RECRUITMENT TACTICS 
It is no secret that borders between countries in Africa are porous. Indeed, there are few countries 
that have a degree of competent control over their borders and over who enters or leaves the 
288 Loc Cit. 
289 Masters, J. Op Cit. 
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country. In the main, the Horn of Africa does not fall under that banner. According to Elbagir 
(2013), there are many panya routes, or “rat routes”, which are undetected trails that have been 
cut into the undergrowth across the border between Kenya and Somalia.290 These pathways have 
allowed smugglers, and possibly those with more nefarious motives, to travel between the two 
countries with a large degree of impunity. Although Kenya has attempted to strengthen security 
– especially after the Westgate Mall massacre – there is little to no government presence along 
these routes. The panya routes end at Dadaab camp, the largest refugee camp in the world, and it 
is believed by Kenyan authorities that al-Shabaab operatives travelled to Kenya and hid amongst 
the Dadaab inhabitants.291 
 
Gartenstein-Ross, et al. (2009) identified that in 2007 dozens of men of Somali descent were 
vanishing from Somali diaspora communities in the West, returning to Somalia to take up arms 
or train in al-Shabaab camps.292 This is a concern for the West and to Somalia’s stability and 
security. 
Al-Shabaab’s recruitment focuses on the plight of Somali refugees and on Somalis in the 
diasporas, particularly in the US and Canada, has been made easier by the fact that the Somali 
community “suffers the highest unemployment rate among East African diaspora communities in 
the United States.”293 In fleeing Somalia and trying to find a better life abroad, many Somalis 
find that their situation has not improved. Al-Shabaab, and other terrorist organisations, use these 
troubles to their advantage. The United Kingdom (UK), which is home to the largest diaspora 
290 Elbagir, N., Exposing smuggler routes across the Somalia-Kenya border, 
http://www.wardheernews.com/exposing-smuggler-routes-across-somalia-kenya-border/, 18 November 2013, p. 1. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Gartenstein-Ross, D. “The Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s al-Shabaab” in Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2009. p. 1. 
293 Ibid. 
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Somali community in Europe, reported that “dozens of Islamic extremists had returned to Britain 
from terror training camps in Somalia.”294 Australia, Canada and Sweden have all reported that 
10 – 20, 20 – 30, and around 20 of their citizens respectively have returned to Somalia to join al-
Shabaab.295 This sort of behaviour speaks to the lack of fear returning Somalis have of 
consequences of joining a movement that so openly and violently oppresses the Somali 
government. There appears to be little-to-no threat currently that the government can stem the 
influx of recruits for al-Shabaab. 
In 2008 al-Shabaab spokesperson, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, stated that the organisation was in 
negotiations on how to unite “into one” with al-Qaeda.296 Its chief military strategist Saleh Ali 
Saleh Nabhan formally reached out to the global terrorist organisation in a 24-minute video 
entitled March Forth297, which has gone viral amongst jihadist websites. Not long after that an 
alliance between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda formed. In 2012 a joint-video was released by al-
Shabaab and al-Qaeda announcing the expected coalition between the groups.298 This merger 
was always a concern for many security experts, as it gives al-Qaeda a stable stronghold in 
Africa, as well as providing al-Shabaab with many logistical and training incentives that it 
otherwise did not have. This was evident almost immediately with the Westgate Mall attack in 
Kenya, which deviated from the small-scale, localised attacks of the past by al-Shabaab, to a 
more brazen and deadly attack that one is accustomed to seeing from al-Qaeda.  
294 Gartenstein-Ross, D. Op Cit, p. 1. 
295 Gartenstein-Ross, et. al., Al-Shabaab recruiting in the West, http://www.daveedgr.com/publications/policy-
journal-articles/al-shabaab-recruiting-in-the-west/, 4 November 2009, p. 1. 
296 Gartenstein-Ross, D. & Gruen, M. Op Cit, p. 1. 
297 Gartenstein-Ross, D. Op Cit, p. 1. 
298 BBC News, Somalia’s al-Shabaab joins al-Qaeda, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16979440, 10 
February 2012, p. 1. 
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It is estimated that al-Shabaab has around 6000 – 7000 ‘fighters’.299 Their competency and level 
of training in the insurgency against Ethiopia has proven that they are battle ready and more than 
capable and willing to engage in further conflict. Added to their experience in fighting foreign 
armies, the allegiance with al-Qaeda will further enhance the network’s proficiencies and 
efficacy at maintaining control of their territories and continuing the fight against the Somali 
government. 
Al-Shabaab, for the most part, fought a conventional guerrilla warfare campaign. Its targets were 
the TFG and its backers’ strongholds and personnel. However, possibly due to its increasing 
association with al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab has employed another style of attack – suicide bombs. Al-
Shabaab targeted government offices, the Ethiopian consulate, as well as a number of UN 
agencies.300 The suicide attacks devastated the rare sense of calm that had descended in the 
northern part of Somalia, as most attacks occurred in the southern and central parts of the 
country. 
Ethiopia and Kenya have attempted to assist the Somali government but this has, to a large 
degree, backfired. On the night of the FIFA World Cup 2010 Final there were a series of 
multiple suicide bombs in Kampala, Uganda, which targeted bars and restaurants, including an 
Ethiopian restaurant.301 As many as 74 people were killed in the series of attacks.302 This was the 
first transnational attack carried out by al-Shabaab, which was the first signal that the group had 
the capabilities to cause regional destabilisation. The most recent, and most fear-provoking, 
299 Gartenstein-Ross, D. Op Cit. 
300 Phillips, M. Op Cit.   
301 Loc Cit. 
302 BBC News, Somali militants behind Kampala World Cup blasts, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10602791, 12 July 
2010.  
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assault by al-Shabaab took place in Kenya, and not Somalia.303 Although Kenya is no stranger to 
assaults from al-Shabaab in alleged retribution for Kenya’s 2011 military intervention into 
southern Somalia to combat the terrorist group, the vast majority of attacks have been hand 
grenades and small-scale. The Westgate Mall assault was different. The attack was alarming for 
its audacity, scale and sophistication, as the modus operandi is seemingly straight out of the al-
Qaeda playbook.304 Al-Shabaab has proudly branded 2013 as the Year of the Westgate, and has 
vowed that 2014 will be crowned by the targeting and assassination of a head of an East African 
state.305 
 
According to Alexander (2013), many of al-Shabaab’s attacks follow the formula of gunmen 
firing into the aftermath of bombings or grenade and car bomb attacks to inflict the maximum 
number of casualties.306 Members of the Somali Police and African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) Policing pact know that their attackers are likely to be hiding in plain sight – young 
boys between the ages of 10 – 14 years, have been identified as part of al-Shabaab’s bomb-
throwing squads.  
 
303 al-Shabaab’s assault on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, which left as many as 67 dead. 
304 Cruickshank, P., & Lister, T., al-Shabaab breaks new ground with complex Nairobi attack, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/meast/kenya-mall-al-shabaab-analysis/, 23 September 2013.  
305 Abwao, K., al-Shabaab changes tactic in readiness for protracted war, 
http://terrorfreesomalia.blogspot.com/2014/01/security-al-shabaab-changes-tactics-in.html, 13 January 2014. 
306 Alexander, G., al-Shabaab: The rise of a youth-led Islamist movement, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/21/al-shabaab-rise-youth-fighters-islamist-movement, 21 September 
2013.  
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According to Abwao (2014), Al-Shabaab has begun changing its tactics in readiness for a 
prolonged war in Somalia.307 Mogadishu has been described, as recently as 13 January 2014, as 
being an impending terrorist strike site. The fact that there is a lull in the battle in the capital, due 
to the ousting of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu, would for the most part be an optimistic sign. 
However, security experts disagree and believe it is the calm before a possible terrorist storm.308 
Whereas, in many cases when a violent non-government actor is displaced, the group tends to 
suffer from fracturing,309 al-Shabaab has been restructuring in preparation for a long drawn-out 
insurgency in mainly urban areas.  
 
It appears that al-Shabaab is determined to inflict as much damage as possible, not only on those 
in Somalia, but also on the countries of Kenya and Uganda, which support the Somali 
government.310  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Somalia is a country marred by decades of clan- and political-infighting. There have been clan-
cleansing massacres perpetrated by those in charge to dissuade others from rising up. Added to 
this, there have been Islamist groups that have controlled large swathes of the country, regardless 
of clan. Somalia has been an arena of conflict between different ethnic clans and sub-clans, and 
307 Abwao, K. Op Cit.  
308 Ibid.  
309 Examples would be the many splintered groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo like the Rassemblement 
Conglais pour la Democratie (RCD) splintering into the RCD-ML, which was the Congolese Liberation Movement, 
and the RCD-Goma, which was based in Goma. 
310 Grill, B., Nairobi Attack: Threat of Somali militants spreads beyond borders, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/somali-islamists-behind-kenya-attack-getting-more-dangerous-a-
924449.html, 25 September 2013. 
Page 94 of 234 
 
                                                            
religion versus secular beliefs. The battle between religion and secular beliefs, in the form of 
government targets, may prevent a lasting peace. The continuous fighting has resulted in Somalia 
deteriorating into a battleground that centred in Mogadishu. The country has, according to 
numerous commentators and statistics, failed. Without an existing or effective authority to 
govern the country, anarchy has prevailed. Al-Shabaab has developed into a regional and global 
threat to stability. The failure of proper governance in Somalia has confirmed the notion that al-
Shabaab is under little or no constraints. On the contrary, the terrorist organisation looks set to 
increase its reach in both recruitment and attacks. The lack of adequate border control, policing 
and vigilance has provided a safe haven for thugs, and in this case, terrorists to flourish. Coupled 
with the lack of security apparatus, is the gloomy outlook for future development and 
prospective growth. Without development and growth, the country looks set to maintain the 
current status quo, and the inhibited youth that find no alleviation from poverty, apart from 
joining al-Shabaab and other networks, will continue to seek refuge and prospects within terror 
groups.  
 
To conclude, Grill (2013) has explained the Somali situation after the 1991 coup quite 
succinctly:  
“Somalia had ceased to exist as a nation. The leaderless country, torn apart by conflicts 
among rival clans, developed into an ideal haven for militant Islamists from around the world – 
and al-Shabaab became a melting pot for international Muslim terrorists.”311 
 
311 Grill, B. Op Cit. 
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The development of al-Shabaab, along with the rise of the terrorist network, can be explained by 
Grill’s frank assessment. Al-Shabaab came about, and grew in strength, because of the failed 
state situation in Somalia.  
There has been an almost omnipresent and growing threat from al-Shabaab since its inception. 
According to the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START) by the University of 
Maryland’s National Consortium, there were around 550 terrorist attacks carried out by al-
Shabaab between 2007 and 2012.312 There were 1 600 casualties and 2 100 wounded in those 
attacks. Perhaps, what is most terrifying is that in 2007 there were just 10 terrorist attacks, 
whereas in 2012 there were around 200. Thus, it seems that al-Shabaab is an increasing and 
insidious threat to Somalia and the region. There is no slowing down of its assaults; in fact there 
appears to be an escalation. The lack of adequate or any controls and the systemic failure of the 
Somali government to police its territories and borders to eradicate the terrorists and their 
strongholds has to be placed at the forefront of al-Shabaab’s growing strength. Al-Shabaab 
seems to have grown from strength-to-strength since the perceived catalyst caused by the 
Ethiopia’s invasion, with the ‘failed state’, or ‘non-existent’ state as Grill referred to Somalia, 
being a hotbed for terrorism. A number of UN security experts have warned that al-Shabaab is 
“absolutely” capable of destabilising the entire region of the Horn of Africa. This is a vitally 
important reason to focus on the group, and attempt to find ways to deal with al-Shabaab. 
 
 
 
 
312 Abwao, K. Op Cit. 
Page 96 of 234 
 
                                                            
CHAPTER 3: 
NIGERIA 
AND 
BOKO HARAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The wealth which enslaves the owner isn’t wealth” – Yoruba Proverb  
Page 97 of 234 
 
CHRONOLOGY: 
11th Century – Islam introduced to Nigeria. 
Mid-19th Century – Christianity brought to southern Nigeria by foreign missionaries.  
1960 – Nigeria achieves full independence from Britain. 
1966 – Rebellion in eastern Nigeria.  
1966 – Military intervention results in Yakubu Gowon emerging as country’s leader. 
1967 – Eastern Nigeria declares independence as Biafra.  
1970 – Biafra surrenders, while leader Odumegwu Ojukwu escapes to the Ivory Coast in exile. 
1970s – 1980s – The Maitatsine Uprisings are occurring throughout Nigeria. 
1971 – Nigeria becomes part of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
1973-4 – Oil Crisis boosts Nigeria’s oil revenues. 
1975 – Military coup topples Gowon. General Murtala Ramat Muhammed is elected leader. 
1976 – Muhammed is assassinated. Second-in-command Olusegen Obasanjo becomes the 
country’s military leader. 
1979 – Obansajo hands leadership to democratically elected Shehu Shagari.  
1985 – General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida takes military control. 
1993 – Presidential elections for a democratic leader, but General Sani Abacha seizes power. 
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1995 – The Ogoni Nine are executed. Global outcry puts pressure on the government for 
elections. 
1998 – Abacha and the 1994 presidential elections winner Mashood Abiola both die. 
1999 – Olusegun Obasanjo wins the elections, which ended the 16 years of military rule.  
2000 – Boko Haram created by Islamic Cleric Muhammed Yusuf.  
2003 – Obasanjo is re-elected.  
2007 – Obasanjo’s handpicked successor Umaru Yar’adua wins the presidential elections.  
2009 – Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf is killed in police custody. 
2009 – Boko Haram’s uprisings begin, resulting in widespread violence and religious clashes 
between Muslims and Christians.  
2010 – Yar’Adua dies from a heart complication. 
2010 – Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan succeeds Yar’Adua.  
2010 – Boko Haram blamed for New Year’s Eve attack on army barracks in Abuja. 
2011 – President Goodluck Jonathan is re-elected.  
2011 – Boko Haram bomb the police headquarters and the UN headquarters in Abuja.  
2011 – Former president Obasanjo attempts to hold peace negotiations with Boko Haram. 
2012 – Attempts made by government and Boko Haram to peacefully resolve insurgency failed.  
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2013 – Boko Haram is formally brought within the purview of Nigeria’s Terrorism Prevention 
Act.  
2013 – Military offensive launched by the government against Boko Haram strongholds in the 
northeast of Nigeria. Joint Task Force is established.  
2013 – State of Emergency also enforced in three northern Nigerian states. 
2014 – An estimated 276 school girls abducted by Boko Haram from their boarding school in 
Chibok.  
2014 – Boko Haram make cross-border raid into Cameroon.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 will follow a similar format to the previous chapter. The history of Nigeria will be 
analysed in order to set the parameters of the socio-economic and political circumstances within 
the territory of the West African country. It is these factors that play a role in identifying the anti-
government, or in many instances terrorist, behaviour in Nigeria. Many commentators have 
labelled Nigeria as a “dysfunctional state” and this concept will be used to address the creation 
and development of Boko Haram, the main terrorist organisation in Nigeria.  
Nigeria, officially the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is Africa’s largest country, with an estimated 
population of over 160 million.313 It is home to around 400 different ethnic groups each having 
their own language, social customs and beliefs.314 Since independence, the country’s lifespan has 
been divided into the First Republic (1960-6), the Second Republic (1979-83), the Third 
Republic, which was aborted through criminal annulment of the 12 June 1993 elections, and the 
Fourth Republic (1999 – 2007).315  
The diverse nature of Nigeria’s society has resulted in a number of fault lines. The social milieu 
is a complex mixture of tribal, religious and political factors that have all played a part in the 
current tension within Nigeria. These elements need to be examined when analysing the 
country’s socio-economic and political situation. The history of Nigeria shows that these fault 
lines created a number of unresolved issues. The country can be divided into two zones, the north 
and south. The dividing line, the Middle Belt, is often the place where religious conflicts occur. 
313 World Population Review, Nigeria Population 2014, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-
population/, p. 1. 
314 Chidi I: Nigeria’s Religious and Cultural Conflict, Stanford University, 
http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Nigeria's%20Religious%20and%20Cultural%20Conflict.doc, 2003, p. 2. 
315 Omotola, J. “Elections and Democratic Transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic”, in African Affairs, Vol. 
109, No. 437, July 2010, p. 535. Retrieved from http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/109/437/535.full.pdf+html.  
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This chapter will show how the country’s history has been, to a large degree, shaped by tribal 
and religious differences. The conflict between Islam and Christianity has resulted in tension 
between large swathes of the population, with both faiths attempting to acquire a greater number 
of believers. This religious battleground has impacted on the current socio-economic and 
political environment within Nigeria to such an extent that one has to ask whether or not the 
country will be able to survive the conflict, or be compelled to follow the approach of Sudan and 
divide the country into two separate religion-based states.  
Nigeria’s economic conditions have been problematic for the country’s stability. During the first 
decade or so of independence, the distribution of revenues generated from agriculture and natural 
resource exports created the foundation for separate regional economies, which then fuelled 
regional political strife.316 The unrest was compounded when in the 1970s, the economy was 
transformed by the revenues generated by oil exports. The revenues were centralised, where state 
patronage and corruption thrived, which resulted in the economy becoming more vulnerable to 
global oil prices and political mismanagement. The rising inequality and seemingly ever 
increasing poverty heightened social tensions.   
The behaviour of Nigeria’s alternating military and civilian leadership has also played a 
significant role in determining the country’s current climate. Corrupt and authoritarian-style 
governance plagued any chance of stability and effective functionality. The history of Nigeria, 
which will be detailed, shows that even after independence, democracy was constantly under 
threat from military coups. Whether democracy or military rule was better for Nigeria in terms of 
316 Lewis, P.: Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31782/1/CSIS-%20Nigeria.pdf?1, June 2011, p. 2. 
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stability, is hard to say. There has been a revolving-door-style political arena with democratic 
rule being replaced by military rule and vice versa.  
 
PART ONE 
 
RELIGION 
Religion in Nigeria is divided predominantly between Christianity and Islam. With a split of 
around 50% Muslim and 40% Christian (the remaining 10% is believed to be indigenous)317, the 
conflicting faiths are equally matched. The conflict between the two religions has plagued 
Nigeria ever since independence, with leaders using their preachings to indoctrinate their 
followers to more radical beliefs and creating greater tension across the country. Religion in 
Nigeria appears to be exploited by both political and economic elites that are essentially 
parochial and greedy. However, it is not ‘religion’ that is the problem, or root cause, of the crisis 
in northern Nigeria. More so, it is the destructive exploitation of the country’s religious 
temperament by individuals and groups, like Boko Haram, that has resulted in religion becoming 
one of the key drivers in the conflict. Boko Haram, in particular, has manipulated Islamic beliefs 
by misrepresentation to the detriment of stability in Nigeria.  
Nigeria’s 1979 Constitution allowed for the “freedom to change his religion or belief… and 
freedom to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
317 Index Mundi, Nigeria demographics profile 2013, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/demographics_profile.html, 21 February 2013, p. 1. 
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observance.”318 This brought about conflict between the two main faiths, as both Christians and 
Muslims attempted to convert as many people as possible to their cause.  
This religious dichotomy has created a ‘belt’ across Nigeria that divides the Muslim north from 
the Christian South. The conflict between the two faiths has played a powerful role in 
establishing the environment that has proved conducive to the establishment of religious 
fundamental groups.  
The implementation of Sharia law in many northern states in Nigeria has resulted in periodic 
sectarian violence mainly between Christians and Muslims. In February 2000, the first major 
conflict between the two faiths occurred following the introduction of strict Islamic law in 
Kaduna.319 Both Christians and Muslims blamed the other for the violence that lasted for 3 days, 
with President Obasanjo comparing it to the Civil War of 1967-70.  
The Christian Association of Nigerian (CAN) has warned that Boko Haram is a direct assault on 
Christianity, with the aim of transforming the country into an Islamic state.320 Although, this is a 
broad claim, looking at some of the targets of Boko Haram’s attacks, it is hard to disagree with 
CAN president, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor. In December 2010 and 2011, Boko Haram set off bombs 
across Nigeria on Christmas Day, with three in 2011 directly targeting churches.321 This was the 
second Christmas in a row that Boko Haram has caused mass carnage with Church bombings.322 
The recent kidnappings of schoolgirls from their boarding school in Chibok, which will be 
318 Federal Republic of Nigeria: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/nig_const_79.pdf, 1979, p. 17. 
319 Chidi Ike. Op Cit, p. 7.  
320 Clottey, P. Nigeria group warns of Boko Haram Christianity attack, http://www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-
group-warns-of-boko-haram-christianity-attacks/1914722.html, 14 May 2014, p. 1. 
321 Onuah, F., & Eboh, C., Islamists kill dozens in Nigeria Christmas bombs, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/25/us-nigeria-blast-idUSTRE7BO03020111225, 25 December 2011, p. 1. 
322 In 2010, bombs were donated during Christmas Eve celebrations in the central city of Jos. In a separate incident, 
two churches were bombed in the northeast of the country. 
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further examined, is another example of a Boko Haram attack on Christianity. A number of the 
abducted girls – the majority of whom are Christians – were forced to convert to Islam.323 Boko 
Haram is either attempting to convert Christians and moderate Muslims to a more radical and 
fundamental strand of Islam, or is attacking those it cannot forcefully convert. Thus, the Islam 
vs. Christianity war in Nigeria is a vital factor when looking at Boko Haram’s ethos.  
 
HISTORY OF NIGERIA 1960 - 1966 
Upon receiving independence from the British in 1960, the newly-independent government was 
hopeful of successfully leading the country out of the British mandate. The colonial government 
bequeathed a country that was divided both territorially and religiously. The sixty years of 
British colonial rule (1900 – 1960) was categorised by the frequent reclassifying of territories for 
administrative purposes.324 Before independence, in 1951, infighting had divided the country 
into Northern, Eastern and Western regions, each with its own government. The north was 
primarily home to the tribes of the Hausa-Fulani, to the east the Igbo, and to the west the 
Yuroba.325  
The religious tension in Nigeria originates from the country’s religious polarisation, which has 
strong historical roots. Islam was introduced into Nigeria as early as the eleventh century, 
becoming the religion of the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri tribes.326 Muslim clerics carried Islam 
323 Clottey, P. Op Cit. 
324 History World, History of Nigeria, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad41, 
p. 1. 
325 Embry, A., & Otitigbe, J., & Thomas, C.: The Price of Oil, 
http://www.stanford.edu/class/e297c/trade_environment/energy/hpetroleum.html, Stanford University, (n.d), p. 1. 
326 Onadike, D., “Muslim-Christian Conflict and Political Instability in Nigeria” in Hunwik, J. Religion and National 
Integration in Africa: Islam, Christianity, and  Politics in the Sudan and Nigeria, Northwestern University Press, 
Illinois, 1992, p. 102. Retrieved from 
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southwards in an attempt to spread the religion throughout Nigeria. Christianity was brought to 
southern Nigeria in the mid-nineteenth century by foreign missionaries, who set about 
evangelizing the non-Muslim communities in southern Zaria, Plateau, Benue, and Gongola.327 
The religious conflict between the two faiths created a divide that not only added to the 
complexity of the country by dividing the Nigerian population along religious lines, but also 
created the current apprehensive environment. The complexity of Nigeria was exacerbated by the 
third constitution in eight years in 1954, which established the Federation of Nigeria. In the 
following 5 years, each region was granted internal self-government. 
Thus, the territory of Nigeria and some surrounding areas were formed into three distinctive 
blocks. However, due to the British withdrawing from the region, the problem of each region 
being self-governed was shifted onto the shoulders of Nigeria, as a whole.  
 
HISTORY OF NIGERIA 1966 – 1976  
In the first years after acquiring independence, Muslim leaders in the north used the political 
advantage gained under British mandate, and assumed political domination. Islam became a 
powerful political instrument, in accordance with the Islamic tradition of fusing politics with 
religion.328 The pursuit of “One North, One Islam”, which was the unifying of all northern 
Muslims, led to a strong “Islaminisation campaign”329 that brought about hundreds of thousands 
of new Islamic converts. Between 1960 and 1970, the military’s ethnic composition began to 
http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=nkbYlltTi4sC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=nigeria+christianity+and+isla
m+geography+divide&ots=seRTzRzieU&sig=gz3Xb-
RBNJiWMn5oeKYM7iuYRdE#v=onepage&q=nigeria&f=false.  
327 Ibid, p. 103. 
328 Ibid, p. 104. 
329 Mainly carried out by Ahmadu Bello, the sardauna of Sokoto and leader of the Northern Peoples Congress 
(NPC). 
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mirror the growing ethnic tensions in Nigeria. Added to that, there was almost a constant anti-
Northern unrest elsewhere in Nigeria, culminating in the 1966 rebellion by the Igbo dominated 
Eastern Nigeria, 330 which overthrew Prime Minister Sir Abubaker Tafawa Balewa, and 
President Dr Nnamdi Azikwe.331  
The 1966 military rebellion, which abolished the regional system, implemented the creation of 
states out of former regions. This process led to a rapid spread of Christianity and Western 
education northwards, particularly in the states of Kaduna, Plateau, Benue, and Gongola.332 The 
spread of a rival faith in a mainly Muslim society was perceived as a direct threat to Islamic 
culture. Nigerian Muslims saw Western education as an attack on their Islamic education, 
because Western education championed the use of English – the official language of Nigeria – 
over the use of Arabic.333 It also targeted all young persons, including females, which was 
forbidden by Islamic fundamentalists. Thus, Muslims were offended as they found themselves 
discriminated against because they had not acquired appropriate skills in English. The spread of 
Western education was, to many Nigerian Muslims’ minds, a subtle form of Christian 
indoctrination. The religious battle was fermenting between the two major faiths in Nigeria. The 
approach that the Nigerian government took towards this conflict would determine the 
effectiveness of its authority. However, as one will see, the simmering religious unrest was not 
dealt with, and has formed a divisive thorn in the side of the government.  
 
330 Officers from Eastern Nigeria assassinated the federal prime minister as well as the premiers of Northern and 
Western Nigeria. Throughout the ensuing chaos many Easterners were killed in Northern Nigeria, and vice versa. 
331 Suleiman, S., Nigerian Leaders from 1960 till date, http://reportsonnaija.blogspot.com/2012/06/nigeria-leaders-
from-1960-till-date.html, 29 June 2012, p. 1. 
332 Onadike, D. Op Cit, p. 104. 
333 John Hunwick (1992) pointed out that most Christian Nigerians do not realise the level of importance that 
Muslim Nigerians placed on education, nor do they understand that literacy was regarded as a primary means of 
religious communication. 
Page 107 of 234 
 
                                                            
From the 1966 military intervention, a Northern officer, Yakubu Gowon, emerged as the 
country’s leader, and he attempted to pacify the warring tribal factions by subdividing all the 
country’s territories into 12 states. The concept backfired, when  Eastern Nigeria cut off territory 
to the sea, which resulted in a senior officer, Odumegwu Ojukwu, declaring the Eastern region 
an independent state – the Republic of Biafra (May 1967).334  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Biafra civil war, between the federal army, which initially consisted of 10 000 and increased 
to 200 000, and fighters from the secessionist region followed. This was the first African post-
independence war to receive global coverage, and it divided the West. The United States of 
America and Britain supported the federal army, and France extended the same courtesy to 
Biafra. By 1970, the Biafra population had suffered hugely, and the territory surrendered and 
ceased to exist. Ojukwu escaped to the Ivory Coast where he was granted asylum.335 The country 
has since been divided into 36 states.336 
334 History World, Op Cit. 
335 History World, Op Cit.  
336 Law, G., States of Nigeria, http://www.statoids.com/ung.html, 10 January 2014, p. 1. 
Figure 1: Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Un-nigeria.png 
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Undisputed leader General Gowon (1966 – 1975) achieved impressive reconciliation in Nigeria, 
with the country becoming one of the wealthiest in Africa due to its reserves of petroleum oil. 
Nigeria became part of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 
1971.337 Due to the Oil Crisis of 1973-4, Nigeria’s output value was boosted by the high prices. 
Oil revenues were used largely to support the military regime. Under Gowon’s leadership, there 
was minimal oversight of how the oil revenues were being utilised. There was rampant 
corruption and nepotism.338 Gowon was in no hurry to return power to a civilian leader, and in 
1973 he announced further postponements to the transition to democracy. With the average 
Nigerian resentful of Gowon’s misappropriation of oil revenues and the delays to democracy, in 
1975, there was a bloodless military coup by Colonel Joseph Garba and Lieutenant Colonel 
Musa Yar’Adua that toppled the government.339  
Almost coincidentally, oil prices plummeted in the latter half of the 1970s, and Nigeria suffered 
rapid economic crises and political disorder. General Murtala Ramat Mohammed was elected to 
lead the country after Gowon was usurped. He attempted to bring about democracy to the West 
African nation. The following year, on 13 February 1976, the General himself was assassinated 
in a military coup.340 Between 1970 and 1983 there were three different regimes, two military 
coups and a civilian leadership.341 However, all three mismanaged government funds and oil 
revenues, which have contributed to the development of the “kleptocracy” that plagues the 
337 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Nigeria Facts and Figures, 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm, p. 1. 
338 Heaton, M., & Falola, T., A History of Nigeria, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008, p. 187. Retrieved 
from 
http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=XygZjbNRap0C&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=history+of+nigeria+leader
s&ots=ETzIpQ92SK&sig=-g2bOvaD2-fgXypIZHzWXOLf_x8#v=onepage&q=181&f=false.  
339 Ibid, p. 188. 
340 NewsAdmin, ““Why we Overthrew Murtala Mohammed” – Dinka’s 1976 Coup Speech” in Street Journal, 
February 2013, p. 1. Retrieved from http://thestreetjournal.org/2013/02/why-we-overthrew-murtala-mohammed-
dimkas-1976-coup-speech/.  
341 Heaton, M. & Falola, T. Op Cit. p. 181. 
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country.342 Mohammed’s rule, which ended in a failed coup in 1976, brought about the 
leadership of his second-in-command Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo.343 
 
HISTORY OF NIGERIA 1976 – 1998  
Within just 5 years after Gowon’s usurpation, the average income per head in Nigeria plunged 
from $1000 a year to $250.344 Therefore, one has to investigate the vital role that oil played in 
the socio-economic and political environment in Nigeria.  
With the focus on oil, the shift from the agricultural sector to the petroleum sector resulted in a 
decline of local self-sufficiency and a heavy dependence on foreign imports.345 The socio-
economic fabric of many oil rich areas in Nigeria has deteriorated, as the state left it up to the 
various oil multinational corporations (MNCs) to deal with the local communities. Any attempt 
at developing local communities was generally ill-planned and unsuccessful, which resulted in 
the majority of local communities not seeing any benefit from the presence of oil.346 Initially, 
local groups attempted to combat this issue with peaceful protests, but were often detained by 
state and MNC security forces alike.  
In the 1990s, the protests gained greater international attention, as protests by the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, were violently suppressed 
by the federal government. The Human Rights Watch, Ogoni Report, stated that “a threat to oil 
342 Loc Cit. 
343 Ibid, p. 188. 
344 History World, Op Cit.  
345 Embry, A., & Otitigbe, J., & Thomas, C. Op Cit. 
346 Ibid. 
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production is a threat to the entire existing political system.”347 Hundreds of thousands of Ogani 
protestors were beaten and detained. The importance of oil in propping up the military regime at 
this time cannot be underestimated. The socio-economic and political environment in Nigeria has 
been shaped by both the oil revenues being siphoned away by corruption, and local communities 
suffering environmental damage and land annexations.  
Presidential elections took place in 1979, where Obasanjo transferred power to Shehu Shagari of 
the National Party, marking the end of 13 years of military rule with the establishment of the 
Second Republic.348 The leadership was unable to unify the country and regionalism and 
sectional interests prevailed. In December 1983, Shagari was usurped during a military coup 
d’état, and Major-General Muhammadu Buhari was selected by the middle and high ranking 
military officers that carried out the coup to lead Nigeria.349 
In 1985, General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida gained power through another coup. He yielded 
to international pressure, and elected to hold presidential elections in 1993. However, General 
Sani Abacha seized power and declared himself Head of State after the elections were declared 
invalid, allegedly due to massive electoral fraud.350 The person who claimed to be the 
democratically elected president, Mashood Abiola, was arrested and imprisoned in 1994. During 
Abacha’s regime, billions of dollars were siphoned from the national treasury.351 The Abacha 
military regime, like many of the usurping military predecessors, promised a political transition 
347 Embry, A., & Otitigbe, J., & Thomas, C. Op Cit. 
348 Heaton, M. & Falola, T. Op Cit. p. 201. 
349 Pike, J. 1983 Coup, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nigeria2.htm, 11 July 2011, p. 1. 
350 Smith, R., & Holmes, M., & Kaufmann, P. Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud, Australian Institute of Criminology,  
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/D/C/4/%7BDC45B071-70BC-4EB1-B92D-4EEBE31F6D9E%7Dti121.pdf, July 
1999, p. 1. 
351 In 1998, The Times reported that the Abacha family returned as much as $750 million worth of currencies taken 
from state funds to the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
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program that would usher in a civil government in 1995. However, this never occurred, with 
many opposition groups and perceived opponents being persecuted.352 
On 10 November 1995, the Nigerian military under General Abacha executed nine 
environmental activists from the Ogoni minority group353, all of whom were involved in the 
MOSOP protests.354 To the surprise of observers, both internationally and within Nigeria, 
Abacha’s military enacted the most severe of punishments – the death penalty by hanging.355 
Although, all of the executed men were well known in the Delta and southeast regions of 
Nigeria, it was only one that bought about international attention to the oil-related plight of the 
local Nigerian communities – playwright and novelist Kenule Saro-Wiwa.356 The global out-cry 
over Saro-Wiwa’s execution, through a mock-trial, prompted the Nigerian military leadership to 
propose general elections in 1999.  
 
HISTORY OF NIGERIA 1999 – PRESENT 
Prior to the 1999 elections, Abiola died of a heart attack in prison in July 1998, following the 
death of Abacha, whose death has also been attributed to a heart attack, in May 1998. The 
352 Guseh, J., & Oritsejafor, E., “Government size, political freedom, and economic growth in Nigeria, 1960 – 2000), 
in Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2007, p. 144. Retrieved from 
http://faculty.washington.edu/acs22/SinklerSite/PolS%20204/Guseh_Econ_Development_Nigeria.pdf.  
353 Known famously as the Ogoni Nine. 
354 Bastian, M. “Buried Beneath Six Feet of Crude Oil: State-Sponsored Death and the Absent Body of Ken Saro-
Wiwa”, in McLuckie, C., & McPhail, A. Ken Saro-Wiwa: Writer and Political Activist, Lynne Reinner Publishers, 
Colorado, 2000, p. 129. Retrieved from http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=y4tU--0W_-
sC&oi=fnd&pg=PA127&dq=ken+saro-wiwa+execution&ots=JjqF_31UDP&sig=og6zxkLq-_UDO-
qh5qtlfXnEk3M#v=onepage&q=ken%20saro-wiwa%20execution&f=false.  
355 Hanging, for Igbos, is an abominable death, as suicide is one of the worst human offenses. Additionally, the 
burial without mourners is another disregard for Igbo tradition. It is said that the regime did not solely want to 
execute Saro-Wiwa and the other Ogonis, but it wanted to cause as much suffering as possible to them and their 
closest kin.  
356 Accounts of the execution, from officials outside the Nigerian military, were shocking in their lack of planning 
and malfunctions. Saro-Wiwa’s execution is said to have required five attempts.  
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military rallied around General Abdulsalam Abubakar, who after a year long political transition 
program, handed political power to the civilian government of President Olusegun Obasanjo357 
on February 27 1999.358 This was almost the perfect example of the confusion in Nigerian 
politics between military and civilian leadership. Obasanjo had been jailed in 1995 by General 
Abacha on charges of plotting a coup. However, when General Abubakar took power, he 
released nine key political prisoners – including Obsanjo in June 1998.359 
The 1999 elections featured all the traits of “founding elections in Africa.” According to J. 
Omotola (2010), these included a landslide victory, a rejection of results by the opposition, and 
poor administration of elections.360 The results of the elections, won by the Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP) were challenged by Olu Falae, the leader of the alliance between the All People’s 
Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). However, on the whole, the general elections 
reflected some interesting influences in Nigeria. The issues of ethnicity and religion played a 
major role, as the parties were each dominant in their respective ethno-regional and religious 
sectors. The use of “moneybags” was evident throughout the elections, with serious vote buying 
occurring. However, regardless of all the irregularities that plagued the 1999 elections, with the 
backing of the military, Obasanjo was destined to command political power. The level of 
military involvement, even in a democratic election, showed the strength of the military 
leadership at this time. The blurred lines between military and civil rule did not help the 
grievances felt by many Nigerians who were not in favour of the PDP, or the military.  
Despite independence in 1960, democracy was only truly introduced in 1999, ending 16 years of 
military rule. Olusegun Obasanjo became president of a country that was struggling socially, 
357 Obasanjo was previously the country’s military leader from 1976 – 1979. 
358 Guseh, J., & Oritsejafor, E. Op Cit, p. 145. 
359 Isaacs, D. Profile: Olusegun Obasanjo, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1804940.stm, 6 February 2002, p. 1. 
360 Omotola, J. Op Cit, p. 543. 
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economically and politically. The new head of state had to preside over a dysfunctional 
bureaucracy, collapsed or non-existent infrastructure, as well as a military that believed they 
were entitled to rewards for stepping down from government.361 Communal violence was 
persistently present in the era of the Obasanjo government.362  
The prolonged military rule had left both society and infrastructure in disorder. The hope was 
that the Fourth Republic under democratic civilian rule would bring about improvements to the 
array of economic and political problems.363 Obasanjo’s government took decisive steps to make 
Nigeria more democratic, more internationally credible, and he put the economy on a 
development drive. However, according to Suraj Mudasiru and Olusola Adabonyon (2001), these 
measures did not have much positive impact.364  While the Obasanjo government pledged to end 
corruption, there were no high-profile prosecutions of officials who allegedly were behind 
massive looting of public funds under the past regimes. Looking at Nigeria’s economy under 
Obasanjo, little changed for the ordinary Nigerian. Unemployment was high, and public services 
361 Total, History of Nigeria, http://www.ng.total.com/01_about_nigeria/0103_history.htm, p. 1. 
362 Within a year of the inception of Obasanjo’s government, over a 1000 people were killed in riots against Sharia 
Law in Kaduna State, with more than 2000 killed in September 2001 in inter-religious fighting in Jos state. The 
following month hundreds more were killed or displaced by inter-religious and tribal conflict that spread across the 
middle states of Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa.362 Army soldiers, who were sent to quash the fighting, killed more 
than 200 unarmed civilians, which was reported in retaliation for the abduction and murder of 19 soldiers by tribal 
militia in the area.362 The violence did not appear to stop, when in February 2002, 100 people killed in the then-
capital Lagos in clashes between mainly-Islamic and northern Hausas, and the predominantly-Christian and southern 
Yorubas. There is even greater ethnic violence in November of the same year when after 4 days of rioting by 
Muslims opposed to the Miss World Beauty Pageant being held in Kaduna results in over 200 people being killed – 
the event was subsequently relocated to Britain. 
363 The country was plagued by terrible poverty. Inflation was soaring at its peak. Social and governmental 
institutions were subverted, and there were increasing levels of political patronage. There were also many incidents 
of human rights abuses recorded under the Abacha regime.  
364 Mudasiru, S., & Adabonyon, O., “The Nigerian Economy under Obasanjo”, in Development Policy Management 
Network Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2001, p. 2. Retrieved from 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/IDEP/UNPAN004220.pdf.  
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were poor, with infrastructure underdeveloped.365 It was believed that the average Nigerian was 
as frustrated with life under civilian Obasanjo, as under his military predecessors.  
In 2003, legislative and presidential elections took place. Obasanjo’s PDP won the parliamentary 
elections on 12 April 2003, with Obasanjo being re-elected for a second term with as much as 
60% of vote. Both legislative and presidential elections were marred by delays, with allegations 
of ballot-rigging, the presidential elections results were rejected by opposition parties and the 
European Union poll observers cited “serious irregularities” with the outcome.366 
Under Obasanjo, Nigeria continued to suffer from communal and Christian-Muslim conflict. 
Dan Isaacs (2002) stated that more than 10 000 people had died in Nigeria within three years of 
the PDP taking power.367 These deaths were the result of communal and religious conflicts. The 
staggering death toll speaks to Obasanjo’s inability to control the volatile situation in Nigeria. 
His initial response to the religious unrest throughout the country was to deploy the army to 
control localised problems. Eventually, Obasanjo attempted to bring together local and religious 
leaders to resolve the conflict. Far more people died in communal and religious clashes during 
the first few years of civilian rule than under the previous military regime.368 The fighting 
between followers of both religions carried on throughout the country and is still present in 
today’s turmoil.  
The elections in April 2007 marked the first time in the country’s checkered history that political 
power passed from one civilian administration to another. President Obasanjo’s handpicked 
successor, Umaru Yar’Adua, won in a landslide victory, again under the shroud of vote rigging 
365 Cunliffe-Jones, P., Behind the Strife, Economic and Political Problems in Nigeria, http://www.hartford-
hwp.com/archives/34a/114.html, 6 March 2000, p. 1. 
366 BBC News, Nigeria Profile, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13951696, 20 May 2014, p. 1. 
367 Isaacs, D. Op Cit. 
368 Ibid. 
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and irregularities. It was reported that Yar’Adua won with as much as 70% of the vote.369 It 
appeared as if the country was heading towards a one-party democracy. The irregularities and the 
mammoth landslide victory seem to have become a regular occurrence in Nigerian elections, 
pointing to the lack of transparent political measures in the country. 
President Yar’Adua’s term of office was not peaceful nor was it successful in curtailing the 
conflict in the country. Yar’Adua was a northern Muslim, as opposed to his predecessor, born-
again Christian, Obasanjo. It was hoped that this would serve to cool tensions between the two 
religions, in the sense that the power-sharing arrangement, whereby the presidency rotates 
between the main ethno-religious regions of the country, would remain on course.370 
Additionally, the appointment of Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan in 2007, from the troubled 
Niger Delta state of Baylesa, indicated the intention that Yar’Adua’s government would play a 
more direct role in reconciliation in the Niger Delta region. Jonathan’s appointment was met 
with mixed reactions, and with two separate assassination attempts made on his life, it would 
seem that Goodluck Jonathan was not the peace-broking appointment the PDP had hoped for.371  
In 2010 President Yar’Adua died from a heart condition, and Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan 
succeeded him.372 Although, this seemed straightforward, many Muslim northerners felt cheated. 
The fact that a Christian replaced Yar’Adua, and then was re-elected in the presidential elections 
in 2011, completely disrupted the alternating power-sharing agreement. A solution to the conflict 
between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria was not addressed under any leadership. When the 
369 Nairne, S. Nigeria: Mapping Political, Economic, and Business Scenarios in the Post-Obasanjo Era, 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/NigeriaPoliticalEconomicBusinessScenariosPostObasanjo.pdf, Canadian Defence & 
Foreign Affairs Institute, June 2007, p. 2.  
370 Heaton, M., Falola, T. Op Cit, p. 277. 
371 Nairne, S. Op Cit, p. 4. 
372 Marshall, P., Deadly University, http://www.hudson.org/research/8797-deadly-diversity, Hudson Institute, March 
2012, p. 1. 
Page 116 of 234 
 
                                                            
2011 election results were announced, there were mass riots in northern Nigeria that left 
hundreds dead. Most of the victims were Christians, but traditional Muslims leaders that called 
for restraint were also threatened.373  
The current regime under Jonathan has made successful reforms to stabilise and improve the 
economy. There are signs of diversification, which is vital in many resource-rich countries, as 
well as growing dynamism in the private sector and public welfare.374 The country “rebased”375 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data, which has resulted in Nigeria being Africa’s biggest 
economy.376 Even with the rebase, the GDP per capita of South Africans – now, the second 
biggest economy in Africa – is three times that of Nigeria’s. Either way, under President 
Jonathan there has been a concerted effort to improve the economy and grow Nigeria into an 
international economic powerhouse.  
This is where evidence of Nigeria’s dysfunction is most obvious. Politically, the country has had 
a chain of flawed elections with a one-party dominated system, which has lacked political 
transparency that has undermined the legitimacy and stability of democratic governance.377 
Lewis (2011) identified that weak institutions378 foster continuing problems of governance. 
Localised conflict, whether because of religious or communal violence, or because of political 
and economic tensions, appeared to increase under President Jonathan. The government’s focus 
on the economy instead of the social and political aspects of the country, identify that the country 
is capable of progressive change, but is incapable of applying that positive growth to all spheres 
373 Ibid. 
374 Lewis, P. Op Cit, p. 2. 
375 By rebasing its economy, Nigeria included the previously uncounted industries like telecoms, information 
technology, music, online sales, airlines, and film production.  
376 BBC News, Nigeria becomes Africa’s biggest economy, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26913497, 6 April 
2014, p. 1. 
377 Lewis, P. Op Cit, p. 2. 
378 These include the legislature, courts, police, and civil services.  
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of its society. President Jonathan is, debatably, also part of the problem of the dysfunctional 
government in Nigeria. His presidency has fuelled feelings of marginalisation in the north, and 
his constant focus on the economy instead of social and political issues seems to be fostering the 
dysfunction. 
 
Looking at the socio-economic and political climate of Nigeria since its independence, one sees 
that the country has been hampered by a number of factors. Religious and communal violence, as 
well as the lack of development of social institutions and infrastructure have hindered any form 
of social cohesion. The shifting leadership between democracy and the military has facilitated 
feelings of marginalisation and persecution for those not in power at the time. Although, many 
Nigerian leaderships have attempted to reform the economy, the oil sector has had the lion’s 
share of interest with little diversification. The country has maintained an apprehensive 
equilibrium of stability and volatility, which has portrayed instances of functionality and 
dysfunction. All in all, the country is home to an environment that is dysfunctional, and appears 
to be set to maintain this level of unpredictability.  
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SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NIGERIA 
 
Nigeria is one of the leading oil producers in the world, and the biggest in Africa, but the benefit 
of this oil wealth to the country’s development is questionable.379 Until the early 1980s, the 
Nigerian economy was based around agriculture production, and the production of consumer 
goods. Since then, oil production has been the main source of national revenue. Despite 
Nigeria’s obvious wealth, the country has experienced dramatic economic deterioration, which 
was worse during military rule. Nigeria is the example of what is known as the “resource 
curse”.380 It is blessed with vast oil, and to a degree, mineral wealth, but does not reap the 
income for the benefit of its citizens. 
Nigeria’s development has been hampered by corruption, seemingly continuous military coups, 
and failed socio-economic policies, amongst other factors.381 Nigeria’s oil revenue has not 
filtered down to the general population, with as much as 70% of the population reportedly living 
379 Rantimi Jays, J., “Nigerian economy, social unrest, and the nation’s popular drama”, in Afro Asian Journal of 
Social Sciences, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2011, p. 1. Retrieved from 
http://www.academia.edu/782696/NIGERIAN_ECONOMY_SOCIAL_UNREST_AND_THE_NATIONS_POPUL
AR_DRAMA.  
380 The resource curse is a paradoxical situation in which a country with an abundance of non-renewable natural 
resources experiences stagnant or marginal growth. The resource curse occurs as a country focuses all its energy on 
the resource sector, and neglects other sectors of the economy.  
381 Rantimi Jays, J. Op Cit, p. 2. 
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below the poverty line.382 Other factors contributing to such a high level of poverty include the 
restricted access to education, and the lack of healthcare. The government’s inability to utilise 
the country’s economic wealth to develop essential services in various communities, particularly 
in resource rich areas of the north of the country, has created rifts amongst its population and 
encouraged feelings of marginalisation from some ethnic groups.  
 
According to Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the measure of “relative poverty”383 
is most evident in the more radical north. In comparison to the southeast (67.0%) and southwest 
(59.1%) regions, the northeast (76.3%) and northwest (77.7%) are much higher.384 Regarding 
other vital indicators, there is a similar pattern throughout. However, it is important to note that 
the contrast between overall deprivation levels between the south and north, can also be a 
consequence of the bad governance of northern Nigerian leaders.  
With such high poverty figures, there appears to be little hope for real development. Hand-in-
hand with this is unemployment, which is another social and economic indicator of the plight of 
Nigerians. According to the NBS, in 2010, the unemployment rate among the youth was as high 
as 41.6%.385 Such a high figure has led to feelings of hopelessness and ostracism, as youths see 
no way out of their plight. Terrorist groups, like Boko Haram in this case, are known to recruit 
382 Rantimi Jays, J. Op Cit, p. 2. 
383 Defined as “the condition in which people lack the minimum amount of income needed in order to maintain the 
average standard of living in the society in which they live.” 
384 Olojo, A.: Nigeria’s Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram, 
http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf, International Centre for 
Counter-Terrorism, October 2013, p. 7. 
385 Salami, C., “Youth Unemployment in Nigeria: A time for creative intervention”, in International Journal of 
Business and Marketing Management, Vol. 1, No. 2., July 2013, p.  20. Retrieved from 
http://www.resjournals.org/IJBMM/PDF/2013/July/Salami.pdf.  
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youths who see no hope. These young men are drawn to terrorist groups, which provide a type of 
employment and inclusion that the young men seek.  
POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL SITUATION IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria is a country that has been characterised by ineffectual leadership since independence. 
According to Julius-Adeoye Rantimi Jays, the leadership over the last half a century, since 
independence has induced poverty and corruption, and has done little to nothing to prevent 
religious tensions or conflict. An unstable and elitist political system with dictatorial leaders, and 
the complete disregard for basic amenities exists.386  
Nigeria, in recent years, has been home to an environment that suits extremist ideologies. Human 
Rights Watch believes the lack of equal access to education, health and other social services, 
endemic government and elitist corruption, as well as the failure to adequately investigate those 
responsible for religious, ethnic and tribal violence, are all factors that give rise to militancy not 
only in the Muslim north, but across the country.387 The leadership of Nigeria has been tainted 
by corruption, and it is these leaders that have been in charge of attempting to distribute the 
wealth garnered from oil revenues. In this, they have been largely unsuccessful. 
Supporters of incumbent leaders were rewarded with illegal contracts, appointments to political 
positions, and had a say in policies that would favour them. More often than not, the services 
they rendered would become commodities, which must be paid for by their recipients.388 The 
levels of patronage made wealth formation revolve around the activities of the state. State 
386 Rantimi Jays, J. Op Cit, p. 3. 
387 Allison, S. Analysis: has Nigeria’s ‘major offensive’ against Boko Haram been a failure?, 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-12-03-analysis-has-nigerias-major-offensive-against-boko-haram-
been-a-failure/#.UxbrNfmSxCY, 3 December 2013, p. 1. 
388 Eze, C. “The Privatised State and Mass Poverty in Nigeria: The Factor of Economic Development Programmes 
since 1980s”, in African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 10, October 2009, p. 
446. Retrieved from http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1381824052_Eze%20df.pdf.  
Page 121 of 234 
 
                                                            
economic programmes were planned to serve the private interests of a select few, to the 
detriment of the masses. The brainchild of the IMF, the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) that were introduced into Nigeria in 1986 failed to achieve a significant result. Tokunbo 
(2003) argued that the SAPs decreased living standards and intensified poverty. 
Significantly, Rantimi Jays argues that the inability of the Nigerian government to govern 
effectively has been at the forefront of the country’s problems. The country’s leaders did not 
judiciously utilise the country’s revenues to develop communities around the entire country, 
which created rifts amongst the population and led to various ethnic nationalities splitting away 
from one another.389 The leadership’s inability to use its economic wealth to integrate the 
country successfully created ethno-religious groups that became defensive of their territories and 
ideologies, which lead to the dichotomy of “us” vs. “them”. This gulf led directly to further 
mistrust amongst the population. The mistrust and mis-governance has created a fear amongst 
Africa’s largest population, and the constant ethnic and religious clashes further highlight the 
ideology of difference.  
 
To some observers, Nigeria is a globally significant country for a multitude of reasons, including 
its political resilience in spite of the complex religious diversity and ethno-religious conflicts. 
Although others believe Nigeria could be a model of interreligious and political governance that 
389 Rantimi Jays, J. Op Cit, p. 2. 
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would bridge the divide between the Muslim world and the West, the cultural, religious and 
social sectors remain as evidence of division rather than harmony.390 
 
Since independence, the Nigerian government has attempted to mend the diversity created by 
British territorial division; however, these attempts have not yielded much. Aregbeshola 
Adewale391 identified that because of the depth of differing ethnicities embedded in politics and 
governance, it is no wonder that the government’s distribution of social welfare and development 
is based on a political agenda, rather than compatibility or need.392 This deficiency partly 
explains the misplaced concentration of infrastructure, both social and development, in major 
towns that serve as political power bases for the ruling elites.  
 
PART TWO 
 
BOKO HARAM 
It is important to be aware that to reduce the Boko Haram crisis to causes solely based on 
economic, social and political factors would be detrimental to understanding the situation.  
390 Adewale, A.: The Political, Economic, and Social Dynamics of Nigeria: A Synopsis, http://www.ai.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2011/11/No-39.-The-Political-Economic-and-Social-Dynamics-of-Nigeria-A-
synopsis.pdf, Africa Institute of South Africa, February 2011, p. 3.  
391 Aregbeshola R. Adewale is a lecturer in the Department of Business Management  
(International Business) at the University of South Africa. 
392 Loc Cit.   
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Boko Haram’s development into an extremist organisation has its roots in the 1970s and 1980s 
Maitatsine uprisings.393 The uprisings394, and thus the origination of Boko Haram, have generally 
been explained by a combination of factors that range from economic, to social and political.395 
It is therefore important that the Maitatsine uprisings are briefly addressed in order to relate the 
context to Boko Haram’s evolution.  
The Maitatsine uprisings are almost unknown to non-Nigerians, yet are germane to the current 
situation in the country. A chain of events started when a Cameroon native Muhammadu Marwa 
completed his training as a mallam (Islamic cleric),396 and moved to the northern state of Kano 
in Nigeria in about 1945. Marwa was known for his controversial sermons, which were based on 
the Koran, and were aimed at both religious and political authorities, as well as at the British 
colonial powers at the time. Marwa was to become known as Maitatsine, which in the local 
dialect of Hausa means “he who curses others”.397 Marwa, or Maitatsine, was deported by 
British powers back to Cameroon, but returned to post-independent Nigeria, and by the 1970s 
had garnered a large and ever increasing military backing known as Yan Tatsine (Followers of 
Maitatsine). 
The doctrine and oratories displayed the level of charisma that Marwa held, which was a double-
edged sword in some cases. Although he presented himself, and his teachings, as Islamic, he 
393 Adesoji, A., “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria” in Africa Spectrum, Vol. 45, No. 2, 
2010. Retrieved from http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/330/330. 
394 The Maitatsine Uprisings have been identified as the first attempts at imposing religious ideology on the secular 
Nigerian state. The rebellions in Kano 1980, Kaduna and Bulumkutu 1982, Yola 1984, and Bauchi 1985 marked the 
beginning of violent revolts throughout the country.  
395 Gourley, S., “Linkages between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda: A Potential Deadly Synergy” in Global Security 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2012. Retrieved from http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Gourley%20Boko%20Haram.pdf.  
396 Ojo, A. The Maitatsine Revolution in Nigeria, http://i-
epistemology.net/attachments/321_V2N2%20December%2085%20-%20MA%20Ojo%20-
%20The%20Maitatsine%20Revoultion%20in%20Nigeria.pdf, p. 298. 
397 Pham, J.: In Nigeria False Prophets are Real Problems, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham101906.shtml, 
World Defence Review, October 2006, p. 1. 
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denounced the reading of anything other than the holy book – including the hadith and sunna, 
which are revered in orthodox Islam.398 He also, quite strangely, denounced the use of watches, 
radios, bicycles and motor vehicles. It has been rumoured that Maitatsine went as far as to reject 
the prophet Muhammad and proclaim himself as an annabi (Hausa for prophet).399 Whether this 
is true or otherwise, fundamentalists would not have accepted such an insult to Allah, and the 
tension would have been palpable.  
After a number of years, and polemic lectures, Yan Tatsine, who it was thought numbered in 
their thousands, were increasingly verbally and physically against what they deemed corruption 
within the Muslim community of Kano. This came to a head in 1980. Yan Tatsine attacked other 
religious figures as well as the Kano police force. The Nigerian army was forced to intervene 
against the Yan Tatsine, and the ensuing battles resulted in as many as 5000 people being killed, 
according to the Maitatsine himself.400 The crackdown on Yan Tatsine in Kano did not put a stop 
to their assaults. For a number of years the Yan Tatsine caused havoc in the country, with 
disciples of Maitatsine following his teachings to rid the country of perceived corruption.  
According to J. Peter Pham401, the underlying dynamics that enabled the Maitatsine and his 
followers to wreak havoc and instil fear in the population have not changed. In his opinion there 
are five factors that have remained unchanged since the Maitatsine uprisings that need to be 
addressed:  
398 Ibid. 
399 Ojo, A. Op Cit, p. 299. 
400 Pham, J. Op Cit. 
401 J. Peter Pham is the director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs. He is also a Research 
Fellow of the Institute for Infrastructure and Information Assurance at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, 
Virginia. 
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1. Members of Yan Tatsine were primarily comprised of urban poor, who had arrived from 
the countryside. The attacks on the privileged and Western ways of Nigeria’s elite 
resonated with them. Akerele and Adewuyi (2011) stated that the poverty gap between 
the haves and have nots in Nigeria had widened.402 This has continued despite the $508 
billion403 in oil revenues that Nigeria had acquired between 2004 – 2012.404  
2. These same members are often students, some as young as 10 years old, who have been 
sent into the care of an Islamic teacher. In this instance, it just happened to be that their 
teacher was a fundamentalist. However, the greater concern right now is that the youths 
are still being apprenticed in this way. 
3. According to Pham, the Maitatsine uprisings took place against the backdrop of conflict 
between Christians and Muslims over the introduction of the 1979 constitution that 
recognised the individual’s right to change their religion. The bitter acrimony resulted in 
Muslims officials walking out of the constituent assembly. The constitution was only 
passed because the military leader at the time, Obasanjo, a born-again Christian, pushed it 
through.  
4. The fourth factor that Pham noted was that the behaviour and methods of the Yan Tatsine 
did not differ significantly from those of other followers of radical Islamic teachers. For 
example, followers of Sheikh Abubakar Gumi’s Jamaat Izalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al-
Sunna (“the Society for the Eradication of Evil Innovation and the Establishment of the 
402 Akerele, D., & Adewuyi, S., “Analysis of Poverty Profiles and Socioeconomic Determinants of Welfare among 
Urban Households of Ekiti State, Nigeria”, in Current Research Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2011, p. 2. 
Retrieved from http://ikk.fema.ipb.ac.id/v2/images/pek_jurnal1.pdf.  
403 To put this mammoth figure in perspective, the two other African nations in OPEC, namely Algeria and Angola, 
have acquired $383 billion and $374 billion, respectively.  
404 US Energy Information Administration: OPEC net oil export revenues, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=OPEC, US Energy Information Administration, July 2013, p. 1. 
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Sunna”) also rejected the secular foundations of the Nigerian democracy, and fought for 
the creation of an Islamic state.405 
5. From around 1985 – 2010, post the Maitatsine uprisings, and just prior to Boko Haram’s, 
there were a number of crises and riots in particular in Nigeria that identified the 
economic, social and political turmoil of the country.  
While Maitatsine, and other followers, were relatively poor West Africans that received little 
or no support from outside the region, their actions and followers resulted in over 10 000 
deaths and millions of dollars of damage, further exposing the fragility of the Nigerian 
state.406 
According to Abimbola Adesoji407, virtually all the crises took on a violent form, and if the riots 
were not due to curbing the excesses of one group by another, it was generally because of 
conversion drives of one religious group in resistance to another’s in their religious 
stronghold.408 However, almost all riots were subsumed under religion. It is apparent that there 
are additional, external factors that played a part – economic disequilibrium, envy, poverty, and 
unhealthy political rivalry. 
Adesoji (2010) has pointed out that there was mass poverty409, massive inequalities in education, 
politics and employment opportunities, as well as vast government and elitist corruption.410 The 
wealth gained, through oil revenues in particular, did not result in a better lifestyle for the general 
405 Pham, J. Op Cit.  
406 Ibid. 
407 Abimbola Adesoji is a lecturer in the Department of History at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, 
and is currently Georg Forster Fellow at the Institut für Ethnologie at Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt am Main, 
Germany. 
408 Adesoji, A. Op Cit, p. 97. 
409 Mass poverty can be seen as a state of deprivation, the lack of basic necessities, and the inability to satisfy basic 
requirements for survival. In 2004 it was reported that over 70% of the population in Nigeria lived below the 
poverty line.  
410 Adesoji, A. Op Cit, p. 97. 
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population because of the corrupt hoarding by elite state and company officials. Coupled with 
this, the tension around elections and their illegitimacy resulted in an increasing disillusionment 
with the Western systems of elections and governance in general.  
 
It may be argued that due to the misappropriation of social wealth and government infrastructure 
towards certain ethno-religious communities, the marginalised youth were desperate to align 
themselves with an ideology.  
 
For example, looking at the Niger Delta, which has been termed Nigeria’s Oil Belt, the region 
has been embroiled in resistance against the central government, with pockets of insurrection and 
armed rebellion.411 The region has suffered from environmental damage and state neglect412, 
while other regions have been improved from the revenue generated by oil. Additionally, the 
411 Ikelegbe, A. “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria” in Nordic Journal of 
African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2005, p. 208. Retrieved from http://integritynigeria.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/ikelegbe_the_economy-of-Conflict.pdf.  
412 Many leaders and elders in northern Nigeria believe the Federal Government has neglected the region, because of 
the religious divide in the country with northern Nigeria being predominantly Muslim. There is also the belief that 
President Jonathan is attempting to destabilize the region so that there will be no unified challenge to the next 
Presidential elections in 2015. 
SOFREP, Why Boko Haram Terrorists won’t be Defeated Easily, http://sofrep.com/35336/bringbackourgirls-why-boko-
haram-terrorists-wont-be-defeated-easily-nigeria/#prettyPhoto, 12 May 2014. 
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northern states of Nigeria have seen a “perfect storm” of economic stagnation, demographic 
growth, and the splintering of Muslim communities.413 Many Nigerians see a higher level of 
poverty in northern Nigeria, with fewer opportunities to attend school, and less meaningful 
sources of economic growth.414 There is a high illiteracy rate in Nigeria, with the north being 
home to many of those who cannot read or write. The population explosion makes competition 
that much greater for the limited opportunities in the north, which increases the number of 
destitute. Ngbea and Achunike (2014) stated that “northern Nigeria has the highest poverty rate 
in the country,”415 and this can only result in greater numbers of people feeling marganilised and 
disenfranchised by the richer, Christian government. With most of the political power base for 
Nigeria situated in the Christian-dominated South, the Muslim North felt side-lined as a whole. 
Boko Haram was able to impugn the political elites of northern Nigeria for their cooperation 
with Christian political leaders within the national Federal Government416, insinuating the 
disregard for the common Muslim northerner by those in political power.  
When a young person is poor, illiterate and unemployed, he becomes an easy target for any kind 
of nefarious brainwashing or recruitment.  Economic deprivation has been identified as one of 
the key factors that stimulated the violent extremism, ease of recruitment, and amount of support 
that Boko Haram possesses. Coupled with economic deprivation, the extent of abject poverty in 
northern Nigeria has dramatically increased the feelings of marginalisation amongst many young 
413 Watts, J.: Silent Violence: Food, Famine, and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria, University of Georgia Press, 
Georgia, 2013, p. XIV. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=vRuvAAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR3&dq=under+development+in
+northern+nigeria&ots=T1kCqNl4ld&sig=Tcgb5qgN2AxA4nA905mqpzSp9qw#v=onepage&q=under%20develop
ment%20in%20northern%20nigeria&f=false. 
414 Ngbea, G. & Achunike, H. “Poverty in Northern Nigeria”, in Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
Vnol. 2, No. 2, April 2014, p. 270. 
415 Loc Cit. 
416 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p. 3. 
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Nigerians in the region. Boko Haram has been able to exploit the grievances of these 
disenfranchised youths to find support and recruitment.  
An example of Boko Haram exploiting the dire economic situation in Nigeria can be seen 
amongst the women and teenage prisoners the government released in May 2013. Amongst the 
teenagers were persons who had admitted to accepting 5 000 Nigerian Naira from the militant 
group, who supplied them with casks of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri.417 
According to Akinola Olojo418, the sectarian group’s popularity in northern Nigeria soared post-
September 11, as many disenfranchised Muslim youths saw the anti-Western statements and 
global jihad as an inspiration.419 The resulting Iraq and Afghanistan wars portrayed Middle East 
Muslims as being oppressed comrades in the eyes of the socio-economically vulnerable youths 
within an environment of religious tension. 
 
ORIGINS OF BOKO HARAM 
There are differing views as to how Boko Haram originated. One view is that in around 1995, the 
group emerged from a little-known Muslim youth organisation called Shabaab420 (not to be 
confused with al-Shabaab in Somalia) under the leadership of Lawan Abubaker. Another account 
suggests that in around 2000, Boko Haram arose from a group of Muslim students from the 
University of Maiduguri, under Isa Gusau who preached Islamic views that Western education 
was “unlawful”. 
417 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p. 6. 
418 International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 
419 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p. 4. 
420 Ibid, p. 2. 
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The most common view, and that which this paper will look at specifically, is that Boko Haram 
was created in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno, by Islamic 
cleric Muhammed Yusuf421, and has operated under a number of different monikers.422 Yusuf, 
who was a trained Salafist, which is a school of thought often associated with jihadists, was the 
leader of a radical Islamist youth group in the 1990s.  
The group refers to itself as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, which is “people 
committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad”.423 It is, however, widely 
referred to as Boko Haram. There is a belief that the name Boko Haram, which is now globally 
recognised, was not the group’s choice, but rather it was derived from an external view of their 
basic beliefs. “Boko Haram” is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko, meaning 
“book”, and the Arabic word or phrase haram, which refers to something that is ungodly, sinful 
or forbidden. Thus, literally the group’s name: “Book is sinful”. However, the group’s beliefs put 
deeper meaning to the name insofar as it identifies that Western education is ungodly, and 
therefore should be forbidden. 
 
BOKO HARAM’S IDEOLOGY 
Boko Haram has vehemently opposed Western education, culture, and modernisation. It has 
incorporated and propagated the strict adherence to Islamic law, regardless of the beliefs of 
421 Council on Foreign Relations: Boko Haram, http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2014. 
422 Such names included: the Nigerian Taliban; Ahlusunna wal’ Jamma Hijra; and the Yusufiyya. 
423 Council on Foreign Relations, Op Cit. 
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individuals in the sect’s territories. In line with such beliefs, Boko Haram has attempted to 
enforce Sharia law across all Nigerian states.424  
 
Prior to 2009, when the group made its presence known to the international community, Boko 
Haram was not focused on the usurpation of the government. Yusuf instead called for the 
annexing of northern states away from the “illegitimate non-Islamic state”. It would appear that 
the Nigerian government had a hand in the radicalisation of Boko Haram. Yusuf’s preachings 
resulted in violent clashes between Christians and Muslims, which the Nigerian government 
sought to quell through harsh reprisals and pervasive police brutality. This mistreatment has been 
identified as a key component to the radicalisation of Boko Haram.425  
 
 
424 Adesoji, A. Op Cit, p. 100. 
425 Council on Foreign Relations, Op Cit. 
Figures from 2009 - 2013 
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In July 2009, the situation changed. Boko Haram members refused to abide by a motorcycle 
helmet law, which led, once again, to heavy-handed police tactics that sparked an armed uprising 
in the northern state of Bauchi, and spread almost instantly to the states of Borno, Yobe, and 
Kano. Not unexpectedly, police brutally suppressed the uprising, which left as many as 800 dead. 
To add fuel to the simmering fire that Nigeria was becoming, the televised execution of Yusuf, 
as well as many other members of Boko Haram, created what Paul Lubeck426 described as “an 
Islamist insurrection under a splintered leadership”.427 In response, the radical group carried out 
a number of high profile assassinations and suicide bombings across the country from Maiduguri 
to Abuja, and staged a well-executed prison break in Bauchi in 2010.  
426 Professor studying Muslim societies in Africa, University of California 
427 Council on Foreign Relations. Op Cit. 
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The 2009 Boko Haram uprising set a new precedent when it re-enforced the attempts made by 
Islamic conservative and fundamental elements to impose a variant of Islamic religious doctrine 
over a secular state.428 
 
MEMBERSHIP 
Boko Haram’s membership, or Yusuffiya, is for the most part derived from the poorest groups of 
Nigeria. However, there are a number of members in the upper echelons of the sect that do not fit 
this category.429 The general consensus amongst the members was the desire to overthrow the 
country’s government, but the oratory skills of Yusuf did contribute to the mobilisation and 
participation of a number of Boko Haram members. 
 
Many northern Nigerians that offered support to Boko Haram did so because they supposedly 
believed in the radical ideology of the group.430 Youths, in particular, were disenfranchised by 
the central government, which Boko Haram regarded as a “poorly administered secular 
system”.431 The ideology reverberates for powerful and resourceful individuals, and thus the 
operational capabilities of Boko Haram are clearer.432 Prior to the 2009 Boko Haram uprising, 
the group was not regarded as a major security threat and thus many supporters in the north 
simply saw the group as a radical organisation that occasionally lapsed into violence.  
428 Adesoji, A. Op Cit, p. 2. 
429 Ibid, p. 7. 
430 The factors of poverty and economic dislocation, as well as unemployment and discrimination by the south were 
reasons that northern Nigerians saw Boko Haram as a force that could combat the government.  
431 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p. 3. 
432 Ibid.  
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MODUS OPERANDI  
Boko Haram has adopted a style of operation that is modelled on the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Adesoji (2010) believes that Boko Haram modelled itself after the Taliban simply to 
acknowledge its source of inspiration. It could have been done in order to garner greater global 
sympathy and support from the Taliban and related insurgencies.433 There have also been 
rumoured links with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (SGPC) in Algeria, clerics in 
Pakistan, and Wahabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia.434 
Some observers believe Boko Haram’s aggressive tactics are “extremism beyond a domestic 
agenda”. In particular, the ‘use’ of suicide attacks presents a trait that is more akin with the 
violence of international terrorism, a type of attack that was generally alien to Nigeria.435  
 
While religion is a force for good for the vast majority of individuals, Boko Haram employs it as 
a mechanism to garner greater support for the ‘plight’ of Muslims in northern Nigeria.436 The 
call for Sharia law speaks to many Muslim youths with religious aspirations who see the group’s 
assurances of political and economic emancipation as alluring. This has translated to a surge in 
attacks on Christian communities in Nigeria, and even on fellow Muslims who are not as devout 
as Boko Haram wishes.  
Many Muslim leaders in Nigerian communities have spoken out against Boko Haram’s 
misrepresentation of Islam, seeing the group’s Sharia behaviour as religious justification through 
433 Adesoji, A. Op Cit, 101. 
434 Abimbola, J. & Adesote S., “Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, issues and trends: A 
historical discourse”, in Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society, Vol. 4, September 2012, p. 20.  
435 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p.  1. 
436 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p. 8. 
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manipulation of Islam, rather than religiously inspired. Indeed, mainstream Sunni writings on 
war forbid the killing of “non-combatants”, of which Boko Haram is guilty. 
 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO BOKO HARAM 
As previously stated, prior to 2009, Boko Haram was not considered a major security threat to 
the country. Only in 2009, after the group had killed as many as 1000 people in several attacks 
across the country, did the then Yar Adua government declare the group a security risk. More 
recently, during a particularly bloody period in 2013, President Jonathan authorised an order 
which officially brought the activities of Boko Haram within the purview of Nigeria’s Terrorism 
Prevention Act.437 
The securitisation policy appeared to diminish the view that Boko Haram possessed legitimate 
motives for its campaigns. There was a large degree of mud-slinging, as political elites accused 
each other of being affiliated with Boko Haram before 2009.438 While these issues remain 
tainted, it should be noted that allegations exchanged between political elites, which hint at Boko 
Haram affiliation, can also be utilised as a shrewd political move to neutralise or lower the 
opposition’s public image within the context of state politics. However, despite the ambiguity, 
the fact remains that the development and ideology of the sectarian group has grown beyond 
proportions that political elites, including President Jonathan, can manage. 
On 26 July 2009, a joint security task team raided a Boko Haram stronghold in Bauchi State, 
where 9 members of the sect were arrested, and bomb-making materials and ammunition were 
437 Loc Cit. 
438 Ibid, p. 6. 
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seized.439 On the face of it, this looked like a successful start to the anti-terrorist campaign. 
However, this was not the case. In response, Boko Haram attacked schools, police stations, 
government buildings and churches, resulting in as many as 700 people being killed and 
thousands more being injured.440 These events set the tone for the way the Nigerian authorities 
were to deal with Boko Haram – meeting violence with violence. Despite continued brutal 
initiatives against Boko Haram by the Nigerian government, the terrorist group responded with 
greater violence. The Nigerian government appears not to have learned from these past failed 
endeavours.  
In 2012, attempts were made by government and Boko Haram members to peacefully resolve 
Boko Haram’s insurgency. The negotiations were aimed at ending months of bomb and gun 
attacks by the terrorist group in the mostly Muslim north. The attempts, for the most part, 
failed441 and destroyed any hope of an end to the violence that has claimed hundreds, if not 
thousands, of lives in Nigeria.442 According to Reuben Abati, President Jonathan’s spokesperson, 
the government has been in “back-channel” talks with Boko Haram since August 2011443, when 
the President stated he was open to talks but admitted difficulties between the two parties. The 
talks focused on providing amnesty for those seeking peace and denouncing violence.  
Former president Obasanjo held talks on the 16 September 2011 with members of Boko Haram 
in the city of Maiduguri, to ascertain their demands from the Nigerian government. A modicum 
439 Solomon, H. “Counter-terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram”, in Royal United Services Institute, 
Vol. 157, No. 4, p. 6, September 2012. 
440 Loc Cit. 
441 According to President Jonathan, the talks failed because there was “no face” to hold discussions with. There had 
also been violations carried out by both parties in terms of violent attacks and brutal retaliations. Furthermore, it was 
reported that Boko Haram ended the talks because it could not trust a government of “unbelievers”.  
442 IRIN, Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian Government-Boko Haram dialogue, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/96915/analysis-hurdles-to-nigerian-government-boko-haram-dialogue, 28 November 
2012, p. 1. 
443 Ibid. 
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of success was achieved when Boko Haram outlined some of their demands for a ceasefire: the 
end of arrests and killings of Boko Haram members, compensation to the families of those killed, 
and the prosecutions of police officials responsible for the killing of leader Muhammed Yusuf in 
2009.444 According to Shehu Sani445, President Jonathan promised to look at these demands – 
nothing has yet been done. Although Sani seems critical of President Jonathan, he does 
acknowledge that there is little or no trust between Boko Haram and government, and that most 
of the dialogue between the two groups is targeted at Boko Haram’s attempt to garner finance 
from the government, or are scams looking at self-enrichment. It is interesting to note that Boko 
Haram’s demands have not targeted poverty and socio-economic and political conditions in the 
country. 
 
The Nigerian government launched a massive military offensive in the north of the country 
against Boko Haram and the sect’s strongholds in early 2013 under the banner of the Joint Task 
444 Loc Cit.  
445 Director of Civil Rights Congress, a prominent Nigerian rights group. 
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Force (JTF).446 Jonathan’s administration has supported the new military offensive that began 
half way through 2013, and has implemented a State of Emergency in three northern Nigerian 
states.447 Curfews are in place, as well as interruptions to cellular signals to disrupt 
communications between Boko Haram followers.448 While the army hunts down sectarian 
members and supporters, the air force continues to bomb strongholds. Boko Haram responded in 
similar fashion to the 2009 military offensive – greater violence. Nigerian officials believed it 
would take weeks, or a few months at most, for a strong display of military force to drive the 
fundamental Islamist group into submission. It appeared at first that the assumption of a quick 
and decisive victory was on the cards.449 Additionally, to show that the Nigerian government was 
not solely determined to murder its way to victory, there was a steady flow of captures and 
arrests of Boko Haram members.450 However, the situation was not as positive as Nigeria’s 
political and military elite believed.  
 
In retaliation to the government’s military invasion of its northern strongholds, Boko Haram did 
not disappear into the night. Instead the group fought back. Nearly a full year after the offensive 
that was to last a few weeks, hundreds of Boko Haram members attacked an air force base and 
military barracks in a well-coordinated attack in Maiduguri.451 Maiduguri being a stronghold of 
Boko Haram is one of the main targets of the JTF. This proved that the sect was far from 
defeated. In late October and early November 2013, Boko Haram was supposedly responsible for 
446 Allion, S. Op Cit. 
447 Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. 
448 Allison, S. Analysis: Boko Haram is a Symptom of a Deeper Malise, 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-04-16-analysis-boko-haram-is-a-symptom-of-a-deeper-
malaise/#.U1N59vmSxCZ, 16 April 2014, p. 1. 
449 50 Boko Haram members killed in September, 150 more in the same month, with 75 more killed in a raid in 
October, and so on. 
450 Allison, S. Op Cit. 
451 Allison, S. Op Cit. 
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an attack that left 115 people dead, which Amnesty International believe constitutes a crime 
against humanity.452 
2014 has already been the bloodiest year of Boko Haram’s insurgency, with at least 1 500 
fatalities in dozens of attacks in 4 months.453 To put it in perspective, there were 2 100 deaths in 
the 5 years between 2009 and 2013.454 
The response by Boko Haram raises more questions than answers. The most important question 
would be whether or not the government’s military response was the right way to deal with Boko 
Haram. The Nigerian government, through this assault, seems to be fighting fire with fire, which 
has proved to be an ineffective solution. However, what is more concerning for the legitimacy of 
Nigeria’s government is the fact that the JTF has been implicated in similarly unlawful crimes. 
Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, have accused both Boko Haram as well as the 
JTF of violations since 2009.455 As Boko Haram intensified its attacks, the Nigerian government 
forces responded with draconian-style policing. According to Mausi Segun456, Human Rights 
Watch has documented allegations of indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests, detention without 
charge, torture, forced disappearances, as well as extra-judicial killings carried out by the 
Nigerian security forces.457 Simon Allison458 commented that there is no easy solution to the 
Boko Haram situation, and the Nigerian government has to do something about it. He goes as far 
as to call Boko Haram one of the most deadly groups in Africa.  
452 Loc Cit. 
453 Loc Cit. 
454 Loc Cit. 
455 “Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian Government-Boko Haram dialogue” Op Cit.  
456 Human Rights Watch’s Nigeria researcher 
457 Allison, S. Op Cit. 
458 Africa Correspondent for Daily Maverick 
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One of the most difficult obstacles for the Nigerian government to overcome is the issue of who 
to deal with. Like a number of insurgencies, the group has splintered into a number of factions. 
Several individuals have claimed to be part of, or to represent, Boko Haram, with the group 
denouncing the “imposter” days later and denouncing whatever statement was made.459 Even 
more complex, are the number of armed criminal gangs that hide under the shroud of Boko 
Haram in order to justify their criminal activities. As Bawa Abdullahi Wase460 states, the 
government needs to end the Boko Haram attacks through negotiation, before the situation 
becomes too complex and difficult to discern between the sect and imposters.461  
 
David Zounmenou462 argues that a military assault should not be completely dismissed. He 
believes that it shows the commitment of the government and its willingness to take on Boko 
Haram militarily. Having said that, he believes the tactic can only work as part of a three-
pronged approach that addresses some of the root causes of the Boko Haram problem. The socio-
economic conditions that have produced an extremist environment, as well as the corruption and 
lack of transparency from the political elite has produced a generation of disenfranchised and 
marginalised youth – particularly in the majority Muslim north.463 
 
Public support for Boko Haram is representative of both active and passive elements in 
Nigeria.464 Although passive support does not include sacrifices made in the form of suicide 
459 “Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian Government-Boko Haram dialogue” Op Cit. 
460 Criminologist and Rapporteur at the UN Department of Safety and Security 
461 “Analysis: Hurdles to Nigerian Government-Boko Haram dialogue” Op Cit. 
462 Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies 
463 Allison, S. Op Cit. 
464 Olojo, A. Op Cit, p. 4.  
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bombers, their sympathy with insurgents, as well as the refusal to betray them, is a key factor 
that undermines the government’s attempts to deal with Boko Haram. 
 
In January 2012, President Jonathan noted that Boko Haram had sympathisers in the executive, 
legislative and judicial arms of his government. Even worse for the JTF, there appeared to be 
supporters of Boko Haram within the country’s armed forces.465 There were rumours that there 
were a number of political elites in Borno State that funded and supported Mohammed Yusuf in 
payment for the support that Yusuf could amass in favour of electoral victories in 2003 and 
2007. For example, Alhaji Buji Foi was appointed as the Commissioner of Religious Affairs in 
Borno State. Foi was a major financier of Boko Haram and was killed by security forces in July 
2009.466 
 
Politicians that were at one stage or another associated with Boko Haram benefitted from the 
group’s ability to mobilise support from its membership. This support was linked to Yusuf’s 
personal resources that he amassed through the years.  
The government has attempted to close the borders between the northern Nigerian states and 
neighbouring countries, in an attempt to prevent perpetrators of terrorist attacks from escaping 
and to try to limit and thwart any support Boko Haram was receiving from jihadist elements in 
the region.467 However, due to the length of the border (Nigeria-Niger border is 1 497kms and 
465 Ibid, p. 5. 
466 Loc Cit.  
467 Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 7. 
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the Nigeria-Cameroon is 1 690kms468) the type of terrain, as well as the incapability of Nigerian 
border control, the borders remain porous.  
Evidence of the government’s inability to maintain border control can be seen by Cameroon’s 
report that the country has been infiltrated by Boko Haram.469 On 5 May 2014, over 30 suspected 
Boko Haram militants attacked the Kousseri military post in that country. What is significant 
about this attack is that Cameroonian officials believe the attack could not have been carried out 
without local support. The attack on a military installation in Cameroon has the potential to 
destabilise the region, as who does one turn to when the army is the target? Boko Haram has 
never before presented as a regional or international terrorist group. The suspected attack in 
neighbouring Cameroon might be the group’s first step towards a more global or regional plan. 
Regional actors Cameroon and Chad finalised security talks in which they reiterated 
commitments to a “declaration of war” on Boko Haram.470  
Both nations are fearful that the Nigeria-based terrorist group could become a destabilising factor 
to the region, and want to combine efforts to stop the group. Chadian President Idriss Deby went 
as far as to call Boko Haram “an evil force that must be eradicated”. He went further: “All 
Muslims in the world should listen to me: Kidnapping children is not Islam; killing innocent 
citizens is not Islam.”471 However, with all the talk of combatting the terrorist group, it is hard to 
see how citizens will risk personal safety to report suspected Boko Haram members.  
468 Index Mundi, Nigeria Land Boundaries, http://www.indexmundi.com/nigeria/land_boundaries.html, p. 1. 
469 Chimtom, N., Nigeria’s Boko Haram Begins to Destablise Cameroon, http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/05/nigerias-
boko-haram-begins-destabilise-cameroon/, 13 May 2014, p. 1. 
470 Kindzeka, M., Cameroon, Chad finalise Boko Haram security talks, http://www.voanews.com/content/cameroon-
chad-team-up-to-combat-boko-haram/1920228.html, 23 May 2014, p. 1. 
471 Loc Cit.  
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The United States has deployed 80 personnel to Chad472 to assist in the search for the Nigerian 
school girls abducted by Boko Haram. The fact that the United States has deployed troops in 
neighbouring Chad makes one wonder whether or not the abductees have been smuggled out of 
Nigeria, and just how much regional movement Boko Haram actually has. 
  
Somalia’s al-Shabaab has had a much larger regional and global presence than Nigeria’s Boko 
Haram, due to the international interest in the collapsed state, and the organisation’s regional 
attacks. Whether or not Boko Haram has favoured being out of the international spotlight is not 
clear, but with one of its most recent attacks and subsequent actions, the group’s situation seems 
to have changed. On 15 April 2014, Boko Haram attacked a school in the town of Chibok in the 
north-eastern Borno state. The government has been battling the group’s strongholds in Borno 
state for months. An estimated 276 schoolgirls were abducted from their school at gunpoint and 
herded onto transport vehicles.473  
Simon Alison474 identified two key factors that make the attack so noteworthy: Firstly, Boko 
Haram was able to overpower the soldiers sent to the school to provide additional security – not 
exactly a glowing endorsement of the capability of the armed forces to protect the country’s 
citizens. Secondly, in contradiction to the government’s claim that Boko Haram has been forced 
out of their strongholds, the terrorist group clearly has the means and resources to hide the 
472 Karimi, F., & Shoichet, C., 80 US Troops in Chad will aid search for abducted Nigerian girls, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/21/world/africa/nigeria-violence/, 22 May 2014, p. 1. 
473 AlJazeera, US officials fear for abducted Nigerian girls, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/us-
officials-fear-abducted-nigerian-girls-2014565945897810.html, 6 May 2014, p. 1. 
474 Simon Allison is the Africa correspondent for the Daily Maverick.  
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schoolgirls475 – this shows a level of organisation and security that should concern both the 
Jonathan administration and other regional actors.  
According to Amnesty International, Nigerian authorities received advance warnings about the 
attack on the boarding school.476 It has been reported that poor resources and a fear of engaging 
with the “often better-equipped armed group” were behind the indecision to send 
reinforcements.477 Although some additional security was provided, this further tarnishes the 
already heavily-criticised image of the Nigerian government and amounts to a disregard of the 
government’s duty to protect its citizenry.  
In a video released after the kidnappings, a man claiming to be Boko Haram’s current leader, 
Abubaker Shekau, said the group would sell the girls in the market for around $12 each to 
become the “wives” of militants.478 In a second video, Shekau claimed to have “liberated” the 
girls, by forcing them to convert from Christianity to Islam.479 There is also reference made to 
Boko Haram prisoners in Nigerian jails, whose rights are allegedly being violated because of 
their association with the terrorist organisation. Boko Haram offered to release the girls in 
exchange for the prisoners – an offer that was rejected by the Nigerian authority.480 Although, 
the rejection of such an offer was to be expected, it does show willingness on the part of Shekau 
to negotiate with the government.  
475 Allison, S. Op Cit. 
476 Gordts, E., Nigerian authorities had advanced warnings about impending Boko Haram attack on school: Amnesty 
International, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/09/nigeria-warnings-school-
attack_n_5295271.html?&ncid=tweetlnkushpmg00000067, 9 May 2014, p. 1. 
477 Loc Cit. 
478 Abubaker, A., & Levs, J., ‘I will sell them’ Boko Haram leader says of kidnapped girls, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/05/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/index.html, 6 May 2014, p. 1. 
479 Jones, S., Boko Haram rebels parade ‘liberated’ Nigerian girls in propaganda video, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/12/kidnapped-nigerian-girls-paraded-in-boko-haram-video, 13 May 
2014, p. 1. 
480 Associated Press, Nigeria rejects Boko Haram prisoner swap for hostage girls, 
http://indianexpress.com/photos/picture-gallery-others/nigeria-rejects-boko-haram-prisoner-swap-for-hostage-
girls/#apkidnappedgirlsvisdeo, 12 May 2014, p. 1. 
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The abductions sparked worldwide attention, with protests occurring in capitals across the globe 
to urge the Nigerian government to step up efforts in their attempt to rescue the girls.481 It 
appears to have galvanised many previously unaware citizens against Boko Haram, with 
mounting pressure being placed on the Nigerian government. Whereas, Boko Haram was a 
domestic issue in Nigeria, this brazen kidnapping could backfire on the terrorist organisation.482  
The global campaign has led to a number of international actors offering assistance to find the 
kidnapped girls.483 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu explained that countries must fight the 
“cruel terrorism inflicted on you [Nigeria].”484 The United Nations warned Boko Haram that the 
sale of the girls could constitute crimes against humanity.485  
The growing international involvement generated by the kidnappings will put greater pressure on 
the Nigerian government to come to terms with the threat of Boko Haram and respond 
accordingly. Dealing with the dysfunctional government of Nigeria might be relatively 
maintainable for Boko Haram, but dealing with the United Nations, the United States and other 
international actors may not be as easy.  
 
481 Ansari, A., & Brueggeman, T., Demand for return of hundreds of abducted schoolgirls in Nigeria mounts, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/03/world/africa/nigeria-abducted-girls/, 4 May 2014, p. 1. 
482 There is a global campaign that is increasing awareness of the situation in Nigeria. The social media campaign, 
#BringBackOurGirls, is growing and further increasing the world’s interest in Boko Haram. 
483 The United States has sent a team comprised of military personnel, intelligence and hostage negotiators to help 
the Nigerian government. Britain has also offered assistance in locating the girls. France has boosted intelligence 
ties with Nigeria and is sending security personnel to help combat Boko Haram. That country has over 4000 troops 
in the region, and thus has a major incentive to stop the spread of Boko Haram into the Sahel. Israel, a country 
familiar with terrorism, and an ally of Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram, has pledged assistance in finding the 
kidnaped girls. 
484 Keinon, H., Israel offers to help Nigeria find abducted girls, http://www.jpost.com/International/Israel-offers-to-
help-Nigeria-find-abducted-girls-351924, 11 May 2014, p. 1. 
485 Vinograd, C., Nigeria offered help by UK in ‘Bring Our Girls Back’ campaign, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/nigeria-offered-help-u-k-bring-our-girls-home-case-
n97926, 6 May 2014, p. 1. 
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Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan stated at the World Economic Forum (WEF), which was 
held in Abuja (May 7 – 9), that the “kidnap of these girls will be the beginning of the end of 
terrorism in Nigeria.”486 However, the sentiment behind this statement has been heard before in 
Nigeria, and another massacre at the hands of Boko Haram in Gamburu487 at the time of the 
WEF, underscores just how far the Nigerian security apparatus is from protecting its citizens.  
 
Geoff Porter488 identified three fundamental domestic implications that the kidnappings have for 
Nigeria. Firstly, southern Nigeria has, for the most part, seen Boko Haram as a northern Nigeria 
problem, but with a number of attacks in Abuja, and the kidnappings, the national animosity 
towards the sectarian group will grow.489 There is growing domestic and international pressure 
on the Nigerian government to act. Secondly, the nationwide and international protests and 
rallies opposing Boko Haram has not translated into support for Jonathan’s government because 
of the government’s indecisive and slow response to the kidnappings, and the state of emergency 
placed in the north continues to anger and further marginalise Nigerians in the area. The state of 
emergency could delay the February 2015 presidential elections, which would question the 
legitimacy of Jonathan’s term, which is already questioned by many Nigerians, and northern 
Muslims in particular. The delay would also further weaken the government and thus undermine 
the measures to counter Boko Haram.490 Thirdly, Boko Haram’s brutality could lead to the flight 
486 Bigg, M., President Goodluck Jonathan says kidnappings are ‘beginning of the end’ for Nigeria terrorism, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/08/goodluck-jonathan-nigeria-
kidnappings_n_5286903.html?&ncid=tweetlnkushpmg00000067, 8 May 2014, p. 1. 
487 Loc Cit. 
488 Geoff D. Porter is an Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point.  
489 Porter, G.: A Turning Point for Boko Haram, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspective-a-turning-point-
for-boko-haram, Combating Terrorism Center, May 2014, p. 1. 
490 Loc Cit. 
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of Christians and moderate Muslims to the south, which might allow Boko Haram to further 
entrench itself, as real opposition to the group could disappear, with the exodus.  
 
The Nigerian government appears to have done “next to nothing” to recover the abductees. 491 
The abduction is a part of a global backlash against girls’ education by Islamic extremists. With 
reports that a further 8 girls were kidnapped by Boko Haram, hours after claiming responsibility 
for the Chibok kidnappings,492 it appears that the group holds no fear of reprisals by the Nigerian 
government. According to Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh, the government has 
located the abducted girls, but ruled out using force to rescue them.493 However, the claim has 
been met with scepticism both inside Nigeria and globally. Any raid into a Boko Haram 
stronghold would be fraught with risks to both the Nigerian forces, and the girls themselves who 
would no doubt be killed by the terrorists, who have shown ruthlessness in killing civilians.  
Since the abduction of the girls, there have been over 470 civilians killed by Boko Haram in a 
range of attacks from Abuja to villages in the north.494 One must ask how can Nigeria expect to 
be a leader in Africa if the government cannot maintain territorial sovereignty and protect its 
population.  
 
 
491 Kristof, N., ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/opinion/sunday/kristof-bring-back-our-
girls.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1, 3 May 2014, p. 1. 
492 AlJazeera, More girls kidnapped in Nigeria, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/05/boko-haram-abducts-
more-niegera-schoolgirls-20145612512991127.html, 7 May 2014, p. 1. 
493 The Telegraph, ‘We know where missing girls are’ Says Nigerian top military officer, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/10857242/We-know-where-missing-
girls-are-says-Nigerias-top-military-officer.html, 26 May 2014, p. 1. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Nigeria is a country that suffered under years of military rule and ever changing governments. 
During the revolving style of governance in the country, there have been repeated attempts to 
stabilise and remedy the volatile economy. There have, however, not been any successful 
attempts to quell the growing threat of radical Islam in the country, particularly in the north and 
northeast. In a country that has become a religious battleground between Christianity attempting 
to spread northwards, and Islam attempting to spread south, inaction by the government has 
exacerbated the situation. The country is an example of a dysfunctional state: A strong economy, 
with a corrupt political elite, and a fragmented society. Nigeria is a hotbed of religious conflict, 
home to an Islamic terrorist group that is determined to target Christianity, Muslims that disagree 
with its fundamentalism, and the government who it perceives as being a Western, Christian 
marionette.  
Throughout Boko Haram’s existence, with government leaders lining their pockets, there appear 
to have been minimal attempts to rectify the situation and secure the country against the violence 
of Boko Haram. The government has attempted to negotiate with Boko Haram, both prior to and 
after the abductions. The negotiations have brought about no change. The military offensive, 
state of emergency, and the disabling of telecommunications in the northern region have all 
backfired on the Nigerian government, as Boko Haram retaliate with greater force and greater 
brutality to any armed intervention. Boko Haram has no regard for human life and believes that 
death for the cause is a blessing. How does one rationalise or negotiate with such persons?  
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CHAPTER 4: 
AL-SHABAAB  
AND  
BOKO HARAM: 
PRODUCTS OF  
COLLAPSE AND 
DYSFUNCTION? 
 
“Milk and honey have different colours, but they share the same house peacefully” – African Proverb 
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This chapter will analyse the two case studies by comparing the conditions in Nigeria and 
Somalia pre-Boko Haram and –al-Shabaab. This will serve to assess the impact that the socio-
economic and political make ups of these countries have in the formation of their respective 
terrorist groups. Having characterised Nigeria as a dysfunctional state and Somalia as a failed or 
collapsed state, these characterisations form part of the analysis insofar as the development of the 
sectarian groups is potentially a result of the type of authority under which they were established 
and thrived. It is these governments’ responses to their radical Islamist groups that reflect the 
strength and quality of their authority. 
 
THE PARALLELS OF EAST AND WEST AFRICA 
There are a number of historical similarities between Nigeria and Somalia. These parallels assist 
in setting the foundation for a comparison between the types of leadership that have governed the 
countries. As previously stated, Nigeria is a country that has been subject to dysfunctional 
governance since independence, whereas Somalia is a collapsed state without a central authority.  
A brief review of the preceding two chapters identifies that Nigeria was under British mandate 
prior to independence, and the colonial rule was characterised by frequent reclassifying of 
territories for administrative purposes. Somalia, on the other hand, was not commanded by a 
single European coloniser, but rather a collection of European powers. Britain, France and Italy 
all colonised territories in and around the region of Somalia, before Emperor Menelik II of 
Ethiopia became another colonising power in the region.  
1960 is a significant year in relation to both countries, as Nigeria was granted full independence 
from British rule in October 1960, and Somalia reached full independence in the same year. 
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Putting it simplistically, both countries achieved independence after divided colonial and 
territorial rule. Both countries were torn apart either by one power or a multitude of powers, 
resulting in conflict between differing regions and ethnicities that called the separated territories 
home. This can be seen as a hindrance to both countries’ attempts at unification from the 1900s 
to date. This does not take into account the conduct of each country’s governments, which in this 
paper’s opinion have played a greater role in the state of affairs within the countries than the 
history of each country. 
 
POVERTY 
Both Nigeria and Somalia are countries in which the vast majority of the population suffers 
under dire circumstances. The dysfunctional state of Nigeria has garnered massive wealth from 
oil revenues, but the country’s inhabitants have not benefitted. In 2011, Julius-Adeoye Rantimi 
Jays found that as much as 70% of the Nigerian population was living below the global poverty 
line because of the unequal distribution of national resources.495 While in Somalia, according to 
the UNDP 2012 report, Somalia Human Development Report 2012, 82% of the population are 
“considered poor across multiple dimensions”.496 The figures point to a greater socio-economic 
problem in Nigeria and Somalia. With such high poverty figures, there is little hope for real 
development, and hand-in-hand with this is unemployment, another huge social and economic 
indicator of the governments’ failed attempts at improving their respective countries. Youth 
unemployment across the globe, and sub-Saharan Africa, is seemingly a growing trend. In 2002 -
2003, in sub-Saharan Africa, 21% of the youth were unemployed, which is a large percentage of 
495 Rantimi Jays, J. Op Cit, p. 2. 
496 United Nations Development Programme: About Somalia, 
http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo/, United Nations Development Programme. 
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the population.497 In Nigeria, according to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics, in 2010, 
the unemployment rate among the youth was as high as 41.6%. In the same UNDP report 
mentioned above, the youth unemployment in Somalia was even greater, at 67%.498 These 
alarming statistics identify the massive problem of poverty that plagues both countries. 
Somalia’s collapsed government seems to have failed completely in bettering the lives of its 
population. It would appear that Nigeria’s dysfunctionality in improving the standards of living 
for its population is marginally better. Both al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are known to recruit 
unemployed and marginalised youths that see no hope, other than by aligning themselves with 
such organisations. The terrorist groups exploit the high levels of hopelessness as a means to 
convert these youths into fighters.  
With such high levels of poverty and youth unemployment, it would appear that the governments 
have done little in the way of creating development or job opportunities for their populations. 
Indeed, such tasks are not solely the responsibilities of the governments, and the lack of 
development is not exclusively their fault, but it is their duty to do whatever possible in 
attempting to rectify the situation and improve the lives of their people.  
 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
A dysfunctional state is characterised by the growing ineffectiveness of administrative, legal, 
extractive, and coercive institutions that form the state’s core.499 The Nigerian government failed 
to diversify the economy away from dependence on oil into other sectors, which is an indication 
497 Salami, C. Op Cit, p. 20. 
498 “About Somalia” Op Cit. 
499 Busza, E. Op Cit. p. 4. 
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of ineffective broadening of the extractive sector. Thus, when oil prices tumbled, the country 
descended into economic chaos.500 Aligned with economic decline and continued government 
changes, the social situation in the country stuttered as well, with almost no resources being put 
into development. It is believed that government officials have diverted much of the wealth and 
oil revenue to their own pockets and those of their cronies, instead of back into development 
within the country.501 It is this conduct that many Nigerians have suggested led to the emergence 
of Boko Haram. The establishment of Boko Haram was, in part, a reaction to this systemic and 
systematic corruption. 
In comparison to Nigeria’s dysfunctional, yet operational economy, the collapsed state of 
Somalia’s economy has struggled since independence. Prior to the country’s collapse, under 
Barre’s military regime, the economy withered under socialism that focused on military 
expenditure. When the country fell into anarchy after the Barre regime, the economy collapsed. 
There was no functioning economy in Somalia. A collapsed state’s economy is generally defined 
by severe economic decline, and this has been clearly evident throughout Somalia’s history since 
independence. The livestock and agriculture sectors, both of which were mainstays of the 
country’s economy, imploded. The country’s political climate was slowly influenced by the lack 
of a central economy, as localised groups – often militant groups – were the only sectors 
providing minimal basic services. There are a number of ills that plague the Somali economy, 
such as structural constraints502, mismanagement of public resources and corruption, warlord 
500 In the second half of the 1970s, after the 1973/4 Oil Crisis, which saw the country flourish due to the high oil 
revenues, the average income per person in Nigeria plunged from $1000 to $250. 
501 Chayes, S., Nigeria: Where corruption and insurrection go hand-in-hand, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/27/opinion/la-oe-chayes-nigeria-corruption-insurgency-20140327, 27 March 
2014, p. 1. 
502 The lack of adequate infrastructure and social services, the lack of labour opportunities, limited benefits due to 
poor economic growth, and the dependency on a few export markets are some of the structural constraints that 
limited the Somali economy. 
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rule, and a disorganised public sector.503 The constantly changing governments or rivalling elites 
who attempt to line their pockets before being deposed have been a major hindrance to the 
collapsed state’s chances of rectifying its failed economy. 
Although, there have been some economic improvements504 in Somalia since the TFG and 
international actors gained control, the vast majority of the population has not benefited. In 
October 2013, the international community promised $2.3 billion to help Somalia develop and 
eradicate al-Shabaab, but to date, not a single dollar has arrived in the country.505 This is, in part, 
the Somali government’s fault, as it lacks the capacity and integrity to receive and properly 
utilise the money.  
Al-Shabaab has garnered support from disenfranchised people who see the government as having 
failed the country. The group developed by providing a semblance of basic services, economic 
activity and a degree of stability in their controlled areas, and was assisted by the perception of 
corruption that is so endemic in the Somali government. 
 
Nigeria’s civil rights after independence up until democracy, and some would argue, continuing 
into democracy, have been suppressed at times by the country’s rotating leadership. The 
Maitatsine Uprisings provide a clear view of the socio-economic situation in much of Nigeria in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The revolts have been explained by a combination of factors: economic 
dislocation and deprivation, income inequalities, and devastating poverty. These factors can be 
seen as a dysfunctional government’s failure to address the causes of social strife. The situation 
503 Samatar, A. Op Cit, p. 1.  
504 Economic hotspots are developing in the country. Expatriates have been responsible for improvements in 
communications, hospitals and schools. 
505 Fabricius, P. Op Cit.  
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during the uprisings was violent and depressing, which one would expect would force a 
government to improve the situation. This, according to Adesoji (2010), was not the case. Mass 
poverty increased, as did the inequality in education, as well as discrimination in political and 
employment opportunities. There is growing unemployment across the spectrum, with 
government corruption and misuse of resources ostensibly not being stopped.506 These problems 
have swollen the mass of vulnerable people whose marginalisation and impoverishment made 
them susceptible to Boko Haram’s lure. The country’s systemic corruption, the failure to 
equitably distribute the country’s wealth, and the elections being shrouded in controversy have 
turned many Nigerians against the Western-style governance, bringing further recruitment to the 
ranks of the Islamic group.507  
 
ROTATING LEADERSHIP  
The revolving-door-style politics in Somalia resulted in as many as 14 different governments 
between 1991 and 2010.508 These continuous revolutions have done little to improve the country, 
as any leader attempting to govern along a more transparent path is disposed of by those with 
more sinister intentions. Somalia has been plagued by the destruction of infrastructure, incidents 
of ethnic cleansing and with almost continuous armed conflict. There are a number of regions 
within the Somali borders that are semiautonomous; however, this is due to clan- and tribe-
warlords exerting their own control.509 The country, from independence, was plagued by 
corruption and violence, with the added affliction of there being no political reforms, as many 
506 Adesoji, A. Op Cit, p. 100. 
507 Loc Cit. 
508 “Council on Foreign Relations” Op Cit. 
509 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 2. 
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positions were allocated or taken up by those with the most powerful armed force or their 
allies.510 Somalia is a collapsed state that has almost no political control or functioning public 
institutions, and has entirely lost or rescinded control of its territory.  
Rotating leadership has also been a factor in Nigeria’s dysfunction. Since independence, Nigeria 
has seen an ever changing government of civilian rulers, and military leadership, but there have 
been adequate public services, such as the rule of law in certain parts of the country, and a 
central authority that has exercised some governance in those areas. 
Civilian and Military leaders of Nigeria since 1960 
Oct 1960 – Jan 1966  Sir Abubaker Tafawa 
Balewa 
Prime Minister of the First 
Republic of Nigeria 
Civilian 
Oct 1960 – Jan 1966  Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe First President Civilian 
Jan 1966 – July 1966 Major-General J. Aguyi-
Ironsi 
First Military Head of 
State 
Military 
1966 – 1975 General Yakubu Gowon Second Military Head of 
State 
Military 
July 1975 – Feb 1976  General Murtala 
Mohammed 
Third Military Head of 
State 
Military 
1976 – 1979  General Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
Fourth Military Head of 
State 
Military 
Oct 1979 – Dec – 1983 Alhaji Shehu Shagari First Executive President 
of the Fourth Republic of 
Nigeria 
Civilian 
1983 – 1985  Major-General 
Muhammedu Buhari 
Head of State Military 
Aug 1985 – Aug 1993  General Ibrahim Badama 
Babangida 
Nigerian Military 
President 
Military 
Aug 1993 – Nov 1993 Chief Ernest Shonekan Head of State Civilian 
Nov 1993 – June 1998 General Sani Abacha Head of State Military 
June 1998 – May 1999 General Abdulsalam 
Abubaker 
Head of State Military 
May 1999 – May 2007 General Olusegun 
Obasanjo 
National President of 
Nigeria 
Civilian 
May 2007 – May 2010 Alhaji Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adu 
National President of 
Nigeria 
Civilian 
2010 – present Goodluck Jonathan National President of 
Nigeria 
Civilian 
 
510 Leeson, P. Op Cit, p. 690.  
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The constant change in governance has facilitated many leaders lining their pockets to 
accumulate as much self-wealth as possible before being deposed.  
 
CORRUPTION 
Corruption within a country’s authority can be seen as an indicator of a dysfunctional or 
collapsed state’s inability to govern. Nigeria, rightly or wrongly, is seen as one of the most 
corrupt countries in Africa, if not the world. Doug Bandow’s511 article: “Nigeria is not a country, 
it is an opportunity,”512 identified the country’s reputation for its rampant corruption. The 
Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Nigeria tied-144 out of 175 countries, making it one of the 
most corrupt nations in the world. However, even worse off is Somalia ranked last.513  
Somalia’s absence of governance and its own corruption is also seen as a trigger for the rise of 
al-Shabaab, as that sectarian group’s members felt marginalised and disenfranchised by the 
corrupt political elite. Many international donors are concerned with money going into Somalia 
because of the perception of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government siphoning off the 
aid.514 Prior to Hassan Sheikh, and other attempts at governance, the political void in Somalia 
provided a fertile ground for al-Shabaab to operate almost unchecked, with no government 
actions hindering their growth. 
 
511 Former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan 
512 Bandow, D., Unlocking Prosperity in Nigeria, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/3/bandow-
unlocking-prosperity-in-a-corrupt-nigeria/?page=all, 3 April 2014, p. 1. 
513 Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2013 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/, 
Transparency International, 2014. 
514 Fabricius, P. Op Cit. 
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OIL 
The discovery of oil in 1956 in the southeast of Nigeria515, which is predominantly Igbo and thus 
Christian, had a great effect on the central government’s neglect of the north. The resulting boom 
in the petroleum sector redirected resources from other sectors of the economy, focusing the 
government’s efforts on the oil-rich region. The agricultural sector, which was the lifeblood of 
northern Nigeria, rapidly deteriorated. The government’s focus on oil, and therefore the southern 
oilfields, and the resulting neglect of the agricultural sector fostered feelings of marginalisation 
that were utilised to spread a more radical brand of Islam. Nigeria’s dysfunctionality is clearly 
evident in the unequal distribution of oil revenues that has produced a new wave of tension 
within the country. There has been escalating violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, where 
the conflict is over the control of oil and the lack of oil revenues put back into the area.516 The 
‘oil-development nexus’ posits the view that oil breeds corruption, poor governance, possible 
human rights violations, and in the end violent conflict.517  
 
 
 
 
515 Wojtanik, A., Nigeria’s Boko Haram horrow show: How to move forward, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/nigerias-boko-haram-horror-show-how-move-forward-10510, 22 May 2014, p. 1. 
516 The unequal distribution of oil revenues back into the Niger Delta region has brought about the establishment of 
a second terrorist group in Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, which has carried out 
numerous attacks against the oil industry, foreign actors, and government installations.  
517 Obi, C.: Oil and Development in Africa: Some lessons from the Oil Factor in Nigeria for the Sudan, Dansk 
Institute for International Studies, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-
1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=33990, 2007, p. 11. 
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This describes the situation in Nigeria, where according to Amnesty International:  
“The oil industry in the Niger Delta of Nigeria has brought about impoverishment, 
conflict, human rights abuses and despair to the majority of the people in the oil-producing 
areas.”518 
 
Thus, as beneficial as oil revenues have been to Nigeria, the government’s ineffective use and 
distribution of the revenues has created greater antagonism in the oil-producing regions, and in 
the areas in the north, which derive no benefit from oil revenues.  
 
RADICAL ISLAM  
Both in Nigeria and Somalia, Islam has been adopted by the impoverished masses, representing 
itself as the religion of the oppressed against the corrupt elites.519 Solomon and Botha (2005) see 
the Islamic resurgence as a response to the confusion and apprehension of countries 
modernising.520 The belief that modernisation would lead to more secular beliefs has made many 
Muslims believe that their religion is under threat. This can be seen as socio-political resistance 
around more conservative religious concepts. However, despite the moderate and peaceful values 
of Islam, the misrepresentation of Islamic teachings has overshadowed the positive message that 
Muslims preach. Across the Islamic world, whether it is in the Middle East, Asia, or Africa, 
governments are struggling to contain the spread of fundamental Islam, which heeds the call for 
518 Amnesty International, Oil Industry has brought poverty and pollution to Niger Delta, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/oil-industry-has-brought-poverty-and-pollution-to-niger-delta-
20090630, 30 June 2009, p. 1. 
519 Solomon, H., & Botha, A. Op Cit, p. 1. 
520 Loc Cit. 
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an “Islamic” government and society. This call has usually been accompanied by the use of 
violence to bring about such change.521  
Nigeria has done little to curb the spread of fundamental, or radical, Islam within its borders, 
which is surprising given Boko Haram’s aim of converting the country into an Islamic state. In 
addition, recruitment of their disciples by religious leaders resulted in religious fervour and 
loyalty to their cause, making the job of the Nigerian intelligence in dealing with Boko Haram 
that much more difficult.522 A number of Muslim intellectuals believe that the Nigerian 
administration has far too little regard for the interests of Muslims in northern Nigeria.523 This 
alleged disregard fostered a greater feeling of marginalisation among the northern population, 
which, in turn, brought about a more fundamental approach for many northern Muslims who saw 
the political regime favouring Christians over Muslims. Coupled with this, is the election of 
Goodluck Jonathan, which followed two terms under Obasanjo (both of whom were Christians) 
and the death of Muslim Yar’Adua, which generated further feelings of marginalisation and 
discontent amongst the Muslim northern population.  
The fact that many Muslims reject any Western influence, which the system of elections 
represents and especially the election of Christian presidents, has further resulted in government 
neglect in the northern region. According to Marchal (2012), there is a largely unequal 
distribution of economic and social services in the northern versus southern states in Nigeria.524 
521 Ibid, p. 2. 
522 Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 9. 
523 Loimeier, R.: Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria, Northwestern University Press, United 
States of America, 1997, p. 8. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.co.za/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_RLEcWL45W8C&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=fundamental+islam+in+
nigeria&ots=I_JJWiPICq&sig=z7elbQJR3X4ZV-
ZKh4TG7rJjcDY#v=onepage&q=fundamental%20islam%20in%20nigeria&f=false.  
524 Marchal, R.: Boko Haram and the Resilience of Militant Islam in Northern Nigeria, Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre, 
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The efforts of the central government appear to have been focused on southern Nigeria, which is 
predominantly Christian. Some Muslims see this as a direct threat to the survival of Islam, and 
Boko Haram has used this to enhance its support and to justify their cause. 
 
The Nigerian police are controlled at the federal, or central level, and not by the various states 
themselves. Therefore, the police forces are not being deployed in their local areas, and are 
unable to develop grassroots connections or understanding of the culture or religion in the areas 
they police. This policy has resulted in less effective policing, and the increase in animosity 
between the police and locals. This dysfunction prevents any chance of the police, or army, 
making any progress in their counter-insurgency.525 
 
The Nigerian central government’s focus on the south, and perceived or actual disregard of the 
north, portrays the dysfunctional approach that it took to governing the country. The extent to 
which a country has failed can be measured by the amount of territory over which the state has 
lost control. Although, Nigeria is not a failed state, the amount of territory over which it has 
minimal control identifies the government’s inability to adequately govern. In particular in a 
number of northern states, where Boko Haram is most prevalent, its governance is seriously 
lacking. It is, however, able to exert a degree of effective governance over the rest of the country. 
Somalia’s situation does not involve religious conflict to the same degree that Nigeria’s does. 
The attacks in Somalia accredited to al-Shabaab are primarily directed at government and 
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/dc58a110fb362470133354efb8fee228.pdf, 
June 2012, p. 6. 
525 Ibid, p. 4.  
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political targets and regional actors that support the Somali authority. There is a religious 
element in that al-Shabaab represents an Islamic movement, which acts against the government 
which they perceive to be subject to Western or regional influence. The inner conflict of Somalia 
could be seen as religion vs. secularism. On 14 April 2013, the terrorist group carried out 
coordinated attacks against the judiciary and their newly-formed Magistrate’s courts in 
Mogadishu.526  
There was a second attack shortly afterwards that left 5 dead, which targeted a Turkish aid 
convoy that was assisting the Somali population.527 In February 2014, al-Shabaab attacked 
Somalia’s Presidential Palace in Mogadishu.528 President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was 
unharmed during the attack, but the secretary to the Prime Minister and the former Deputy 
National Intelligence Agency Chief, Gen. Nur Shirbow, were among those killed.529 The attack 
occurred just over a week after al-Shabaab attacked an airport in the capital, which killed two. 
Spokesperson for al-Shabaab, Mohamud Rageh, told the media that their fighters would double 
the number of attacks against the government, and would go to “every possible length” to attain 
their goal to destroy or weaken the government’s power.530 Thus, one significant difference 
between Nigeria and Somalia is the religious-terrorism warfare in the former, and the latter’s 
religious-secular battles. 
 
526 Nine attackers were dressed in uniform similar to government officials, and detonated explosive vests while 
others opened gunfire on civilians – the attack left as many as 29 dead. 
527 Department of International Relations and Cooperation: South Africa Condemns attacks in Mogadishu, Somalia, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201304160887.html, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2014, p. 1. 
528 Associated Press, Somali Presidential Palace attacked by al-Shabaab militants, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/somali-presidential-palace-attacked-mogadishu-bomb, 21 February 
2014, p. 1. 
529 Nor, O., & Smith-Spark, L., al-Shabaab militants attack Somali Presidential Palace in Mogadishu, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/africa/somalia-attack/, 21 February 2014, p. 1.  
530 Loc Cit.  
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GOVERNMENT RESPONSES AND COUNTER-TERRORISM  
A government’s response to a terrorist attack, or in this case the rise and development of a 
terrorist organisation, can be a telling factor in the effectiveness of the government’s rule. The 
reactions in each country will be evaluated. 
 
NIGERIA 
With the on-going bloodshed taking place throughout Nigeria largely at the hands of Boko 
Haram, the Nigerian government wants to put an end to the group’s activities. The administration 
of President Goodluck Jonathan has adopted a number of counter-terrorism measures in an 
attempt to deal with the terrorist group.  
The current campaign of violence against the Nigerian state started in 2009, and this was at the 
time that one of the first military offensives by the government occurred. On the face of it, this 
appeared to be a successful start to the anti-terrorist campaign, but this was not the result. In 
response, Boko Haram attacked schools, police stations, government buildings and churches, 
resulting in as many as 700 people being killed and thousands more injured.531 These events set 
the tone for the way the Nigerian authorities were to deal with Boko Haram – meeting violence 
with ever increasing violence. Despite continued brutal initiatives against Boko Haram by the 
Nigerian government, the terrorist group responded with greater violence. The Nigerian 
government appears not to have adapted its stance to this response.  
 
531 Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 1. 
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Having abandoned any form of diplomacy, whether through their own lack of success or Boko 
Haram’s ever increasing violence, the Nigerian government is still involved in an all-out military 
campaign in the north of the country. The government implemented a State of Emergency in 
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa, with enforced curfews and interruptions to cellular signals in an 
attempt to disrupt communications between Boko Haram members. Under the banner of the Joint 
Task Force (JTF), the army has also been deployed to hunt down members, and the air force 
continues to bomb Boko Haram strongholds. The police carried out a number of arrests of Boko 
Haram followers. Jonathan’s administration has supported this new military offensive that began 
half way through 2013. 
Some see the 2013 military operation as Jonathan’s ‘big gesture’; as a show of triumph in the 
fight to take Boko Haram seriously. However, there appears to be a degree of déjà vu in this 
conflict. As seen after the 2009 military offensive, Boko Haram has responded with even greater 
violence to the heavy-handed tactics of the Jonathan government. 2014 has already been the 
bloodiest year of Boko Haram’s insurgency, with at least 1 500 fatalities in over a dozen attacks 
– and that was only half way through April.532 Several attacks have occurred since then. To put it 
in perspective, there were a total of 2 100 deaths between 2009 and 2013. 
 
Nigeria’s counter-terrorism strategy is predominantly based on military action against Boko 
Haram. The policy of fighting fire-with-fire has done little to neutralise Boko Haram. To the 
contrary, the policy has galvanised the terrorist group into more brutal and devastating attacks. It 
would appear that the Nigerian government has realised that a new approach to Boko Haram is 
532 Loc Cit. 
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required, with the Office of the National Security Advisor (NSA) rolling out “Nigeria’s Soft 
Approach to Countering Terrorism” (NACTEST).533 The strategy was developed to understand 
the root causes of terrorism in order to apply appropriate counter-terrorism solutions. According 
to retired Col. Sambo Dasuki, the first requirement of NACTEST was to “de-radicalise” 
convicted terrorists, or those suspected of engaging in terrorist actions. The approach would 
utilise the understanding of the “economic root causes of terrorism,” and work with those in 
control of the north-eastern states to design economic regeneration programmes to target the 
most deprived states.534  
Although, the soft politics approach is one that is required to address the situation in Nigeria, it 
would appear that the Nigerian government believes that poverty and economic dislocation are 
the main driving factors behind terrorism in the country. The fact that throughout all of President 
Jonathan’s speeches regarding the military offensive, and now the NACTEST approach, there 
has been no mention of the religious differences that plague the country is telling. In a country 
where terrorism is religious in both its targets and agents, and where religion has become a 
countervailing variable to social cohesion in Nigeria, the blinkered views of the government are 
concerning.  
The democratic approach to integration and unity within the country is being repeatedly tested by 
the incessant bombings and killings of one group of the population by another. With that, the 
counterterrorism options available to the Jonathan administration are complex. Indeed, the socio-
economic grievances that plague his country have to be addressed, but this requires a strong 
government that is capable of resolving the problems, as well as prosecuting corrupt officials that 
533 Premium Times, Boko Haram: Nigeria rolls-out Soft Approach to Counter Terrorism, 
http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/157111-boko-haram-nigeria-rolls-soft-approach-counter-terrorism.html, 20 
March 2014, p. 1. 
534 Ibid. 
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hinder those efforts. The government has rather focused on economic solutions, but ignores the 
fact that the conflict between Christianity and the West on the one hand, and Islam on the other 
remains a key factor in what drives terrorism in the country.  
The behaviour of Jonathan’s police and military has been repressive535, and this negatively 
impacts on the influence that his administration could have. The culprits of heavy-handed tactics 
within the military have not been brought to book, which equals the need to bring terrorists to 
justice. The government could reduce the civil discontent and distrust by stopping civilian 
harassment and heavy-handed tactics by the military. 
Counter-terrorism measures are also hampered by the intelligence apparatuses themselves. 
According to Amnesty International, most Nigerian police stations do not document their work, 
nor is there an effective forensic or finger printing data-basing.536 There are only two forensic 
laboratories, which are understaffed and insufficiently funded. Additionally, inter-agency rivalry 
in Nigeria and the inability to share intelligence has been identified as one of the factors negating 
justice.537 
What this underscores about Nigeria’s prospects of countering Boko Haram is that while there 
are efforts being made, due to dysfunctional infrastructure, those efforts are hampered to such a 
degree that it hardly impacts on the Islamist militant group’s capacity at all. Additionally, the 
heavy-handed tactics used by the security forces are counterproductive, and are more likely 
creating a larger base of Boko Haram sympathisers. Solomon (2012) pointed out that the soldiers 
patrolling the northern territories are national soldiers, not local, and thus have no cultural or 
535 Omede, J. “Nigeria: Analysing the Security Challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan Administration”, in Canadian 
Social Science, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2011, p. 96. Retrieved from 
http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/viewFile/J.css.1923669720110705.220/2002.  
536 Solomon, H. Op Cit, p. 9. 
537 Omede, J. Op Cit, p. 96. 
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religious connection to the region’s inhabitants.538 This has further instilled the feeling of being 
marginalised by the federal government. 
 
SOMALIA 
Somalia has struggled to deal with the threat of al-Shabaab, and has had to rely mainly on 
external actors and their expertise in counter-terrorism. The collapsed state has facilitated and 
welcomed outside intervention, caused by central government’s inability to govern its territories 
or protect its population. 
The counterterrorism units that have been deployed in Mogadishu are not hindering al-Shabaab 
to any significant degree.539 The units, which themselves are reliant on international assistance, 
are at best a collapsed government’s attempt at showing the international community that it is 
committed to eradicating the scourge of al-Shabaab. 
Kenya and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) play significant roles in instituting 
counter terrorism measures against al-Shabaab.540 The Kenyan’s need to intervene is, in part, 
self-preservation, as there are many Somalis living in Kenya that support and harbour members 
of the sectarian group. According to Liban Mohamud Hussein541, Kenya became involved due to 
the absence of a strong government in Somalia, going even as far as to adopt a more assertive 
538 Solomon, H., Op Cit, p. 9. 
539 The Somali government deployed a number of counterterrorism units in Mogadishu, with the aim of disarming 
and destroying terrorist cells and strongholds. The hope was that these units would combat the threat of al-Shabaab 
and bring about peace and stability. 
540 Hussein, L., Somalia: Counter-Terrorism in Horn of Africa and al-Shabaab, http://somalilandpress.com/somalia-
counter-terrorism-in-horn-africa-and-al-shabab-43457, 5 August 2013, p. 1. 
541 Loc Cit. 
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approach to combat al-Shabaab.542  It is noteworthy that Kenya’s methods in countering al-
Shabaab have not been based solely around military might. According to Hussein (2013),543 
Kenya has formed alliances with Somali fighters against al-Shabaab along the two countries’ 
borders. Exactly who these local fighters are, is unclear, but the tribal and ethnic differences in 
Somalia would lead one to assume they are of a different clan or religious persuasion to that of 
al-Shabaab. 
Kenya’s involvement, similar to that of Ethiopia’s a decade or so earlier, has been less than 
effective and has evoked violent response. Al-Shabaab has attacked Kenya through shootings 
and bombings in retaliation directly against the Kenyan army but also against Kenya itself. Some 
Somalis in Kenya have rallied to the call of al-Shabaab, as they see it as a legitimate entity 
defending the country against a foreign invader.544 
AMISOM has been bolstered in recent years by the Kenyan forces that have been operating in 
the region under one banner. There are an estimated 22 216 personnel in Somalia545 from 
countries like Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Uganda. Although the 
AMISOM website states that the mission mandates the delivery of humanitarian aid, and 
reconstruction and development546, Liban Mohamud Hussein points out that most of AMISOM’s 
measures rely on the use of force to deal with al-Shabaab.547 Humanitarian aid, reconstruction 
and development are thus relegated to a secondary level. 
 
542 Loc Cit. 
543 Loc Cit. 
544 Loc Cit. 
545 AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia, http://amisom-au.org/frequently-asked-questions/, AMISOM, 
2014. 
546 Loc Cit. 
547 Hussein, L. Op Cit. 
Page 169 of 234 
 
                                                            
NIGERIAN DYSFUNCTION? SOMALI COLLAPSE! 
Nigeria’s governments since independence have comprised both military and civilian rule. 
Although the country suffered, and continues to suffer, under the yoke of years of corrupt and 
often self-enriching leadership, Nigeria was able to achieve a degree of reconciliation and 
economic growth, mainly due to the revenues achieved through petroleum oil.  
The oil crisis coupled with corruption since independence caused rapid economic crisis and 
political turmoil and there were many attempts from both civilian and military leaders to rectify 
the situation. As addressed in chapter 3, Nigeria bowed to international pressure to hold 
democratic elections. Despite the first elections being cancelled, the second was accepted, and 
democratic elections have continued since. While the elections have often been marred with 
irregularities and vote rigging, the elections have taken place and the results have been accepted.  
The situation in Somalia since independence has been fraught with turmoil. The first elections 
were held in 1969, less than a decade after independence, which would appear a step in the right 
direction for the country. However, what transpired proved that this was not the case. The first 
president, Muhammad Egal, was assassinated and the military seized power. Somalia was then 
governed by a brutal Marxist, whose repressive regime promoted nation over clan and tribe 
loyalties. Barre’s military regime’s dominance led to numerous clan- and tribe-based rebel 
groups forming with the common goal of toppling the government. These guerrilla groups 
attacked the government in 1988 when a fully-fledged civil war ensued, resulting in as many as 
12 different warlords and clans claiming leadership over territories in the deteriorating 
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country.548 The divided leadership, between coups d’état and the in-fighting amongst themselves, 
reflected the political landscape that made it almost impossible to maintain order and cohesive 
leadership in the collapsed state. According to Wise (2011), in the two decades prior to his 
report, there were as many as 14 failed attempts at peace processes in Somalia.549 
The collapsed state caused lawlessness and anarchy that became endemic in Somalia almost 
immediately after the country’s independence, with the capital Mogadishu, the main 
battleground. There was little or no evidence of effective governance, until the Sharia courts 
were established and created a level of stability in the warring neighbourhoods.550 These courts, 
set up in reaction to the dire need for some means to uphold law and order in the capital, were 
under local clans’ control rather than the government’s, which speaks to the government’s 
inability to maintain authority in Mogadishu and wider regions. However, as noted in Chapter 2, 
more radical elements of the courts system began imposing strict sharia law, and severely 
punished those perceived to be “un-Islamic”, or too moderate for the courts’ leaders. After the 
Sharia courts were removed, anarchy again reigned in Somalia.  
Whereas in Nigeria, the government is actively and integrally involved in the battle against Boko 
Haram, and in governing the country, Somalia’s government is totally ineffective. In many cases 
the organisation that is dealing with socio-economic issues in the country is the UN. This results 
in Somalis being unable to complain or strive for greater support, as their government has not 
taken responsibility for providing services, which is a major hindrance to any attempt at 
progress.  
548 The rebel groups were unpaid in most cases, and turned to looting from the population as the easiest way to 
acquire wealth. Virtually the entire country was subjected to inter-clan or –tribe, or –ethnic fighting, and this 
reduced the country, and in particular Mogadishu, into a battle zone.  
549 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 2. 
550 Ibid, p. 3. 
Page 171 of 234 
 
                                                            
Another issue which remains unhindered through the lack of governance is the issue of funding. 
Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, received funding from Salafist contacts in Saudi 
Arabia.551 It is believed that Boko Haram has received funding from wealthy northerners, most 
likely Muslims, who are unhappy with the federal government. The group is also funded through 
bank robberies, car thefts and attacks on cash-in-transit convoys.552 Politicians and governors, 
particularly in the north, have used Boko Haram to win elections through intimidation and to 
score political points from those who sympathise with the terrorist group. Members of the 
judiciary and the armed forces have been arrested and are under trial for allegedly financing 
Boko Haram. According to Zenn (2013), there are reports that Boko Haram has received funding 
from AQIM553, but there is no substantial evidence supporting this claim. The fact that Boko 
Haram is, to a certain degree, financed by members of the Nigerian government, judiciary and 
armed forces is telling in the debate around Nigeria’s dysfunctionality.  
Wise (2011) identified that al-Shabaab’s association with al-Qaeda has also provided the terrorist 
group with financial backing, but the true extent of al-Qaeda’s involvement still remains 
unclear.554 According to Vilkko (2011), there are external sources that provide financial support 
to al-Shabaab. These include mainly donations from international jihadists, but also diaspora 
remittances, and funding from the neighbouring state Eritrea.555 The international jihadists are 
mainly based in the Arabian Peninsula and are committed to al-Shabaab through a shared radical 
Islamist dogma. Eritrea has been involved in funding several armed insurgencies in Somalia for a 
551 Walker, A: What is Boko Haram?, United States Institute of Peace, http://www.xtome.org/docs/groups/boko-
haram/SR308.pdf, June 2012, p. 3. 
552 Ibid, p. 14. 
553 Zenn, J. Op Cit, p. 2.  
554 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 10. 
555 Vilkko, V.: Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extraction, Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency, http://www.math.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/57537_MFS_paper_Vilkko.pdf, March 2011, p. 6. 
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long time. Eritrea’s involvement is based around the abhorrence of Ethiopia.556 According to the 
UN, Eritrea provided as much as $40 000 - $50 000 per month to al-Shabaab in 2009.557 
Diaspora remittances received considerable attention after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. 
The Ethiopian invasion in 2006, which for many portrayed al-Shabaab as a defender of the 
Somali homeland, awakened the Somali diaspora’s funding. The belief was that by financing al-
Shabaab, they were helping in the fight against an invading force. A turning point in the funding 
was in 2008 when the Ethiopian occupation ended, but diaspora funding is still prevalent for al-
Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has relied on international and regional financial support for its activities. 
The Ethiopian invasion gave al-Shabaab the support of the diaspora and international jihadists 
and the collapse of an effective government left funding routes for al-Shabaab unopposed.  
 
QUALITY OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE 
The crux of this paper attempts to deal with how the quality of governance dictated the creation, 
emboldening, and further development of the two respective terrorist organisations.  
Examining each country’s historical situation, both countries suffered under similar 
circumstances in terms of colonial rule and division of territories, as well as their achievement of 
independence. It would be naïve to assume that the two countries were in the exact same political 
and socio-economic orbit, but the governments’ conduct can still be compared around such 
issues.   
556 Eritrea was under Ethiopian occupation for many years and is still a contentious issue between the two nations.  
557  Vilkko, V. Op Cit, p. 7. 
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The International Crisis Group released a report on 3 April 2014, Curbing Violence in Nigeria 
(II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, which detailed how Nigeria’s dysfunctional government has 
resulted in more Nigerians being poorer today than they were at independence in 1960. The 
report found that Nigerians are victims of the resource curse and rampant, entrenched 
corruption.558 The agriculture sector is struggling, while in many parts of the country, the 
government is unable to provide effective security, education, or infrastructure.  
Since the overthrow of the military dictatorship of Barre, Somalia has been in an almost 
perpetual state of anarchy. Wise (2011) captured the conduct of the Somali governments since 
the advent of al-Shabaab: “Inadequate governance allowed al-Shabaab to operate unfettered in 
large safe havens…”559 By establishing these safe havens, al-Shabaab was able to secure a 
network of strongholds to build training camps, while establishing a system of extortion to raise 
funds to support their cause. The group controlled the territory around the key port city of 
Kismayo, which through taxation on goods entering the port, brought in roughly $1 million per 
month.560 What the Somali governments lacked, al-Shabaab exploited by providing basic 
governmental services to areas under their control561, which boosted their image to the region’s 
inhabitants and bolstered recruitment. 
 
One cannot ignore the role of foreign intervention, at the request of the collapsed Somali 
government, which inadvertently fostered the growth of al-Shabaab. The group claimed to be 
558 International Crisis Group: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-
insurgency.aspx, Africa Report No. 216, April 2014.  
559 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 2. 
560 Ibid, p. 6. 
561 Ibid, p. 2. 
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fighting on a national front, rather than a religious one, to rid Somalia of foreign forces. This was 
probably hubristic and dishonest propaganda calculated to swell its ranks. Somalia’s inability to 
deal with the al-Shabaab’s predecessors, and the seeking of foreign assistance, were catalysts in 
the rise and development of the terrorist organisation.  
 
Apart from the involvements of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, as part of the AMISOM, the 
United Nations has also attempted to rectify the situation in Somalia, under the banner of the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).562 This mission was a belated response to the 
crisis and conflict in Somalia, with the aim of peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. The mission 
first deployed in 1992, but it was reinforced in 1995 by 30 000 foreign troops under the 
mandated military deployment of the UN taskforce, Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The task 
force was doomed from the outset, due to poorly regulated systems, and the UN withdrew it in 
1995. The failure of international assistance in governing Somalia led to the emergence of 
“donor-governments” supported by foreign powers. After the UN withdrawal, the first major 
influences like the European Commission (EC), international aid organisations, and 
neighbouring countries appeared to be doing a successful job as the focus of aid shifted from 
“relief” to “development”.563  
The country appeared to be on the rise; however donors were unwilling, in the most part, to 
adequately fund structural changes that the Somali government required. With the aftermath of 
9/11 and the global focus on terrorism, international involvement in Somalia shifted from 
562 Bradbury, M.: State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licencing Humanitarianism in Somalia, 
http://www.humanitarianforum.co.uk/data/files/statebuilding_somalia.pdf, Feinstein International Center, September 
2010, p. 4. 
563 Loc Cit.  
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humanitarian aid to security and protection. Thus, even international governance appeared to be 
minimally effective at best, with little quality in terms of developing the infrastructure needed by 
any government to operate adequately. The country was severely depleted by war and natural 
disasters, and the reluctance of donors to fund the country properly, sustained a perpetual façade 
of stability, when in fact, the country was anything but. With warring factions holding shaky 
truces due to consolidation of territories, and autonomous regions falling under their own 
leadership, Somalia did not progress as many international donors might have hoped.  
Since 9/11, the US has been heavily involved in counter-terrorism across the globe, including in 
Somalia. The Western powerhouse has invested in the Somali counter-terrorism capabilities, and 
through its surveillance and intelligence capabilities from its Djibouti military base, the US has 
been able to assist the Somalis.564 However, American involvement can again be seen as a 
double-edge sword, similarly to that of Ethiopia’s invasion. Americans, and the US as a whole, 
are among the top targets for Islamic terrorist attacks, as many Islam-followers believe the US is 
persecuting Muslims and is Islamophobic. With the involvement in Somalia, one can only 
wonder if that country’s presence in the region is a rallying call for more recruits to defeat an 
American ally. 
 
A difference between the dysfunctional state of Nigeria and the collapsed state of Somalia is 
evident from the events of 2011. In an agreement prepared by Presidents Jonathan and Barack 
Obama of the US, around 120 Nigerian soldiers were sent to Somalia. The soldiers were 
supposedly under the auspices of the AMISOM, but Jonathan arranged their deployment outside 
564 International Crisis Group: Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?, Africa Report No. 95, July 
2005, p. 11. 
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the scope of the AU’s mission.565 It was contended that al-Shabaab was in cahoots relating to 
training and support with other regional terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram. Jonathan 
was attempting to nullify the Somali-based group before it could provide effective backing to 
Boko Haram in his own country. Although Nigeria is attempting to deal with terrorism and other 
issues within its own borders, the country was able to deploy troops across the region. This 
shows that even when dysfunctional, the country has the ability to operate domestically and 
regionally to a certain degree. 
The reactions to al-Shabaab and Boko Haram activities have played a vital role in the groups’ 
development into the radical Islamic organisations they are today. As identified, the Somali 
government has had little effect in hindering the rise and development of al-Shabaab, and has 
had to rely on the interventions of regional and international actors to assist in attempting to stifle 
the charge of the sectarian group. Al-Shabaab has not been eradicated by these joint-efforts; 
although the group has been ejected from a number of its strongholds. But the group is still as 
strong and as lethal as ever. What the regional involvement has done in attempting to limit al-
Shabaab appears to have had the opposite effect – the group has burgeoned into a terrorist threat 
to the entire Horn of Africa. There have been terrorist attacks carried out by al-Shabaab in 
neighbouring Kenya566, and Uganda567, as well as failed attacks in Ethiopia.568 The regional 
interventions against al-Shabaab backfired insofar as the group now targets regional actors, and 
not solely the Somali government.  
565 SaharaReporters, Jonathan sends troops to Somalia while Nigerians battle Islamists at home, 
http://saharareporters.com/news-page/jonathan-sends-troops-somalia-while-nigerians-battle-islamists-home, 5 July 
2011, p. 1. 
566 The Westgate Mall attack. 
567 The 2010 FIFA World Cup attack. 
568 Tekle, T., Ethiopia: al-Shabaab behind plot to bomb Stadium, http://allafrica.com/stories/201312260009.html, 25 
December 2013, p. 1. 
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The responses to Boko Haram have produced a different outcome, but no less significant. There 
appear to be few regional attacks by Boko Haram, with the main focus of the group remaining 
the federal government and supposed Western influences – such as the UN headquarters 
bombing in Abuja on 26 August 2011.569 However, the Nigerian government’s offensives have 
resulted in a more brutal and vociferous terrorist organisation, which appears even more 
determined to implement an Islamic state in the northern part of the West Africa nation. The 
brazen attacks and abductions by Boko Haram speak to a greater threat to the Nigerian state, and 
continue to shine a spotlight on the inability of President Jonathan’s administration to effectively 
deal with the radical group.  
Somalia’s complete lack of effective governance, and reliance on foreign aid and assistance, has 
left al-Shabaab unchecked and growing into a regional threat to the Horn of Africa, and 
potentially the greater northeast of the continent. One the other hand, Nigeria’s dysfunctional 
approach to Boko Haram has turned the extremist Islamic group into a more violent and focused 
organisation determined on reaching their domestic goals in northern Nigeria.  
 
WHAT COULD THE FUTURE HOLD?  
In order for there to be real progress in Somalia and Nigeria, the first step has to be the 
improvement of the quality of their governance. Better and more effective governance will 
provide a more cogent presence in any dialogue or further military action towards al-Shabaab 
and Boko Haram.  
569 Mshelizza, I., Islamist sect Boko Haram claims Nigerian UN bombing, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/29/us-nigeria-bombing-claim-idUSTRE77S3ZO20110829, 29 August 2011, 
p. 1. 
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There seems to be little success through the fight-fire-with-fire policy that both Nigeria and 
Somalia – the latter through foreign assistance – are adopting to combat the terrorist groups. Soft 
politics, known as the ability to persuade without the use of force or coercion570, could be the 
best route for both countries to add to their repertoire to deal with them. Admittedly, the phrase, 
“we do not negotiate with terrorists” comes to mind. Striking dialogue with terrorist 
organisations does not seem like the most plausible solution to the problem. However, without 
discussions, the situation seems bound to continue on its current trajectory. This paper does not 
suggest negotiations with the terrorist groups in order to disband them, as that seems highly 
unlikely. Rather the idea is to confer with the terrorist organisations in order to establish the real 
reasons, which led to their creation and expansion and then combat the supposed ‘root causes’, 
which are most likely socio-economic and political shortcomings. Dealing with the radical 
religious views may prove more difficult, if not impossible. No state, even developed and 
functional, has been successful in dealing with radical Islam. 
 
IS A TRANS-AFRICAN TERRORIST NETWORK A POSSIBILITY? 
With the geographical locations of Nigeria and Somalia on either side of the African continent, 
the threat of a radical Islamist belt “connecting” the two nations is real. North Africa is home to 
countries that are unstable politically and involved in conflicts with extremist Islamic groups.571 
According to Carter Ham,572 there has already been some evidence that links al-Shabaab and 
570 Nye Jr, J.: Soft Power: The means to success in World Politics, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59732/g-
john-ikenberry/soft-power-the-means-to-success-in-world-politics, Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p. 1. 
571 The north of Africa plays host to terrorist groups such as: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine and the 
Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in northern Mali, and in Libya and Egypt with 
radical Islamists.  
572 Commander of the US military’s Africa Command. 
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Boko Haram.573 Ham believes that the groups are attempting to coordinate and synchronise their 
efforts, as well as those of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), in northern Africa. The 
recent kidnapping of girls by Boko Haram in Nigeria could hinder the connection with al-Qaeda. 
Indeed AQIM has been known to raise funds through kidnappings and ransoms, but the 
kidnappings of girls – who are the most vulnerable targets, and some of whom were themselves 
Muslim – will do little to boost the image of Boko Haram. Boko Haram’s leader, Abubaker 
Shekau, has taken it upon himself to interpret whether or not Muslims are sufficiently religious 
or not truly Muslim. His interpretation has not been wholly accepted by al-Qaeda, and there is a 
possibility that al-Qaeda and its affiliates – al-Shabaab, for example – will distance themselves 
from Boko Haram in light of this recent kidnapping incident and the Islamic misinterpretation.574  
 
CAN SOMALIA REGAIN ANY GOVERNMENT CONTROL? 
Jens Mjaugedal575 believes that military offensives alone cannot save the failed state of 
Somalia.576 Clearing al-Shabaab from territories it holds will not be as helpful as the AU mission 
is hoping for. The Somali government has to replace the al-Shabaab authority with its own 
effective administration, rather than simply installing military barracks. Al-Shabaab provided 
basic services577; the replacement Somali government has to do the same or better. 
President Hassan Sheikh was credibly elected, and is not a clan leader. As a result, Mjaudegal 
believes that the international community no longer appears to see Somalia as a priority. This 
573 Gourley, S., Op Cit, p. 7.  
574 Porter, G. Op Cit. 
575 Special Envoy of Norway to Somalia. 
576 Fabricius, P. Op Cit. 
577 Al-Shabaab was able to provide a degree of stability through policing, judicial decision-making and social 
welfare.  
Page 180 of 234 
 
                                                            
viewpoint does not align with the reality of the country. The country is still a warzone with 
almost daily incidents of violence targeting either the civilian population or government officials.  
Somalia’s government has to obtain a degree of credibility both in the eyes of the international 
community, and the Somali population, otherwise it could be ousted in the country’s next 
elections in 2016.578 The main concern is not that the Hassan Sheikh administration will lose 
power, but rather that either al-Shabaab will usurp authority prior to the elections, or that an 
extreme form of Islamic government will be elected. 
Somalia has the potential to attract investors looking to cash in on the rebuilding process in the 
agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors, and the natural resources that the country is home to – 
oil and gas.579 The country has a development plan, the Six Pillar Strategy, which is a 
comprehensive framework policy based on stabilisation and reconstruction of Somalia with the 
AU and international community’s assistance. However, the East African nation has few trade 
deals with other countries, and is not part of any regional trade bloc, nor does it have trade 
agreements with the powerhouses of the US, EU and the World Trade Organisation. This makes 
it that much more difficult for local trade to compete regionally or internationally.580 There is no 
public sector, with the private sector providing for virtually everything in Somalia. Unless the 
constant threat of corruption is dealt with, there seems little chance of a transparent public sector 
developing.  
 
 
578 Fabricius, P. Op Cit.  
579 Parrin, A., Five Challenges for Somalia’s Economic Reconstruction, http://www.irinnews.org/report/99647/five-
hurdles-for-somalia-s-economy, 14 February 2014, p. 1. 
580 Loc Cit. 
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CAN NIGERIA BE SAVED? 
The north, and in particular the north-east, is Boko Haram’s stronghold. The Niger Delta is 
unstable with various groups disenchanted with the government’s unequal distribution of the oil 
revenues generated by the region. The country is plagued by unemployment and poverty. It must 
be questioned whether or not Nigeria can stabilise or should be divided into the separate Niger 
Delta region, or even split along religious lines similar to Sudan with a Muslim North and 
Christian South. Former Governor of Abia State, Dr. Orji Uzor Kalu, believes that unless the 
situation in Nigeria is controlled, President Goodluck Jonathan could be the last president of 
Nigeria.581 The numerous insurgencies in the country have the potential to destabilise internal 
security to such a degree that the country descends even further than simply being dysfunctional. 
Whether or not Boko Haram and the other separatist groups are able to attain their goals, which 
both Boko Haram (an Islamist state) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND) (annex the Niger Delta region) have, remains to be seen. It is the belief that President 
Goodluck Jonathan, with the aid of the international community, can combat these localised 
groups, but only if the deeper root problems are addressed in addition to any military offensive.  
 
THE FUTURE OF AL-SHABAAB 
The attacks on regional actors have resulted in the TFG and the AMISOM sending 
reinforcements into Somalia. An additional 12 000 peacekeepers have been promised to the 
already 8 000 strong mission582, which has allowed the TFG to regain control over some areas of 
581 Vanguard, Boko Haram: Jonathan might be Nigeria’s last President – Kalu, 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/05/boko-haram-jonathan-might-nigerias-last-president-kalu/, 22 May 2014, p. 1. 
582 Wise, R. Op Cit, p. 10. 
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Mogadishu previously in the hands of al-Shabaab. However, there currently looks to be a 
stalemate between al-Shabaab and the TFG/AMISOM. Al-Shabaab does not have the capacity 
presently to completely unseat the Somali government, whereas the TFG and AMISOM are 
unlikely to destroy al-Shabaab. Uganda is sending a 410-strong special force to “guard” UN 
installations in Mogadishu, which the UN is hoping will free up a number of UN-backed troops 
to target al-Shabaab Islamists in the capital.583 The UN has been targeted by al-Shabaab in the 
past,584 and it is no surprise that the international body wants better security in order to carry out 
its mandate of winning the war against the Islamist extremists, and combatting the threat of the 
country descending into a food crisis again. Although, the additional foreign troops are in 
Somalia to help protect the UN and their aid agencies, and bolster the TFG, al-Shabaab has 
repeatedly targeted foreign troops and labelled them as “invaders”. Al-Shabaab has been clear in 
their message and their targets: foreign intervention fuels the terrorist group’s ferocity. More 
boots on the ground seems likely to create more reason for violence from al-Shabaab, which is 
the contrary to what the international community is trying to achieve.  
There are a number of rumours about splintering within al-Shabaab between the Somali nationals 
and the foreign fighters. Wise (2011) has identified a rift between a larger nationalist faction 
under Sheikh Mukhtar “Abu Robow”, and a foreign contingent under Abu Zubair, which could 
be a deciding factor in al-Shabaab’s future.585 Whether or not al-Shabaab is able to gain a 
foothold and defeat the TFG will possibly determine whether the group splits, or whether the 
group shifts targets to more regional actors. Additionally, if AMISOM withdraw, and the TFG 
collapse under pressure from al-Shabaab, the question will be whether the terrorist group 
583 BBC News, Uganda to ‘Send troops to Somalia to Protect UN’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
26432779, 4 March 2014, p. 1.. 
584 In June 2013, al-Shabaab suicide militants targeted a UN base in Mogadishu, killing as many as 16 people. 
585 Wise, R. Op Cit, p.10. 
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maintains its radical Islamic rule, or becomes more moderate. If moderation is the choice, the 
foreign fighters who are more radical than patriotic might not approve the change in conviction. 
Thus, it appears that the future of al-Shabaab hinges on the group’s ability to disrupt the 
stalemate and defeat the TFG/AMISOM coalition, and whether or not, once in control, al-
Shabaab’s governance will be radical or moderate. Either way, a splintering of al-Shabaab may 
be inevitable.  
 
THE FUTURE OF BOKO HARAM 
The number of Boko Haram sympathisers, which could be growing due to the tactics of 
Nigeria’s security forces586, has to be addressed. If not addressed, there are a number of difficult 
questions that have to be asked – such as how does one combat Boko Haram when it has 
infiltrated the security forces?  
Boko Haram has been a security challenge to Nigeria for over half a decade already. Their attack 
capabilities seem to be escalating in brutality, and are becoming more sophisticated. Forest 
(2012) stated that there are indications that the Nigerian-based group is receiving training in 
bomb-making and other tactics from al-Qaeda.587 Although, this is a possibility, it has not been 
proven. Boko Haram’s recent kidnapping of just under 300 girls is a clear statement that the 
group’s abilities are beyond what the Nigerian government believed. Coupled with the group’s 
586 The security forces are known to use heavy-handed tactics when dealing with Boko Haram, or alleged 
sympathisers. Amnesty International believes that both Boko Haram and the Nigerian security forces are carrying 
out violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), with unlawful killings, extrajudicial executions and torture. 
There have been hundreds of people disappearing or being killed in military custody.  
587 Forest, J., “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, in Joint Special Operations University, Vol. 
12, No. 5, May 2012, p. 2.  
Page 184 of 234 
 
                                                            
target, Christianity, and a leader who is brazen and radical, Boko Haram looks set to continue its 
brutal warmongering against anyone opposed to their beliefs. 
 
It appears that Boko Haram is attempting to gain a foothold in the Western / Central region of 
Africa, which differs from the group’s original tactics. The terrorist group has launched an attack 
in neighbouring Cameroon, and fellow neighbour, Chad, has welcomed the deployment of US 
troops in the hunt for the kidnapped girls. There is speculation that the group can develop into a 
regional threat, and this would be a further destabilising factor in a region already in turmoil with 
Islamists.  
With the global coverage of Boko Haram’s kidnappings, the international community has started 
to take notice of the terrorist organisation. The group has never had to deal with international 
pressure or the possibility of international involvement. If Boko Haram is to be contained, or 
conquered, the following should be noted. International military involvement might defeat Boko 
Haram, but it will not solve the socio-economic and religious conditions that led to the rise of 
Boko Haram. Simply defeating Boko Haram militarily will create the space for another Islamic 
Source: BBC News Africa 
Page 185 of 234 
 
terrorist group. In order to obtain a more peaceful environment, Nigeria, with the assistance of 
the international community, needs to address and eradicate the root causes that lead to the rise 
of the terrorist organisation in the first place. The dysfunctionality of the Nigerian authority in 
dealing with the social strife in the northeast (as well as many other hotspots) does not bode well 
for a successful solution to the conflict in the country. 
A future perhaps more provocative prospect is based on religion. Looking at the two terrorist 
organisations, one cannot completely reject the religious element when looking to the future. Can 
Islamic fundamentalism ever be changed? Will changing the socio-economic and political 
climates that allow for sectarian groups to form, make a big enough difference to deter the 
support for religious extremism? Both governments have to investigate, with real determination, 
ways to improve the socio-economic and political environments, to both deter religious 
fundamentalism, and to improve the standards of living for their populations.  
As stated, both al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are proponents of extremist or radical Islam, and 
therein lies another problem: where is the voice of moderate Islam? Moderate Muslims have 
been conflated with radical followers by events that are out of the moderates’ control. The 
majority of Muslims are not anti-democratic, are not inward-looking, and reject violence and 
terrorism.588 Although Islam does not preach to love thy neighbour, or thy enemy, it does 
command the acceptance of difference: “difference within my community is part of God’s 
mercy.”589 It is important to note that the pursuit of education is a basic right in Islam. According 
to Imam Khalid Latif590, “seeking knowledge is compulsory on every Muslim”591. The attacks on 
588 Ibrahim, A., A Symposium: What is Moderate Islam?, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703369704575461503431290986, 1 September 2010, p. 1. 
589 Loc Cit. 
590 Executive Director and Chaplain for the Islamic Center at New York University. 
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educational institutions by terrorist organisations, Boko Haram particularly in this case, as a 
means to derail any notion of “Western” education, is another misrepresentation of Islam.  
There is a belief that there is little hope for moderate Islam in the Muslim world, because such 
judicious ideas can be dangerous as radical groups target such thinkers. Moderate Muslims are 
seen as puppets of the West, but it is vitally important for Muslims to speak out against the 
misrepresentation of Islam by radical Islamist groups. Many Muslim leaders disown the groups, 
refusing to accept they are co-religionists.592 The entire world knows the groups are Islamic, but 
what the world does not know is that they are perverting the religion to justify their violence. The 
most challenging task for moderate Islam is for these Muslims to accept that Islamist terrorist 
groups do exist in the name of their religion. It is up to moderate Muslims to stand up and reject 
the activities of violent extremists who perpetrate their actions in the name of Islam. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The effect that poor quality of or no governance has had and has on the rise and expansion of 
terrorism has been well established. The first prediction is that unless the socio-economic and 
political factors that plague each country are addressed, the situation looks set to remain, or even 
deteriorate. As President Jonathan stated: “Before you talk about economic growth, political 
stability is key”593 and that is the thinking that is required. Nigeria has to effectively combat the 
rampant corruption that hinders the country, and efficiently distribute the massive wealth 
591 Latif, K., It’s time for Muslim Outrage against the Boko Haram, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/imam-khalid-
latif/muslim-outrage-boko-haram_b_5279101.html?utm_hp_ref=tw, 7 May 2014, p. 1. 
592 Hassan, F., Boko Haram are the dark side of Islam, http://www.torontosun.com/2014/05/08/boko-haram-are-the-
dark-side-of-islam, 8 May 2014, p. 1.  
593 Gundan, F., Top Quotes about Africa at the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/faraigundan/2014/01/28/top-quotes-about-africa-at-the-2014-world-economic-forum-
in-davos/, 28 January 2014, p. 1. 
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garnered from oil revenues. At the same time, it must diversify the economy, rebuild the 
agriculture sector to provide for a greater base of employed youths and economic growth across 
the board. It cannot ignore the north. Any reforms must look to nullify the conflict hotspots and 
include all inhabitants in the development of its political and economic strategies.  
Somalia is more extreme. The country needs to fight corruption and focus on transparency in all 
its sectors. It is plagued by nepotism and political patronage that supersedes any efforts that the 
government or the international community attempts. Socio-economic issues stem from political 
mismanagement, but also from the lack of economic growth and diversification. Relying only on 
natural resources, or international aid, will not grow the economy but will result in the stagnation 
the current situation.  
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CONCLUSION: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Peace is costly but it is worth the expense” – Kenyan Proverb 
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This dissertation set out to analyse the effect that the quality of governance has on the rise and 
development of terrorism. The focus narrowed to the rise and development of radical Islamic 
terrorism in two specific African case studies – the collapsed state of Somalia, and the 
dysfunctional state of Nigeria. It was posited that the socio-economic and political factors 
present in the countries played a significant role in creating an environment conducive to the 
formation of extremist groups. The quality of governance can be judged on the way in which 
these factors were dealt with. 
The importance of looking at how governance can affect the emergence of a terrorist group is 
vital in attempting to establish measures to eradicate both terrorism, and the root causes that 
contribute to the development of terrorist groups. This paper identified that it is not only the 
members of each organisation that need to be dealt with, but rather the underlying factors that 
must be addressed to remove any basis, which groups like al-Shabaab and Boko Haram use for 
recruitment.  
This paper makes it clear that with failing or dysfunctional governments, the suppression of 
terrorism cannot be effective without adequately addressing the root causes. Fighting violence 
with violence has proven ineffective, and the two case studies have shown that such tactics have 
backfired, in fact, resulting in more radical and violent behaviour:  
Boko Haram has become more brutal in their assaults, and more brazen in the types of attacks 
they conduct. This can be seen as a direct response to the government’s heavy-handed tactics in 
attempting to deal with the sectarian group. The government’s inability to function properly on a 
socio-political level, or deal with the religious divide that has plagued the country for decades, as 
well as the lack of soft politics in dealing with Boko Haram shows how dysfunctional the 
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leadership is. Indeed, despite the country having the largest economy in Africa, the unequal 
distribution of the wealth creates a lack of social harmony within the country. Although the 
government seems to be dealing with Boko Haram military, the lack of any real alternative other 
than military incursions is of concern in the failing attempts to eradicate terrorism.  
The situation with Al-Shabaab is different. The group, which has been allowed to grow in 
Somalia almost unhindered, seems to be in a more secure position than its Nigerian counterpart. 
The complete lack governance from a central government has allowed al-Shabaab to flourish. 
The constant foreign involvement has proven to be a recruitment tool for al-Shabaab than a 
measure to defeat them. The foreign offensives have done little to curb the extremist group, and 
have, in fact, turned it into a greater regional threat. As with Nigeria, Somalia and the regional 
actors have not sufficiently attempted a soft political approach and any prospect of a peaceful 
future seems remote.  
Al-Shabaab has been vociferous and determined in their attempt to establish Somalia as a 
fundamental Islamic state. The goal has been the usurpation of any form of central government 
and the control of Mogadishu. Boko Haram has a similar goal in Nigeria, to establish an Islamic 
state in northern Nigeria, but their fundamental aims differ. Boko Haram is determined to 
establish an Islamic state, but persists in its aim of annihilation of anything associated with the 
West. Whether it is Western education, or Christianity, the terrorist organisation targets these 
institutions with violence.  
The future seems bleak if the current trajectory continues. Boko Haram’s kidnappings of the 
nearly 300 girls could have a detrimental effect on that group’s future, but will hinge on the 
measures taken by of the Nigerian government and the international actors involved. Al-
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Shabaab’s tactics continue to be a regional threat, especially to Kenya, which has seen an 
upsurge in attacks by the Islamist group. Both dysfunctionality and a collapsed state have proven 
to be enablers in the development of terrorist groups, and it will require great efforts from the 
governments, civil society, and regional and international actors to rectify the socio-economic, 
political, and religious ills that have produced an environment conducive to the formation of 
radical groups. 
Religion, of course, is a significant catalyst in both countries. Fundamentalists have manipulated 
the teachings of Islam and have recruited youths, who have a sense of hopelessness as a result of 
the socio-economic factors referred to in this paper. The key therefore, seems to be to engage 
with the societal ills and the disenfranchised members of the population, in order to provide them 
with basic services before they become disenchanted and turn to terrorist organisations. The 
governing authorities have to engage with all local and divergent groups to avoid the 
marginalisation, which causes such hopelessness. 
The enormous problem of corruption has to be countered. Without corruption, the social and 
economic ills can begin to be addressed. Funds must be re-allocated into regenerating the 
economy for the benefit of the entire population. The AU is hoping to mobilise resources for the 
African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)594 as an interim mechanism until 
the African Standby Force (ASF)595 is formed. These measures of regenerating the economy, 
will of course take time, but the commencement of their implementation should be utilised in a 
soft political approach in order to attempt to de-radicalise the youth and disenchanted and 
marginalised members of the respective societies. These appear to be temporary measures to deal 
594 Doods, C., Call for Rapid Response Force to Fight Terror, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/call-for-rapid-
response-force-to-fight-terror-1.1711116#.U7BG1fmSyoM, 28 June 2014, p. 1. 
595 The ASF is the proposed continental peacekeeping force made up of armies from the five regions of Africa, which 
is to be operational in 2015. 
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with the immediate crisis. The long-term solution, if any, is more complicated, but its 
implementation is the only rational way to attempt to deal with the rise and development of 
terrorism.  
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